R. Pomerance

The self-represented moving party sought review of a motion judge's decision dismissing his motion to extend time to appeal a Superior Court order that had itself declined to extend time for him to appeal a default order in a support enforcement proceeding.

The panel applied the deferential standard requiring an error in law or misapprehension of material evidence before intervening.

Finding no such error, the panel upheld the motion judge's refusal of the extension, which was based on the proposed appeal being manifestly without merit and an abuse of process.

The panel noted that concerns regarding incarceration, support payment history, and arrears calculation had been previously decided and upheld on appeal, and could not be addressed through the proposed appeal in the context of a support enforcement proceeding.

The appellant appealed summary judgment dismissing the claim against a homeowner arising from a serious dog bite injury at the property.

The Court of Appeal held that the respondent, who owned the house but lived abroad and did not know her brother was residing there with the dogs, was neither an owner for purposes of the Dog Owners' Liability Act nor vicariously liable through agency principles.

The court found no evidence that the respondent consented to her brother acting on her behalf or represented that he had authority to do so.

The appeal was dismissed and costs of $10,000 all inclusive were awarded to the respondent.

A payment processing company appealed sanctions imposed after it was found in civil contempt for repeatedly obstructing a court-ordered audit obtained by mandatory injunction under a commercial services agreement.

The appellant argued the penalties were disproportionate, challenged the direction to pay audit costs into court, and sought leave to appeal the contempt-motion costs order.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding the arguments depended on unappealed factual findings that the appellant intentionally obstructed the audit and that no basis existed to interfere with the sanctions or the costs order.

The court allowed the cross-appeal, holding that r. 60.11(6) of the Rules of Civil Procedure is not confined to cases where the officer or director has already been found personally in contempt, and remitted the issue of joint and several liability of the sole officer and director for redetermination.

The appellant Ministry of Transportation appealed a summary judgment dismissing its action against a contractor as statute-barred.

The parties' standard form construction contract required a notice of protest and alternative dispute resolution to be completed within two years of contract completion.

However, the referee's decision was not released until after this two-year period expired.

The Court of Appeal held that the motion judge erred in interpreting the contract; it is commercially absurd to require a party to protest a decision before it is released.

Because the contractual limitation period could not apply, the statutory two-year limitation period governed, and the appellant's action was commenced in time.

The appeal was allowed and the summary judgment set aside.

The appellant municipality appealed a Divisional Court order that quashed an Ontario Land Tribunal decision assuming jurisdiction over a dispute regarding a municipal servicing agreement.

The Court of Appeal held that the Tribunal's decision was interlocutory, as it only assumed jurisdiction on a prima facie basis and deferred the final determination of forum to the Superior Court.

Because the Ontario Land Tribunal Act only permits appeals of final decisions, the Divisional Court lacked jurisdiction to hear the appeal.

The appeal was allowed and the Tribunal's order was restored.

The appellant was convicted of sexual assault following a home invasion at a university residence and sentenced to nine years' imprisonment.

On appeal, he argued the trial judge erred in jury selection, misdirected the jury on reasonable doubt, and that the verdict was unreasonable.

He also appealed his sentence, arguing the trial judge misapprehended an expert opinion on his likelihood of re-offending.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no errors in the trial judge's jury screening or instructions, and upheld the sentence as eminently fit given the gravity of the offence and the appellant's extensive criminal record.

The appellant appealed his jury convictions for sexual assault and assault against his spouse.

He argued the trial judge erred by failing to give a limiting instruction regarding evidence of his controlling behaviour and by failing to caution against cross-count reasoning.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the contextual evidence was relevant to the issue of consent and that a cross-count reasoning caution was unnecessary because the physical and sexual assaults were inextricably linked.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual interference following a jury trial.

At trial, the Crown argued in closing that the self-represented appellant's lack of romantic relationships provided a motive for the offences, characterizing him as a 'sexual opportunist'.

The trial judge included this theory of motive in the jury charge.

The Court of Appeal held that this evidence was irrelevant, prejudicial, and unfair, as it invited impermissible reasoning and the appellant was never cross-examined on it.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction set aside, and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence for sexual assault.

The trial judge had accepted the seven-year-old complainant's evidence despite inconsistencies, relying on the child's description of the assault and his subsequent protective behaviour.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no misapplication of the law and holding that the trial judge's credibility findings were entitled to deference.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the trial judge made no error in principle.

The appellant was convicted of second-degree murder following a fatal stabbing during an altercation.

At trial, he relied on self-defence and the partial defence of provocation.

During deliberations, the jury asked several questions seeking clarification on the elements of provocation, specifically the meaning of 'sudden' and 'sufficient'.

