Eric Brousseau

The appellants, limited partners in a family-owned limited partnership, appealed the dismissal of their application seeking a declaration that they were entitled to an annual cash distribution of 100% of the partnership's net income.

They argued that section 11(1) of the Limited Partnerships Act and the Accumulations Act mandated such distributions, overriding the general partner's discretion under the limited partnership agreement.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the right to a 'share' of profits under the Act does not equate to a statutory obligation to make annual payments, and that the Accumulations Act does not apply to commercial endeavours.

The defendants sought costs following a successful summary judgment motion that dismissed the plaintiff's action based on a prior settlement and release.

The release stipulated that any party breaching it would be liable for costs on a 'solicitor and his own client scale.' The court held that this phrase is synonymous with full indemnity costs, distinguishing prior case law that equated it with substantial indemnity costs.

The court awarded full indemnity costs, fixing them at $70,235.52 for one defendant and $110,000 for the other two defendants, reducing the latter's claim due to overstaffing.

The plaintiff, a co-founder of 1PLUS12, brought an action against numerous defendants, including the corporation's lawyers and investors, alleging a Ponzi scheme and claiming unpaid compensation.

Several groups of defendants brought motions to strike the statement of claim under Rules 21.01 and 25.11 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The court struck the plaintiff's affidavit and the claims against the investors, finding the plaintiff lacked standing to advance claims on their behalf.

The court also struck certain scandalous and irrelevant paragraphs from the pleadings.

However, the court dismissed the motions to strike the entirety of the claims against the defendant lawyers and law firms, finding it was not plain and obvious that the claims for negligence and misrepresentation would fail.

The plaintiffs and the defendant Robert Langlois entered into a joint venture to operate a powder-coating business, ACS.

Mr. Langlois licensed his powder-coating know-how and expertise to ACS.

Before ACS generated any revenue, Mr. Langlois secretly formed a competing business, PCS, with the defendants Jeffrey Sugar and Gary Sugar.

Mr. Langlois diverted corporate opportunities, including a lucrative powder-coating contract, to PCS and later to VML.

The plaintiffs sued for breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty, and knowing assistance.

The court found that Mr. Langlois breached the Licence Agreement and his fiduciary duties by misappropriating corporate opportunities.

The court also found that Jeffrey Sugar and Gary Sugar knowingly assisted in these breaches.

The court ordered disgorgement of profits and repayment of loans and expenses, holding the defendants jointly and severally liable.

The moving parties, six limited partners holding 54.5% of the shares in a family limited partnership, sought leave to commence a derivative action on behalf of the limited partnership and related corporate entities against the general partner, its sole director, and other parties.

The court held that while there is no statutory right for limited partners to bring a derivative action under the Limited Partnerships Act, the common law fraud exception to the rule in Foss v. Harbottle permits such an action where the general partner is the alleged wrongdoer.

Leave was granted to bring the derivative action on behalf of the limited partnership against the general partner and its director, but denied against third parties and on behalf of the underlying corporate entities.

The defendants brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiff's action.

The plaintiff claimed a 50% equitable interest in a real estate property based on an oral joint venture agreement, while the defendants argued the relationship was strictly that of borrower and lender secured by promissory notes and a mortgage.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the conflicting evidence regarding the nature of the parties' relationship raised significant credibility issues that constituted a genuine issue requiring a full trial.

The plaintiff sought costs after successfully resisting the defendants' motions to strike and for summary judgment.

The court awarded the plaintiff $7,500 in costs for the motion to strike.

However, the court denied the plaintiff costs for the summary judgment motion because the plaintiff's principal sent an improper email threatening the defendants with criminal charges to extort a settlement.

The applicants sought to enforce two letters rogatory issued by the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia to compel documentary and oral evidence from the respondent, a non-party in the underlying U.S. patent infringement litigation.

The respondent opposed, arguing the requests were overly broad, moot due to discovery deadlines, and contrary to public policy as they sought proprietary source codes.

The court granted the applications, enforcing the letters rogatory but narrowing their scope and imposing protective conditions, including compliance with a supplemental protective order and the deemed undertaking rule.

The applicant tenant brought an application for the return of moneys held by the respondent landlord following the end of a commercial lease.

The landlord claimed the tenant owed occupancy costs, utilities, and damages for move-out deficiencies.

The court found the landlord's accounting unreliable, as it was uncertified, inconsistent, and relied on hearsay evidence.

The court ordered the landlord to return $49,906.00 to the tenant, representing the funds held less conceded unpaid rent.

Claims by both parties for additional damages were dismissed due to insufficient evidence and the lack of a cross-application by the landlord.

The plaintiff purchased a commercial property from the defendants.

After closing, the plaintiff discovered that the version of a commercial lease provided by the defendants prior to closing was allegedly incorrect, and that the true lease obligated the landlord, rather than the tenant, to repair the roof.

The defendants brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiff's claims for misrepresentation and breach of contract, arguing the plaintiff had already negotiated a price abatement for the roof and did not rely on the lease.

The court dismissed the motion, finding a genuine issue requiring a trial regarding whether the plaintiff lost the opportunity to seek contribution from the tenant based on the incorrect lease provided.

The plaintiff purchaser brought a motion for judgment against the defendant vendors for breach of an agreement of purchase and sale for seven apartment buildings.

The defendants failed to discharge mortgages on title prior to closing, breaching the agreement.

