COURT FILE NO.: CR-20-70000373-0000 DATE: 20220315 ONTARIO SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
BETWEEN:
HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN – and – ABDIKARIM OMER Defendant
Counsel: Sandra Duffey, for the Crown Abdikarim Omer, on his own behalf Ahmed Absiye, counsel appointed pursuant to s. 486.3 of the Criminal Code
HEARD: February 14 – 18, 22, 2022 Schabas J.
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
NOTE: This case is subject to an order that any information that could identify the victim or a witness shall not be published in any document or broadcast or transmitted in any way.
Introduction
[1] Mr. Omer is charged with having sexually assaulted R.G. on January 3, 2018, contrary to s. 271 of the Criminal Code. His judge-alone trial was held before me, via Zoom, from February 14 to 18, 2022, and closing submissions were heard on February 22, 2022. Mr. Omer represented himself although, as required by s. 486.3 of the Criminal Code, counsel was appointed to conduct the cross-examination of the complainant.
[2] I reserved judgment and now provide my Reasons and verdict below.
Factual Background
[3] The complainant was a 19 year-old university student at the time of the alleged offence. She was in need of money and advertised herself as an escort on a website used by people in the sex industry called “backpages” in the fall of 2017.
[4] The accused, a married man in his 30s at the time, responded to the ad, and they had a number of communications by phone and text messaging. The accused wanted the complainant to confirm that she was bisexual, as his intention was to involve both himself and his wife in sex with the complainant. The accused also connected the complainant with his wife to speak and exchange text messages with her so that they could get comfortable with each other.
[5] The complainant said the terms of a proposed arrangement with the accused changed over time, from the accused offering money, to offering to take the complainant out or take her shopping, to saying he and his wife were looking for a relationship, or friendship, that would include sex. The complainant agreed that the accused said he did not want to be a “client.”
[6] The complainant, although she needed money, saw benefits in a friendship, which would include sex, and provide her with a place to “crash” in Toronto where she did not know anyone. In cross-examination the complainant agreed that she saw the relationship as not just a business relationship but an opportunity to have a friendship, to have fun together, go out together, as well as to engage in sex together. This was largely consistent with the evidence of the accused who said he and his wife welcomed the complainant to their home.
[7] The complainant first met the accused and his wife on the evening of December 28, 2017. They met in a bar and later went to the apartment of the accused and his wife on Don Mills Rd. in Toronto. Prior to meeting, at 5:09 PM that day, the accused sent the complainant an e-transfer of $20 for gas money, as the complainant lived out of town. The complainant did not leave for Toronto until she had received the e-transfer.
[8] That evening, at the apartment, the complainant performed oral sex on the accused’s wife. Evidence of other sexual activity that evening was found to be inadmissible in a pre-trial ruling under s. 276 of the Criminal Code; however, this was revisited during the trial and I ruled, with the consent of all parties (including the complainant who was represented when this issue was revisited), that limited evidence could be adduced that the complainant also performed oral sex on Mr. Omer that evening when he was sitting on the chair in the master bedroom.
[9] The complainant did not spend the night at the apartment. After midnight, at 12:37 AM on December 29, 2017, the accused sent the complainant, by e-transfer, an additional $20 as gas money to get home, and a further $25 was sent to the complainant by the accused at 1:28 AM.
[10] The complainant and the accused’s wife exchanged messages after the first meeting. On January 2, 2018, there was a friendly exchange between them. The complainant suggested they get together and go out and have fun, and she referred to the accused offering to let the complainant stay with them in their apartment if she was ever in Toronto where she might “go clubbing.” The accused’s wife agreed and said “sure. Anytime.” In another text she said, “our place is your place.”
[11] The text messages from the accused’s wife confirm that she and her husband wanted the complainant to come to their apartment on January 2, 2018. On the same day, in another text message exchange between the complainant and the accused’s wife, the complainant asked, “Do you eat pussy?” and the accused’s wife said she had “never tried.” The complainant then referred to the oral sex on December 28, saying: “not sure how I did on you. Probably easier for girls to do it than guys because we know what to look for and stick.”
