Roy C. Filion

The appellant employer appealed a Divisional Court decision dismissing its application for judicial review of an Ontario Labour Relations Board decision.

The Board had initially issued a brief decision upholding a union grievance, and later issued supplementary reasons at the union's request.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the Board lacked jurisdiction under section 114(1) of the Labour Relations Act to issue supplementary reasons without reconsidering the decision itself.

The Court found that the doctrine of functus officio applied, and the delivery of supplementary reasons raised a reasonable apprehension of result-driven, after-the-fact reasoning.

The matter was remitted for a new hearing before a differently constituted Board.

The applicant Union sought judicial review of an Ontario Labour Relations Board decision dismissing its grievances.

The Union argued that work paid as maintenance under the General Presidents' Maintenance Agreement was actually construction and should have been paid at a higher scale under the Principal Agreement.

The Board found the Union was estopped from relying on the Principal Agreement because its business agent agreed the work would be done under the GPMA.

The Divisional Court held that the Board's application of estoppel, despite section 162 of the Labour Relations Act, was reasonable and dismissed the application.

Canada Post sought judicial review of an arbitrator's decision to change the cut-off date for calculating damages in a prior award, arguing the arbitrator was functus officio.

The arbitrator had initially set the date without hearing submissions, leading to a mistaken belief of facts.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, holding that the arbitrator's initial failure to allow submissions amounted to a denial of natural justice.

Therefore, the arbitrator had the power and duty to revisit the issue and correct the error, falling within a recognized exception to the functus officio doctrine.

The employer brought an application for judicial review of an Ontario Labour Relations Board decision.

The Board had upheld a union grievance, finding that fire restoration work at a Petro-Canada site was 'construction work' under the Labour Relations Act and governed by the provincial agreement, rather than the General Presidents' Maintenance Agreement.

The employer argued the Board erred in its application of the doctrine of estoppel and lacked jurisdiction to issue supplemental reasons.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, holding that the Board had jurisdiction to issue supplemental reasons and that its decision on the nature of the work and the application of estoppel was reasonable.

The applicant employer sought judicial review of an arbitrator's award requiring it to pay the Ontario Health Premium on behalf of its employees under the collective agreement.

The Divisional Court held that the standard of review for an arbitrator interpreting a collective agreement against a statutory backdrop is patent unreasonableness.

The Court found that the arbitrator's conclusion—that the reintroduction of individual health premiums revived the employer's obligation to pay 100% of the employees' costs for OHIP—was not patently unreasonable.

The application for judicial review was dismissed.

The respondent school board brought a motion to strike paragraphs of an affidavit filed by the applicant union in support of an application for judicial review of an arbitration award.

The arbitration award upheld the termination of a teacher.

The union argued the affidavit was necessary to show the arbitrator's findings of fact were unsupported by evidence.

The court held the motion was not premature and struck the paragraphs, finding there was no basis in law under the Keeprite test to admit the affidavit to augment the record, as there was ample evidence before the arbitrator to support the findings.

The applicant union sought judicial review of an arbitrator's decision dismissing an employee's discharge grievance.

The employee was terminated following a workplace altercation where he verbally and physically confronted a more senior employee.

The applicant argued the arbitrator breached natural justice, made findings without evidence, and improperly failed to substitute a lesser penalty.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding no breach of fairness, sufficient evidence to support the arbitrator's findings, and no improper considerations in the penalty assessment.

The union filed a grievance alleging the employer violated the collective agreement by failing to use reasonable efforts to persuade receiving hospitals to keep transferred employees in the union's pension plan.

Six hospitals applied for third-party standing to participate in the arbitration hearing, arguing they had a significant financial interest in the outcome.

The arbitrator denied the applications for standing, finding that the hospitals' financial interest was analogous to that of a commercial contractor and did not confer a legal entitlement to participate in the hearing, as they asserted no legal claim conflicting with the union's grievance under labour law.

The applicant County sought judicial review of a Pay Equity Hearings Tribunal decision which found that private-home day care providers were employees of the County for the purposes of the Pay Equity Act.

The Tribunal had applied the common law 'total relationship' and 'organization/integration' tests to conclude the providers were employees.

The Divisional Court granted the application and quashed the Tribunal's decision, finding it to be patently unreasonable.

The majority held that the Tribunal ignored or irrationally discounted evidence demonstrating that the providers were independent contractors, such as their contracts, tax filings, and level of independence.

The union appealed from a Divisional Court decision quashing an arbitrator's ruling that he had jurisdiction to determine an employee's entitlement to long-term disability benefits as against an insurer.

The collective agreement required the employer only to maintain the group insurance policy in force and pay premiums, obligations the employer had admittedly fulfilled, and the policy was not incorporated into the collective agreement.

Applying correctness review and the essential character analysis under labour arbitration jurisprudence, the court held the dispute was between the employee and the insurer under the insurance policy, not a dispute arising from the interpretation, application, administration or violation of the collective agreement.

The arbitrator therefore lacked jurisdiction, and also lacked authority to add the insurer to the arbitration.

The Board determined the bargaining unit structure following the amalgamation of four psychiatric and addiction facilities into the Centre for Addiction and Mental Health.

The Board ordered two bargaining units: one for registered and graduate nurses, and one for all other non-managerial employees.

The Board also held that a non-union option must be included on the ballot for any unit where 40% or more of the employees were Crown employees prior to the changeover date.

The geographic scope was limited to the City of Toronto and existing Mississauga employees.