The plaintiff sought damages for sunk costs and over $56 million for lost capital appreciation, based on the defendants' subsequent sale of the properties 2.5 years later.

The court awarded the sunk costs but dismissed the claim for lost profits, holding that damages must be assessed at the closing date and that the plaintiff, an international real estate investor, had mitigated its losses by deploying its funds elsewhere.

Following a successful summary judgment motion dismissing the plaintiffs' action, the successful defendant sought costs of $25,000 to $30,000 on a substantial indemnity basis, relying on an expired offer to settle.

The plaintiffs argued for costs in the range of $10,000 to $15,000.

The court found that substantial indemnity costs were not justified as the offer to settle had expired long before the motion and the case raised important issues for the plaintiffs.

The court awarded the defendant costs on a partial indemnity scale in the amount of $23,376.43.

The defendant, a second mortgagee, brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiffs' action alleging an improvident sale of a property under a power of sale.

The plaintiffs, who held a third mortgage, received nothing from the sale and claimed the defendant failed to obtain fair market value and inflated costs.

The court found that the sale was not improvident, noting the property had been recently exposed to the market, the sale price was supported by appraisals, and the purchaser was ready and willing to close.

The court also held that the plaintiffs had already received an accounting and any further dispute regarding costs should be pursued through the assessment process under the Mortgages Act.

The motion for summary judgment was granted and the action dismissed.

The plaintiffs brought an action in defamation against the defendant, a former union member, for publishing numerous derogatory posts and videos online.

The plaintiffs moved for summary judgment, and the defendant brought a cross-motion to dismiss the action under the anti-SLAPP provisions of the Courts of Justice Act.

The court held that an anti-SLAPP motion can be heard concurrently with a summary judgment motion.

The court dismissed the anti-SLAPP motion, finding that while the expression related to a matter of public interest, the harm suffered by the plaintiffs outweighed the public interest in protecting the expression.

The court granted the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment, finding the posts defamatory and malicious, and awarded a permanent injunction and costs.

The accused, charged with making, circulating, or publishing a false prospectus contrary to s. 400 of the Criminal Code, brought a motion for a directed verdict after the Crown closed its case.

The accused argued there was insufficient evidence that she knew the prospectus contained a material misrepresentation regarding a $20 million private placement, or that she actively circulated it.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the circumstantial evidence—including her role as a founding member, her signing of the prospectus, and her failure to act when informed of severe financial discrepancies—was reasonably capable of supporting an inference of guilt by a properly instructed jury.

The court held that the limited weighing of circumstantial evidence on a directed verdict motion does not permit the judge to resolve competing inferences, which remains the province of the jury.

The self-represented applicant, facing serious fraud-related charges in a lengthy jury trial, suffered a severe cardiac event during the trial.

Medical evidence from his cardiologists indicated a 100% blockage of a main artery and recommended two to three months of rest to avoid a potentially fatal heart attack.

The court granted the motion for a mistrial, finding that continuing the trial posed a serious risk to the applicant's health and his ability to make full answer and defence.

The applicant agreed to waive any s. 11(b) Charter arguments arising from the delay.

Les requérants, accusés de fraude et de parjure, ont présenté une motion en vertu de l'alinéa 11(b) de la Charte pour obtenir un arrêt des procédures en raison de délais déraisonnables.

Le délai total anticipé entre le dépôt des accusations et la fin du procès était de plus de 50 mois.

Après avoir déduit les délais imputables à la défense, le délai net dépassait le plafond de 30 mois établi par l'arrêt Jordan.

La Cour a conclu que le dossier était d'une complexité particulière justifiant les délais excédentaires, compte tenu du volume de la preuve, du nombre de témoins, de la tenue d'un procès conjoint et bilingue devant jury, et de la nature des accusations.

La motion a été rejetée.

The applicants sought to stay a Notice of Arbitration delivered by the respondent regarding an oppression claim, arguing that the dispute involved a non-party to the arbitration agreement and shared factual underpinnings with an ongoing court action.

The court found that while the non-party issue was not a roadblock to arbitration, there was a real danger of overlapping evidence and inconsistent findings of fact between the arbitration and the ongoing action.

The court granted the stay, ordering all matters to proceed in the Superior Court of Justice.

In CCAA proceedings involving a payday lending enterprise, class members in Ontario consumer class actions moved for approval of three settlement agreements forming part of a broader global resolution of litigation involving the debtor companies, their directors and officers, and related parties.

The settlements resolved certain class claims and partially resolved a third‑party lender claim, providing more than $10 million in recovery with potential participation in future litigation proceeds.

The court applied established settlement approval factors including likelihood of success, litigation risks, counsel recommendations, absence of objections, and arm’s‑length negotiations.

The court concluded that the settlements were fair, reasonable, and in the best interests of the class and the restructuring process.

In proceedings under the Companies’ Creditors Arrangement Act arising from the insolvency of a payday lending enterprise, class members moved for approval of settlement administration measures related to consumer class action settlements.

The requested approvals included a settlement distribution protocol, notice plan, privacy and information management protocol, and appointment of a claims administrator.

A third‑party creditor that had purchased loan receivables from the debtor sought accommodation to assert an equitable set‑off against class members’ settlement recoveries.

The court held that the creditor’s claim lacked the close connection required for equitable set‑off and was effectively a prejudgment garnishment against settlement funds.

The administrative protocols were approved as fair, reasonable, and in the best interests of class members.