[12] At 3:01 PM on January 2 the accused e-transferred $30 to the complainant to cover gas and a train ticket to Toronto. According to the complainant the plan was for her to drive to the Oshawa GO station and take a train to Toronto where the accused would meet her, but she missed the train and drove to Toronto. The complainant agreed that she did not leave for Toronto until she received the e-transfer, and probably would not have gone without it. The complainant said that her expectation was to have drinks with the accused and his wife, watch a movie and have some fun having sex.
[13] Upon arriving at the apartment building around 7:30 PM, the accused and his wife pulled up in their car, the complainant got into the backseat and they went to a Shoppers Drug Mart. The accused said they went to buy condoms. The complainant stayed in the car and said she did not know why they went to the drug store, but in cross-examination she said she “assumed” it was for condoms.
[14] The accused testified that he had been to the LCBO earlier where, at the complainant’s request, he had bought her 2 bottles of strawberry wine to drink that night. He also bought a bottle of cognac for himself and a small bottle of vodka for his wife. Following the arrest of the accused, in a search of the apartment the following day, police found two empty bottles of strawberry-flavoured wine, an empty bottle of Courvoisier cognac and a partly empty bottle of vodka in the kitchen.
[15] The accused, his wife and the complainant then went to the apartment and over the next few hours they drank and socialized with one another. The complainant said she drank a bottle and a half of wine over the course of the evening, and although she initially claimed not to remember whether the accused and his wife were drinking, she eventually agreed that they were drinking too, as she had told the police in her statement the following morning. The accused said that, with the exception of a few sips, he drank the full 375 millilitre bottle of cognac during the evening.
[16] At some point after 11:00 PM, they began watching a movie. The complainant and the accused’s wife then got “handsy” and went into the master bedroom to engage in sexual activity together. The accused said this occurred after midnight, after the complainant had asked him to e-transfer money to her for the trip home, which he did at 12:07 AM on January 3, 2018, sending her $20.
[17] The complainant performed oral sex on the accused’s wife in the bedroom and then asked the accused’s wife to do the same to her, which she declined to do and then left the room. During this activity the accused was briefly in the bedroom with them, and said he then watched them through a window when standing on the balcony where he went to smoke a cigarette.
[18] The refusal by Mr. Omer’s wife to perform oral sex on the complainant upset the complainant, something she did not mention in her evidence in-chief but agreed with in cross-examination. Mr. Omer said she looked upset from his vantage point on the balcony, and that after his wife left the room the complainant clenched her fist and threw herself on the bed, something the complainant denied.
[19] According to the complainant, after she and the accused’s wife had finished, the accused came into the bedroom and she started performing oral sex on him. She agreed that this was consensual, although she said she was starting to feel a bit sick from the wine. The complainant expressed some uncertainty about where in the bedroom the oral sex was performed, as she said she had difficulty distinguishing the events of that night with the previous night on December 28; however, she said she knew it was “happening on the bed.”
[20] The accused then made a comment that her vagina “smelled” and asked her to take a shower. This upset the complainant as the accused had previously requested she take a shower after she arrived and she refused, saying that she had showered before she drove there. She said she found the second request hurtful and rude.
[21] The complainant nevertheless took a shower in the bathroom next to the master bedroom, but said she was upset and cried in the shower. She said she was feeling like she was a “piece of meat” and felt she was there for Mr. Omer’s and his wife’s sexual pleasure, not a friendship, as they were not doing anything for her.
[22] She said that after she had showered, Mr. Omer wanted to continue but she said she did not and she went to the living room and told the accused’s wife she was too drunk and did not want to continue. According to the complainant, this upset Mr. Omer and he said that she should leave, to which she said she couldn’t because she was drunk, couldn’t drive and had nowhere to go. The complainant testified that the accused and his wife then said that she should just give the accused a “blow job.” The complainant testified that she and the accused then returned to the bedroom where she performed oral sex on Mr. Omer. The accused’s wife stayed in the living room. At the trial the complainant said she did not want to do this but felt she had no choice.
[23] Following the oral sex, the accused put on a condom and had sexual intercourse with the complainant, who was on her hands and knees on the bed. The accused was behind the complainant. The complainant could not say how their activity evolved from oral sex to sexual intercourse, or how she came to be on her hands and knees. The complainant testified that at first she let the sexual intercourse happen and she slowly slid down onto her stomach. She said she then found that it wasn’t pleasurable and that she told him she didn’t want to do this and that it hurt. She said she said this a few times and was moaning in pain. The complainant testified that the accused put his fingers in her mouth and told her “more than once” to be quiet or to “shut up.”
