Sandra Elizabeth Duffey

The accused, a nightclub promoter, was charged with two counts of sexual assault involving two different complainants at different nightclubs in 2008.

The Crown applied to admit the evidence of each complainant as similar fact evidence across both counts, which the court dismissed due to insufficient similarity and prejudicial effect.

The court assessed the credibility and reliability of the witnesses, finding the accused's exculpatory evidence contrived and unreliable.

The court found the accused guilty on Count 1, accepting the first complainant's evidence beyond a reasonable doubt.

However, the court acquitted the accused on Count 2, finding a reasonable doubt regarding the second complainant's identification of the accused due to her inability to recall his distinctive tattoos.

The Crown brought a bail review application to vacate a release order for the accused, who was charged with criminal harassment and uttering threats against a former intimate partner.

The court found a material change in circumstances because the original justice of the peace was provided with an incorrect, less serious criminal record.

Conducting a de novo hearing, the court analyzed the 'substantial likelihood' standard for detention on the secondary ground.

Despite the accused's lengthy criminal record, the court concluded the Crown did not meet its burden and ordered the accused released on strict conditions with a surety.

The accused was charged with sexual assault after a stranger grabbed the complainant's buttocks.

The complainant followed the assailant to a convenience store, and police later obtained surveillance video showing the accused in the store.

The court assessed the reliability of the complainant's eyewitness identification, noting several frailties including cross-racial identification, discrepancies in the description of the assailant's build and clothing, and the short duration of observation under stress.

The court found these frailties raised a reasonable doubt about identity and acquitted the accused.

The accused was charged with sexual assault following an incident in which a complainant alleged that a man grabbed her buttocks outside an apartment building on Sherbourne Street in Toronto at approximately 3:30-4:00 a.m.

The complainant followed the alleged assailant to a convenience store and identified him on surveillance video.

The Crown relied primarily on the complainant's eyewitness identification.

The court acquitted the accused, finding that despite the complainant's detailed account and her absolute certainty, the cumulative frailties of her evidence, including inconsistencies regarding the assailant's build, the colour and design of his t-shirt, and the inherent dangers of eyewitness identification evidence, left the court in reasonable doubt as to the accused's identity as the perpetrator.

The defendant was charged with assault following a physical altercation with a teenage girl on a downtown Toronto street.

The defendant had directed offensive words at the girl and two of her friends, both of whom were wearing hijabs.

The Crown alleged the defendant initiated both the verbal and physical confrontation.

The defendant claimed the physical altercation was a consensual fight that began when the complainant punched him first.

The court found that while the defendant's credibility was questionable, his evidence raised a reasonable doubt as to who first applied force.

The court concluded the incident constituted a consensual fight rather than an assault and acquitted the defendant.

The accused brought an application for a stay of proceedings pursuant to s. 11(b) of the Charter, alleging a breach of his right to trial within a reasonable time.

The charges were impaired driving and "Over 80." The gross delay from the laying of the Information on July 18, 2016 to the projected conclusion of trial on November 6, 2018 was 27 months and 20 days.

After deducting defence delay and delay attributable to exceptional circumstances, the remaining delay was 22.25 months, exceeding the presumptive ceiling of 18 months for provincial court by 4.25 months.

The court found the case was not particularly complex and granted the application, staying the charges.

The defendant was charged with driving with excess blood alcohol contrary to section 253(1)(b) of the Criminal Code after his vehicle went into a ditch on a rural road.

The trial addressed three key issues: whether the defendant was in care or control of the motor vehicle; whether police had lawful grounds to make demands under section 254 of the Criminal Code; and whether breath tests were taken as soon as practicable.

The court found that the defendant was in care or control, the police had lawful grounds for their demands, and the breath tests were taken as soon as practicable.

The defendant was convicted.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 mg per 100 ml of blood and operating a motor vehicle while impaired by alcohol.

The accused brought a Charter application alleging violations of sections 8, 9, and 10(b) of the Charter.

The court found no section 8 or 9 violation, as the officer reasonably believed the approved screening device was functioning properly.

However, the court found a section 10(b) violation when police refused to permit the accused to contact a third party to obtain a lawyer's name and contact information.

Applying the section 24(2) test, the court admitted the breath samples, finding that exclusion would not be necessary to maintain public confidence in the administration of justice.

The accused was found guilty on both charges.

The defendant was charged with driving with excess blood alcohol concentration contrary to section 253(1)(b) of the Criminal Code following a RIDE programme stop.

Three issues emerged at trial: whether the defendant's section 8 Charter right against unreasonable search and seizure was violated by an improper breath demand; whether the defendant's section 10(a) Charter right to be informed of the charge was breached; and whether the breath tests were taken as soon as practicable.

The court found that the officer failed to follow mandatory protocols established by the Ontario Provincial Police regarding the reliability of the approved screening device, specifically failing to eliminate the possibility of false positives from sugary foods and beverages and failing to conduct required self-tests.

The court concluded that the officer's reliance on the screening test result was unreasonable, constituting a breach of the defendant's section 8 Charter right.

The breath test results were excluded as a remedy, resulting in a verdict of not guilty.

The defendant was charged with impaired operation of a motor vehicle and operating a motor vehicle with an excess blood alcohol concentration.

The Crown called two police witnesses: the arresting officer and a qualified technician who conducted breath analysis.

The defendant testified and introduced photographic evidence regarding her vehicle's colour.

The defendant conceded the excess blood alcohol concentration charge but contested the impaired operation charge.

The court found the defendant guilty of operating a motor vehicle with excess blood alcohol concentration but acquitted her of the impaired operation charge, finding insufficient evidence that her ability to operate the vehicle was impaired despite her elevated blood alcohol level.

The accused was charged with driving with excess blood alcohol concentration.

Following a trial, the court dismissed Charter applications regarding the right to counsel and the lawfulness of the screening test process.

The accused was found guilty of driving with an illegal blood alcohol concentration of 130 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood, which was 50 milligrams over the legal limit.

The court imposed a sentence of a $1,200 fine plus a $360 victim surcharge (total $1,560) payable within one year, and a one-year driving prohibition.

The court noted the accused's youth, education, lack of criminal record, and strong family support as mitigating factors, but emphasized the seriousness of the offense and the high blood alcohol reading.

The accused was charged with two counts of sexual abuse of a child under 16 years of age: touching the complainant with his hand for a sexual purpose contrary to section 151 of the Criminal Code, and inviting the complainant to touch his penis contrary to section 152 of the Criminal Code.

The complainant testified that the accused, a family friend, engaged in a pattern of escalating sexual touching during vehicle rides over approximately two years when she was between 7 and 8 years old.

The accused denied all allegations.

The court found the complainant credible and accepted her evidence, finding the Crown proved the first count beyond a reasonable doubt.

However, the court found insufficient evidence to prove the second count, as the complainant did not establish that the accused invited her to touch his penis specifically.

The accused was convicted on count one and acquitted on count two.