The trial judge's answers failed to adequately clarify the issues and amounted to misdirection regarding what conduct had to be sudden.

The Court of Appeal found the answers deficient, allowed the appeal, and ordered a new trial.

The appellant sought to certify a class action against the municipality for property damage caused by pinhole leaks in copper plumbing, allegedly resulting from the addition of sodium hydroxide to the municipal water supply.

The motion judge certified the negligence claim but struck the nuisance claim, finding it barred by s. 449 of the Municipal Act, 2001, which precludes nuisance claims related to the escape of water from water works.

The Court of Appeal upheld the decision, agreeing that the nuisance claim was plainly and obviously barred by the ordinary meaning of the statute.

The Court also dismissed the appellant's argument that a breach of contract claim should have been certified, as it was not argued before the motion judge.

The appellant was convicted of importing opium after drugs were found in his luggage upon returning from India.

He appealed his conviction, arguing the trial judge erred in her jury instructions regarding his unrecorded out-of-court statements to police, the Crown's comments on his right to silence, and the scope of the W.(D.) instruction.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the jury instructions were functionally adequate, properly cautioned the jury on the right to silence, and correctly conveyed how to apply the burden of proof to the evidence as a whole.

The appellants, limited partners in a family-owned limited partnership, appealed the dismissal of their application seeking a declaration that they were entitled to an annual cash distribution of 100% of the partnership's net income.

They argued that section 11(1) of the Limited Partnerships Act and the Accumulations Act mandated such distributions, overriding the general partner's discretion under the limited partnership agreement.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the right to a 'share' of profits under the Act does not equate to a statutory obligation to make annual payments, and that the Accumulations Act does not apply to commercial endeavours.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment awarding the respondent $1,191,727.94 for a defaulted mortgage.

The appellant argued she was denied a fair hearing because her visual impairment was not adequately accommodated.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, noting the appellant had previously been granted two adjournments and did not request a further adjournment based on her disability at the hearing.

The motion judge's decision finding no triable issues was upheld.

The appellant appealed his convictions for firearm-related offences, arguing the trial judge erred in dismissing his Charter challenge to the search warrant for his home.

The appellant contended there were no reasonable grounds to believe the firearm seen in a video would be found in his home or car.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the issuing justice could reasonably infer as a matter of common sense that the appellant would store the firearm in a comparatively private location like his home or car, given he did not know he had been videotaped with it four days earlier.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual interference, sexual exploitation, sexual assault, and uttering a threat, arguing the trial judge made three errors in the jury charge.

The appellant contended the trial judge failed to provide a Villaroman instruction regarding circumstantial evidence, failed to instruct on a motive to fabricate, and failed to instruct that the accused did not have to explain the complainant's motives.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that a Villaroman instruction was not required as the case was not wholly or substantially circumstantial, and that the trial judge properly instructed the jury on the burden of proof without reversing it.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment that dismissed their claims of substantial interference with an easement and nuisance against the respondents, while granting a permanent injunction preventing parking in the right-of-way tunnel.

The respondents cross-appealed the scope of the parking injunction.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both appeals, finding no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's interpretation of the easement, application of the substantial interference test, or the tailored scope of the parking injunction.

The trial judge's costs award was also upheld.

The appellant appealed his convictions for assault, assault with a weapon, and unlawful confinement against his former domestic partner.

He argued the trial judge erred by dismissing his s. 11(b) Charter application, failing to screen a juror for bias under s. 632 of the Criminal Code, refusing a mistrial after the complainant mentioned he had been in jail, and inadequately instructing the jury on discreditable conduct.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge properly deducted pandemic-related delay, the jury selection process did not result in prejudice, the mid-trial instruction cured any prejudice from the jail reference, and the jury instructions on discreditable conduct were adequate.

The appellants appealed a summary judgment finding them liable for breach of an agreement of purchase and sale for a residential property.

The appellants argued that the agreement never became binding because the respondent accepted an extension offer one day late.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the motion judge's finding that the appellants elected to treat the contract as ongoing by subsequently waiving conditions, paying a second deposit, and engaging in conduct consistent with a binding agreement.

The expectation damages award of $142,757.89 was upheld.

The appellant and respondent, adult siblings, were named co-estate trustees of their father's estate.

Disagreements arose over the payment of estate debts, leading to a breakdown in the administration of the estate.

The application judge removed the appellant as estate trustee, finding she had obstructed the estate's administration and preferred her own interests, while dismissing the application to remove the respondent.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the application judge's discretionary decision and concluding that the appellant's arguments regarding the law of abatement were an ex post facto rationalization for her conduct.