[24] The accused then ended the sexual intercourse, removed his condom and ejaculated on the complainant’s face. In her direct examination the complainant said she could not recall if she touched the accused after the sexual intercourse happened. However, in cross-examination, after being shown her statement to the police, the complainant agreed that she performed more oral sex on the accused after the intercourse and before he ejaculated on her.
[25] The accused’s account is that after his wife left the bedroom, he left the balcony and returned to the living room and exchanged words with his wife, at which time the complainant came out of the bedroom, naked, and said that it was “his turn” and she led him into the bedroom. The accused said the complainant performed oral sex on the chair in the bedroom, which contradicted the complainant’s evidence, but his evidence then changed when confronted with his affidavit on the s.276 application which said it occurred on the chair and on the bed.
[26] The accused said the complainant then got on her hands and knees to have intercourse but the accused said she had an unpleasant odour and he asked her to take a shower. In his direct evidence the accused said the complainant was okay with him asking her to take a shower, but in cross-examination he said she seemed upset and acted as if he “had asked the world of her.”
[27] Mr. Omer said the complainant then returned to the bedroom after quickly showering, got on her hands and knees where he penetrated her from behind, and that after she went down onto her stomach he found the position uncomfortable and ended the intercourse. He removed his condom, the complainant performed more oral sex on him while he fondled her, and he ejaculated on her. The accused agreed he put his fingers in her mouth during intercourse but said the complainant was sucking them, while he was kissing her on the back of her neck or her cheek. He testified that she never said to stop and seemed to be enjoying the sex.
[28] Mr. Omer’s affidavit on the s. 276 application said that the complainant asked him to get “rough” with her and to slap her, something the complainant denied in cross-examination, saying “not on the 3rd”. Mr. Omer repeated this in his evidence, saying she asked to be slapped, and even bruised. He said he did not slap her and was concerned by this request. He did not tell the police about this. In cross-examination he admitted that she did not ask to be slapped on January 3, saying he had conflated it with what had happened on their previous evening together. I have no evidence of what happened on this point on December 28, and no application was made to adduce such evidence.
[29] Following this sexual activity, the complainant went to the bathroom and washed her face. She then returned to the living room and re-joined the accused and his wife in continuing to watch a movie. The complainant agreed that she went into the living room naked and was asked by the accused to put some clothes on. The accused testified that the complainant seemed annoyed by his request that she put on some clothes, and the complainant agreed in cross-examination that she may have said “why should I put on clothes.” She then put on jogging pants but could not remember if she remained topless or put on a shirt. She put a blanket around herself on the sofa as they continued watching a movie.
[30] The complainant said that she then made several trips to the bathroom where she vomited. She said she believed the accused’s wife knew she was vomiting, but she agreed she did not say so until about 2:00 AM when the accused said he wanted her to do oral sex on him again. When the complainant said she didn’t want to do so, he said she should go home, and an argument ensued as she said she couldn’t leave and had nowhere to go. She is not sure how long it lasted, but eventually the complainant went to another bedroom in the apartment where the accused’s wife had said she could stay the night, and where her overnight bag had been put when she arrived earlier in the evening.
[31] The accused, on the other hand, said that he became increasingly uneasy with the complainant over the course of the evening, due to her excessive and fast drinking (“chugging” the wine from the bottles), her upset over not getting oral sex from his wife, her reaction to being asked to shower, and her return to the living room naked following the sex and her annoyance at being asked to put something on. He said that when he asked for more sex and she said no, he felt uncomfortable and asked her to leave which, he said, caused the complainant to become very upset and she started yelling at them. Mr. Omer then testified that he felt she was dangerous and feared for the safety of his wife and himself.
[32] After going into the other bedroom following the argument, the complainant used her mobile phone to find a number for a crisis hotline. She said she felt hurt and unsafe and that she needed to go somewhere safe. She agreed in cross-examination that she called the crisis line because she was looking for a place to stay, not to report a sexual assault. She could not recall if the person she spoke to suggested a particular shelter or whether she was told to call the police. The complainant spoke to the crisis line for 11 minutes beginning at 2:19 AM, until the accused entered the room at about 2:30 AM, which startled her and she hung up. Mr. Omer was angry and told her to leave. She argued back saying his wife told her she could sleep there. The accused left the room and the complainant called the crisis line back but said there was no answer.
