Ryan A. Morris

An insured brought an action against international insurers for breach of an insurance contract.

The insurers moved to stay the action and refer the dispute to arbitration in London, England pursuant to an arbitration clause in the policy.

The motion judge dismissed the stay motion, finding that the "Action Against Insurer" endorsement provided an alternative method of dispute resolution allowing domestic court proceedings.

The appellate court reversed, holding that the arbitration clause was mandatory and the sole method of dispute resolution, and that the "Action Against Insurer" clause was a service of suit provision that did not conflict with the arbitration clause.

The court also clarified that the Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration applies to agreements providing for arbitration of certain disputes, not only those providing for arbitration as the sole method of dispute resolution.

The defendants brought a motion to stay the plaintiff's action based on a mandatory arbitration clause in the base trade credit insurance policy.

The plaintiff opposed the motion, relying on a Canadian endorsement that permitted an action against the insurer in Canada and stated that endorsements prevail in the event of a conflict.

The court found that the contract, read as a whole, provided alternative methods for dispute resolution and that the endorsement prevailed over the base policy's arbitration clause.

The motion to stay the action was dismissed.

The defendants brought a motion to quash the plaintiff's motion for certification of a common law misrepresentation claim, arguing that the court was functus officio, the motion was res judicata, or it constituted an abuse of process.

The court granted the defendants' motion, finding that the preferability of a stand-alone common law misrepresentation claim had already been determined and rejected in a prior certification decision.

This prior determination, which was not appealed, barred re-litigation of the issue under the doctrines of issue estoppel or abuse of process.

However, the court allowed the plaintiff to bring a motion under s. 7 of the Class Proceedings Act, 1992, to continue the action as an opt-in joinder proceeding for class members with significant claims.

The Court addressed three securities class action appeals on whether limitation periods for statutory secondary-market misrepresentation claims are suspended before leave is granted, and on related nunc pro tunc, special circumstances, leave-threshold, and certification issues.

The CIBC and IMAX appeals were dismissed, while the Celestica appeal was allowed.

The plaintiffs brought a motion for certification of a class proceeding and for leave to proceed with statutory claims for misrepresentation under the Securities Act against Celestica Inc. and its former executives.

The plaintiffs alleged misrepresentations regarding a 2005 restructuring, inventory, revenue, and GAAP compliance.

The court granted leave and certified the class action solely with respect to the alleged misrepresentations about the 2005 restructuring, finding a reasonable possibility of success.

Leave and certification were denied for the inventory, revenue, and GAAP claims due to a lack of evidentiary foundation.

The court also declined to certify the common law negligent misrepresentation claim, finding it did not satisfy the preferable procedure criterion.

The defendants brought a motion under Rule 59.06(1) of the Rules of Civil Procedure to amend a previously issued and entered order arising from a Rule 21 motion in a proposed securities class action.

The original order dismissed the defendants’ motion to strike claims under Part XXIII.1 of the Securities Act but failed to reflect the judge’s reasoning that the special circumstances doctrine permitted leave to be granted nunc pro tunc despite the expiry of the statutory limitation period.

The court held that the omission of this conclusion from the formal order was an oversight and that Rule 59.06(1) permits amendment where the order does not accurately express the court’s manifest intention as reflected in the reasons for decision.

The court rejected arguments that the requested amendment was premature or an improper reconsideration of the earlier ruling.

The order was amended to include the finding regarding the special circumstances doctrine.

The defendants brought a motion to strike portions of the plaintiffs' proposed class action statement of claim, arguing that the statutory cause of action under Part XXIII.1 of the Securities Act was statute-barred because the plaintiffs did not obtain leave before the expiry of the three-year limitation period.

The court held that the common law special circumstances doctrine applies to the limitation period in the Securities Act, giving the court jurisdiction to make an order nunc pro tunc granting leave.

The court found special circumstances existed because the defendants had known of the claims since 2007 and suffered no prejudice.

The motion to strike the statutory claims was dismissed, but the common law negligent misrepresentation claim was struck with leave to amend for failing to plead detrimental reliance.