Sandra Caponecchia

The Crown applied for an order permitting a key witness to testify remotely from an undisclosed location during a preliminary inquiry into a first-degree murder charge.

The witness, who was the girlfriend of one of the accused and had direct knowledge of the defendants' conduct at the scene, had received an anonymous threatening message and reported being followed.

The defence opposed the application, arguing that the right to confront witnesses would be compromised and that alternative protective measures were available.

The court granted the application, finding that the witness's fears were genuine and reasonable, and that the legislative amendments to section 486.2 of the Criminal Code lowered the threshold for such orders from "necessary" to "facilitate."

The appellant appealed her conviction for permitting an uninsured motor vehicle to be operated contrary to the Compulsory Automobile Insurance Act.

The vehicle was driven by her domestic partner without her explicit permission while the insurance had expired.

The trial judge convicted her on the basis that she failed to exercise due diligence.

On appeal, the court upheld the conviction, finding that the appellant's implied consent to the driver's use of the vehicle was established by circumstantial evidence, including their domestic relationship, shared residence, shared child, the driver's history of sporadic use of the vehicle, and the accessible location of the keys.

However, the court allowed the sentence appeal and reduced the fine from $7,500 to $3,500, finding the original sentence was unfit given the appellant's lower moral culpability compared to deliberate offenders and the absence of aggravating factors.

The appellant appealed a conviction entered in his absence under section 9.1(1) of the Provincial Offences Act for failing to stop at an amber light contrary to section 144(15) of the Highway Traffic Act.

The appellant did not appear at trial on July 25, 2018, and was deemed not to dispute the charge.

The appellant argued the Certificate of Offence was a nullity because his address was recorded incorrectly.

The court dismissed the appeal, finding that the address was surplusage and that the certificate contained all essential information necessary for the appellant to make an informed decision about how to respond to the charge.

The accused was charged with "over 80" and impaired operation of a motor vehicle following an accident in Brampton.

The Crown sought to rely on three sets of statements made by the accused to police and a breath technician.

The defence challenged the admissibility of all statements under section 7 of the Charter, arguing they were obtained in violation of the accused's rights.

The court conducted a voir dire to determine admissibility.

The court found that only the accused's spontaneous remarks to himself in the police cruiser were admissible.

All other statements were excluded because they were made under an honest and reasonably held belief that the accused had a statutory duty to report the accident.

Without the excluded statements, the Crown could not establish the identity of the driver beyond a reasonable doubt.

The accused was acquitted.

The accused was charged with "over 80" (operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood).

The defence raised two arguments: (1) a Charter section 11(b) right to trial within a reasonable time, and (2) that the breath samples were not taken as soon as practicable.

The court found that the net delay after deducting defence-caused delay was 9 months and 22 days, below the presumptive ceiling of 18 months for Ontario Court of Justice cases.

The defence failed to demonstrate sustained efforts to expedite the proceedings or that the case took markedly longer than it reasonably should have.

The court also found that the breath samples were taken as soon as practicable within the circumstances, with all delays adequately explained or reasonable.

The accused was found guilty.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle with excess blood alcohol in his body.

The Crown presented evidence of a traffic stop where the accused was observed swerving within his lane, and the officer detected the smell of alcohol.

The accused provided breath samples showing readings of 140 mg of alcohol per 100ml of blood.

The defence raised three issues: inadequate notice of the Certificate of the Qualified Breath Technician, non-compliance with section 254(2) of the Criminal Code regarding the ASD demand, and an alleged section 8 Charter breach.

The court found that reasonable notice had been established, that the officer had the requisite suspicion to make the ASD demand based on the totality of evidence, and that no Charter breach occurred.

The accused was found guilty.

The accused, charged with three counts of breach of probation, brought an application alleging a violation of his right to be tried within a reasonable time under s. 11(b) of the Charter.

The accused failed to attend his trial date, leading the court to conclude he was disinterested in exercising his s. 11(b) rights.

Furthermore, the court calculated the net delay to be below the presumptive ceiling established in Jordan, finding that the pre-arrest delay constituted a discrete event due to the accused's unknown whereabouts and the police's reasonable diligence in attempting to locate him.

The application was dismissed.

The accused was charged with three counts of breach of probation for allegedly contacting his wife and children in violation of probation orders.

The first allegation occurred on July 7, 2014, but the information was not sworn until July 21, 2017.

The accused was arrested on March 11, 2017.

The accused brought a section 11(b) Charter motion arguing his right to be tried within a reasonable time had been violated.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that while the total delay exceeded the Jordan presumptive ceiling of 18 months, the pre-arrest delay qualified as a discrete event attributable to exceptional circumstances, as the police acted with reasonable diligence in attempting to locate the accused.

Additionally, the accused's failure to appear at trial demonstrated he was not genuinely exercising his 11(b) rights.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 mg per 100 ml of blood (over 80) following a motor vehicle collision.

The Crown relied on breath samples obtained at the police station.

The defence challenged the admissibility of the breath samples on grounds of breaches of sections 7, 8, and 10(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The court found no breach of section 7 regarding the accused's initial admission of being the driver, as he was neither physically nor psychologically detained at the scene and did not establish statutory compulsion.

However, the court found breaches of both section 8 (unreasonable search and seizure) and section 10(b) (right to counsel).

The section 8 breach arose from the officer's failure to verify that the approved screening device had been properly calibrated and maintained.

The section 10(b) breach occurred when the officer failed to facilitate the accused's access to counsel of choice and instead unilaterally directed him to duty counsel.

The court excluded the breath samples pursuant to section 24(2) of the Charter, finding that the seriousness of the breaches and their impact on Charter-protected interests outweighed society's interest in adjudication on the merits.

An applicant sought to terminate his Sex Offender Information Registration Act (SOIRA) registration order after serving 11 years of a 20-year mandatory registration requirement.

The applicant had pleaded guilty to sexual interference involving his step-daughter between ages 9 and 14, with over 50 sexual encounters occurring over time.

The applicant argued that the impact of continued registration, including stress, anxiety, and fear of disclosure, was grossly disproportionate to the public interest.

The Crown opposed termination.

The court applied the statutory test under section 490.016(1) of the Criminal Code and rejected the application, finding that the applicant failed to meet the high threshold of demonstrating gross disproportionality between the impact on the offender and the public interest in protecting society through effective prevention and investigation of sexual offences.

The accused was charged with "Over 80" (operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration in excess of the legal limit).

The sole issue was whether the accused's Charter rights under s. 10(b) (right to counsel) were breached.

The accused requested to speak with her lawyer of choice, Karl Toews.

Police made six attempts to contact him over 45 minutes during business hours but were unsuccessful.

Police offered the accused the option of contacting another lawyer or duty counsel, which she declined.

The court found no breach of s. 10(b) rights because the accused failed to exercise reasonable diligence in exercising her right to counsel by declining the offer of free legal aid duty counsel.

The court distinguished the case from precedents where accused persons had been found to be duly diligent.

The accused was convicted.

The accused was charged with impaired driving and over 80 on March 19, 2016.

The accused brought a section 11(b) Charter application for a stay of proceedings on the third trial date, alleging unreasonable delay.

The first trial date did not proceed due to lack of judicial resources (no per diem judge available).

The second trial date was adjourned because a Crown witness was unavailable due to a booked vacation.

The court calculated the net delay at 17 months and 8 days, which fell below the 18-month presumptive ceiling established in R. v. Jordan.

The court found that the accused failed to demonstrate sustained efforts to expedite proceedings and that the case did not take markedly longer than reasonably expected.

The section 11(b) application was dismissed.