[33] The complainant then began to feel that “something bad had happened to her” and twelve minutes later she called the police, at 2:42 AM. However, she did not call 911. Instead, she took several minutes to find, using her mobile phone, a non-emergency police number. In cross-examination, the complainant said she did not call 911 because, although she felt unsafe, it was not a life or death situation.
[34] Between the end of the call to the crisis line at about 2:30 AM and the call to the police at 2:42 AM, at 2:39 AM the accused rescinded the e-transfer he had made to the complainant at 12:07 AM. The complainant said she was unaware of this cancelled e-transfer until she checked her email the following day.
[35] While she was on the phone with the police the complainant packed her things and left the apartment. She said that the accused followed her into the corridor and spoke to her while she was waiting for the elevator, saying she could stay the night, but she said she was leaving. In cross-examination it was suggested that she was asked by the accused if she would be okay and she said she could not remember what he said.
[36] The complainant then went to the lobby of the building and the police arrived soon after. Although an ambulance came and it was suggested that the ambulance take her to the hospital to do a “rape kit”, the complainant decided to let the police take her to the hospital. She testified that she did not recall being in any physical pain other than from the drinking and was “just very uncomfortable that this had happened to me.”
[37] Mr. Omer suspected the complainant had called the police and heard sirens. He also went to the lobby and met the police there when they arrived. He and his wife agreed to go to the police station where he was charged a couple of hours later.
Legal Principles
[38] My analysis of the evidence in this trial is governed by some fundamental principles of criminal law that apply to all criminal trials.
[39] First, the Crown must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Omer is guilty of the offence charged. This standard is a high one. It is not enough for me to conclude that Mr. Omer is probably guilty. Proof of probable guilt is not proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Although proof beyond a reasonable doubt does not require absolute certainty of guilt, it is closer to certainty than to probable guilt. However, a reasonable doubt is a doubt based on “reason and common sense”, it is not “imaginary or frivolous”, and must be “logically based upon the evidence or lack of evidence”: R. v. Lifchus, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 319 at paras. 30 and 36. In this regard, the Crown need not negative every possible conjecture which might be consistent with the innocence of the accused, nor must a trier of fact examine each fact “piecemeal, applying a standard of proof to each one”, but base the decision “on the evidence as a whole”: R. v. Pham, 2019 ONCA 338 at para. 22.
[40] Any reasonable doubt must be resolved in favour of Mr. Omer.
[41] Secondly, the presumption of innocence stays with Mr. Omer throughout the case. The Crown bears the burden of proving Mr. Omer’s guilt. Mr. Omer must prove nothing. The presumption is only overcome if and when the evidence satisfies the court beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Omer is guilty of the offence charged. The presumption of innocence also means that he does not have to testify, present evidence, or prove anything in this case. Mr. Omer does not have to prove that he is innocent.
[42] In this case, the charge is sexual assault. This requires the Crown to prove each element of the offence beyond a reasonable doubt. To establish the guilt of the accused, the Crown must establish that the accused intentionally touched the complainant in a sexual way without her consent, and that the accused knew that the complainant was not consenting to the sexual touching.
[43] In this case there is no doubt that there was intentional sexual touching, including oral and vaginal sex between the accused and the complainant. The issues are whether the complainant consented to the sex and, if not, whether the accused knew or was reckless as to whether she was not consenting to the sexual activity.
[44] In this case, I have two competing narratives. However, the trial is not a credibility contest between the accused and the complainant. I must make my decision based on the whole of the evidence. I can accept some, none or all of the evidence of any witness.
[45] Nevertheless, the credibility and reliability of the evidence is a critical issue in this case. The complainant and Mr. Omer both testified and gave different accounts of the critical events. In such circumstances, my analysis must be guided by the principles set out in the Supreme Court of Canada’s decision of R. v. W. (D.), [1991] 1 S.C.R. 742, at para. 28. If I believe Mr. Omer’s evidence, I must acquit him. If I do not believe Mr. Omer’s evidence, but am left with a reasonable doubt from it, I must acquit him. Even if I am not left in doubt by Mr. Omer’s evidence, I must still be convinced beyond a reasonable doubt on the basis of all of the evidence that I do accept that Mr. Omer is guilty.