The Board declined to order the disclosure of employee addresses and telephone numbers to the unions due to safety concerns.

The applicant union referred a grievance to the Ontario Labour Relations Board under section 133 of the Labour Relations Act, 1995, arguing that work performed by the responding party on a blast furnace was construction work and should have been performed under the ICI provincial agreement.

The responding party and intervenors argued the work was maintenance and properly performed under the General President's Maintenance Agreement.

The Board reviewed the scope of work, which involved extensive replacements and redesigns to bring a decommissioned furnace back into service.

The Board concluded that the totality of the work constituted repair and alteration, making it construction work subject to the ICI agreement.

The matter of damages was remitted to the parties.

The union applied for an interim order to prevent the employer from unilaterally excluding seven employees from the bargaining unit at the commencement of a lawful strike.

The employer argued the Board's jurisdiction to grant interim relief was limited to procedural matters under section 98 of the Labour Relations Act, 1995.

The Board held that section 16.1 of the Statutory Powers Procedure Act grants it a general power to make interim orders, which prevails over section 98 of the LRA due to the conflict provision in section 32 of the SPPA.

Applying the two-pronged test for interim relief, the Board found the union had established an arguable case of unfair labour practices and that the balance of labour relations harm favoured granting the order, as the employer's actions undermined the strike and union morale.

The Association of Major League Umpires filed an unfair labour practice complaint against the American and National Leagues and the Toronto Blue Jays, challenging a lock-out and the use of replacement umpires at games in Toronto.

The Leagues argued that their collective bargaining relationship was governed by American law and that Ontario law did not apply.

The Ontario Labour Relations Board held that the Ontario Labour Relations Act applies to the umpires when they work in Toronto.

The Board declared that the lock-out and the use of replacement umpires in Ontario were unlawful because the parties had not completed the compulsory conciliation process required by the Act.

The Employer objected to a Review Officer's Order finding it failed to maintain pay equity for female job classes represented by CUPE 1734.

The Employer argued that wage disparities were due to differences in bargaining strength under s. 8(2) of the Pay Equity Act.

The Tribunal held that s. 8(2) cannot be relied upon because pay equity had not yet been achieved for all employees in the establishment, specifically the teachers.

The Tribunal also found that CUPE 1734 was not complicit in the Employer's contravention, as the union had attempted to negotiate maintenance and subsequently filed a complaint.

The Employer's application was dismissed and the Order confirmed, except for the requirement that the union post a notice.

The applicant union filed applications under the Successor Rights (Crown Transfers) Act seeking declarations that various contractors who entered into contracts with the Crown to perform forest management work (regeneration surveys and herbicide spraying) were bound by the collective agreement between the union and the Crown.

The Crown argued that the work did not constitute an 'undertaking' and relied on a recent Supreme Court of Canada decision interpreting a similar term in the Quebec Labour Code.

The Board rejected the Crown's argument, finding that the statutory definition of 'undertaking' in the Ontario Act was broader and encompassed the transfer of parts of a Crown program.

The Board granted the applications, declaring the contractors bound by the collective agreement.

A dissenting member would have dismissed the applications.

The Ontario Public Service Employees Union brought six applications under the Successor Rights (Crown Transfers) Act, alleging that the Crown transferred undertakings to various contractors who provided services such as snow plowing, garbage disposal, janitorial work, and park maintenance.

The Crown and the contractors argued that the applications should be dismissed because the Union had abandoned its bargaining rights and because some contractors had no employees and were therefore not 'employers' under the Act.

The Ontario Labour Relations Board held that the contracted services constituted 'undertakings' that were transferred from the Crown.

The Board also found that a contractor need not have employees to be an 'employer' under the Act.

Finally, the Board held that even if the Union had abandoned its rights regarding earlier contracts, the undertakings reverted to the Crown upon the expiry of those contracts, creating a fresh transfer and a new opportunity for the Union to assert its rights.

The applications were granted, and the contractors were declared bound by the collective agreement.

The applicant union applied for certification for two bargaining units of the respondent's employees shortly after a related union lost a representation vote for an all-employee unit.

The respondent argued the Board should refuse to entertain the new applications under section 103(2)(i) of the Labour Relations Act.

The Board held that the two unions have separate and distinct status under the Act, and the bar imposed on the first union did not apply to the applicant.

However, the Board appointed an officer to inquire into the appropriateness of the smaller bargaining units sought by the applicant.

The applicant union brought applications under sections 1(4) and 63 of the Labour Relations Act, alleging that a newly formed construction company, Chartex, was either a successor to or under common control with Metro Century and Leaseholds.

Metro Century had ceased active operations due to financial difficulties, and a former employee incorporated Chartex.

The Board found that Chartex only acquired minor assets from Metro Century and was a new, independent business rather than a continuation of the predecessor's business.

The Board also concluded that Chartex was not sufficiently functionally integrated with Leaseholds to justify a related employer declaration.

Both applications were dismissed.

The complainant union alleged that the respondent employer violated the duty to bargain in good faith under the Labour Relations Act by unlawfully withdrawing an offer to continue COLA payments in order to avoid reaching a collective agreement.

The employer argued that its inexperienced negotiator made a mistake in conveying the company's position during conciliation, and that it promptly corrected the error once discovered.

The Ontario Labour Relations Board dismissed the complaint, finding that the employer had made a genuine mistake and did not intend to continue the COLA payments, and that correcting the unaccepted offer did not constitute bad faith bargaining.