[46] At all times in conducting this analysis I must bear in mind that the burden of proving the charge beyond a reasonable doubt remains on the Crown and never shifts; that I am not to simply choose which version of events is preferred; that it is open to me, as the trier of fact, to conclude that I am unable to decide which version of events to believe; and that there can be a conviction only where the evidence which I accept proves guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
Assessment of the evidence
[47] In assessing and weighing the evidence of the accused and the complainant, I have considered the plausibility of their evidence, whether it was internally and externally consistent, their ability to recall events, the relative completeness of their evidence, their willingness to provide straightforward answers or not, and their explanations for why their evidence may have changed or their lack of recollection.
[48] I begin with the accused. He was subjected to a lengthy cross-examination in which he was impeached several times on inconsistent statements he made to the police, in his affidavit on the s. 276 motion, which he had drafted himself, and during his cross-examination on that motion. The accused often sought to avoid answering straightforward questions and gave long non-responsive and often repetitive answers, repeatedly proclaiming his innocence. The many inconsistencies and the evasive manner in which he testified causes me to conclude that his evidence is neither credible nor reliable.
[49] The inconsistencies in the accused’s testimony and statements include:
- When interviewed by the police the accused said he met the complainant on Instagram, not “backpages.”
- At trial he said that when he was on the balcony he could hear the conversations between his wife and the complainant when they were having sex in the bedroom, which is inconsistent with what he said when cross-examined on the s. 276 motion just a few weeks prior to trial when he testified that he could not hear them.
- The accused did not tell the police about the complainant throwing herself on the bed after the accused’s wife refused to perform oral sex on the complainant, despite this being concerning for the accused.
- The accused was critical of the complainant’s drinking and claimed to be drinking “slowly and responsibly.” However, he consumed almost an entire 375 ml bottle of Courvoisier with 40% alcohol content over the course of 2-3 hours. He also said that he does not drink alcohol any more because of the incident, but later said it was because he was overweight and wanted to take better care of himself.
- In his direct evidence, the accused said that the complainant performed oral sex on him on the chair, a point he continued to make in cross-examination until confronted with his affidavit that said this occurred on the chair and on the bed.
- In his direct evidence, the accused said that the complainant seemed okay with him asking her to take a shower, but in cross-examination he said she seemed upset and acted “as if he had asked the world of her.”
- The accused also said that the complainant asked him to slap her, which he had included in his s. 276 affidavit, and at trial he added that she wanted him to be more “rough” with her and to “bruise” her. But he admitted in cross-examination that this did not happen that night and that she never she used the word “bruise.” This was also not included in the statement to the police.
- The accused’s evidence was inconsistent as to why and when the complainant became upset around 2:00 AM, saying it was because he asked her to have sex again, and then saying it was after he asked her to leave. He also gave conflicting evidence on why he asked her to leave – whether due to her refusal to have sex, or his concern that she was dangerous and that he feared for his safety, or that she was dangerous because he feared she would make what he called a false allegation against him.
- When the complainant was in the other bedroom and on the phone the accused testified that he was telling his wife that he thought she was calling the police, but in his statement to the police he said they were chatting about the errands they had to do the next day.
- It was put to the complainant in cross-examination that when speaking to the police on the phone she yelled “hurry” and ran out of the apartment, as the accused had stated in his s. 276 affidavit. However, at trial, after she denied this and the recording of the call was played which did not disclose any such statement, the accused said she was holding her left hand over her phone and was mouthing the words. The evidence at trial, from both the accused and the complainant was that she did not run out of the apartment. Although she may have left hurriedly, the accused followed her to the elevator and spoke to her there.
- In addition, in his affidavit the accused said he told her to leave when she was telling the police to hurry, but at trial he said he told her she could stay the night.
[50] To the extent that the accused had explanations for these inconsistencies it was to the effect that he had thought about it some more, or that his memory was “refreshed.” In my view, the accused was an unreliable witness and that his testimony lacked credibility. Some of his evidence simply made no sense at all. I do not accept any of it other than where it is consistent with that of the complainant. Accordingly, his evidence does not raise a reasonable doubt that he committed the offence of sexual assault.
[51] I found the complainant, on the other hand, to be a credible and reliable witness. She was responsive to questions and acknowledged that she could not remember certain things. She was candid about what she did, including the consensual sexual acts, and about her communications and expectations of the relationship – that she too wanted a friendship and to enjoy herself as well. Her lack of specific memory of whether she performed oral sex on the accused when he was on the chair or on the bed was explained by her that she had difficulty differentiating what happened on the two different evenings she spent at the apartment. She also said that she was sure they were on the bed, which even Mr. Omer agreed occurred or was “possible.” Although the complainant said she could not recall if she touched the accused after the sexual intercourse happened, after being shown her statement to the police, she agreed that she performed more oral sex on the accused, as she had told the police.
[52] The complainant’s lack of recollection of the drinking by the accused and his wife, was not significant, as she could have said they were drinking heavily, for example, but instead said she wasn’t sure and when taken to her police statement readily agreed that they must have been drinking too. The complainant was open about how much she had to drink, that she was feeling unwell by the time of the sexual activity, and that she was sick to her stomach afterwards.
[53] Although the complainant did not volunteer the information, she did not deny that she was disappointed by the lack of oral sex from the accused’s wife, and did not deny she returned to the living room naked when asked in her examination-in-chief what she was wearing at the time. She could not describe how she came to be on her hands and knees to commence intercourse and said that at first she let it happen, but after it started she said it hurt and she told him to stop. This occurred, it bears repeating, after the complainant had told the accused she did not want to continue with any sex, to which he responded “you can leave”, making her feel that she had no choice.
[54] I put no weight on the fact that the complainant returned to the living room naked following the sexual activity in the bedroom or to her conduct later that night, including the fact she called a crisis line first, and then chose not to call 911 but instead called a non-emergency police number. It is well accepted that victims of trauma such as sexual assault respond in different ways and their conduct should not be judged on the basis of a stereotype of how such a person ought to have reacted: R. v. D.D., 2000 SCC 43 at para. 32; R. v. A.R.J.D., 2018 SCC 6 at para. 2.
[55] Overall, the complainant’s evidence was credible and reliable. The weaknesses in her memory were explained. To the extent her evidence contained any inconsistencies, they were minor and understandable as a result of her intoxication, the trauma of the event, and the passage of time. She acknowledged things that did not reflect well on her and, unlike the accused, she did not have flatly conflicting evidence on any issue. In short, any weaknesses in her evidence did not affect the core of her allegations. Her testimony made sense, was compelling, and I accept it.
[56] The complainant consented to sex prior to the shower; however, as has been observed in many cases, consent can be revoked. A person must be consenting “at the time of the sexual activity”: Criminal Code, s. 273.1(1) and (1.1); R. v. J.A., 2011 SCC 28 at para. 33. It does not matter, therefore, that the complainant came to the apartment that evening willing to have sex and, indeed, engaged in some consensual sex with each of the accused and his wife.
[57] Following the shower, the complainant told the accused and his wife that she did not wish to continue with sex and only did so after they said she could stay if she performed oral sex on Mr. Omer. Consent under duress is not consent. Consent must be voluntary and must be freely given, not given because one had no choice: R. v. Ewanchuk, [1999] 1 S.C.R. 330 at paras. 26-28 (SCC). Furthermore, when the accused commenced sexual intercourse, the complainant told the accused to stop and he did not do so immediately. I conclude, therefore, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the complainant did not consent to the sexual acts with the accused in the master bedroom following the shower.
[58] I also find beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused knew or was reckless that the complainant was not consenting to the sexual acts. I accept that the complainant told the accused and his wife that she did not want to continue, and this put them on notice that she was no longer consenting. Even though she complied with the request to perform oral sex after they said she could stay if she did so, the accused was aware that the complainant was doing this under duress as she had told them she had nowhere to go, and yet he proceeded in any event. At the very least he was reckless as to whether she was consenting. Further, his refusal to stop the sexual intercourse, which went beyond the oral sex suggested in the living room, even after she said to stop, clearly drove home his knowledge of her lack of consent to further sexual activity.
[59] Accordingly, I find the accused guilty as charged.
Paul B. Schabas J.
Released: March 15, 2022