Ronald B. Moldaver

The moving party sought an order dismissing relief requested in a notice of hearing for directions and a declaration that the court lacked jurisdiction to continue a reference arising from a judgment for sale under the Partition Act.

The original judgment ordered the sale of jointly owned properties under the direction of a referee, with proceeds to be paid into court.

The applicant in the original proceeding later privately sold its ownership interest without complying with the judgment for sale and without paying proceeds into court.

The court held that the judgment for sale was the sole jurisdictional basis for the reference and had become unenforceable due to the private sale.

As a result, the reference master lacked jurisdiction to continue the reference.

The defendant brought a motion under the Rules of Civil Procedure seeking an order requiring the plaintiff to answer certain undertakings and refused questions arising from examinations for discovery.

The court applied the relevance test under Rule 31.06(1) and reviewed multiple refused questions to determine whether they related to matters in issue, particularly the ownership of coins held in a safety deposit box.

Most questions were found to be irrelevant or speculative and did not need to be answered, though one question relating to an alleged event in Israel was ordered answered.

The court also addressed alleged improper interruptions by plaintiff’s counsel during discovery and directed counsel to conduct future examinations consistently with established principles governing discovery conduct.

Costs of $1,000 were awarded to the defendant.

A secured creditor applied for the appointment of a receiver over a debtor real estate holding company under s. 243(1) of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act and s. 101 of the Courts of Justice Act.

The respondent argued that the appointment of a receiver should not proceed by application and that ordinary remedies were available.

The court held that the governing legislation expressly contemplates appointment by application and that such an order constitutes a final order determining the issues raised.

Given the debtor’s continuing default, the enforceability of the creditor’s security, and the lack of an operating business, the court found it just and convenient to appoint a receiver.

Following a motion to strike portions of a statement of defence under Rule 25.11 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the court determined the appropriate costs award.

The moving party had been largely successful, obtaining an order striking three of four impugned paragraphs.

Although the moving party sought partial indemnity costs exceeding $7,000, the court held the requested amount was disproportionate given the limited complexity and narrow scope of the motion.

Applying the principles under s.131 of the Courts of Justice Act and Rule 57, the court fixed costs at a reduced amount to reflect both proportionality and the moving party’s partial success.

The appellant appealed a trial decision dismissing his claim for $25,000 on a promissory note and awarding the respondent $10,030 on a counterclaim for construction defects.

The trial judge found the promissory note lacked consideration and was obtained by misrepresentation.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's factual findings or assessment of damages.

The Divisional Court determined it lacked jurisdiction over the cross appeal.

Because the appeal and cross appeal were intertwined, the court adjourned both matters without a fixed date so they could be heard together following a motion under section 6(3) of the Courts of Justice Act.

Enforcement of the payment order was stayed pending further order.

The plaintiff brought a motion under Rule 25.11 of the Rules of Civil Procedure seeking to strike several paragraphs from a defendant’s statement of defence.

The impugned pleadings alleged that the action was malicious and sought elevated or non‑party costs against the plaintiff’s officers and directors.

The court held that allegations regarding a plaintiff’s motive for commencing litigation do not constitute a defence and that pleadings directed solely to potential costs consequences are improper.

The court struck the impugned paragraphs that related to improper motive and potential non‑party costs, while permitting a paragraph requesting dismissal of the action with full indemnity costs to remain as a general costs request.

Leave to amend was refused because the defects related to improper pleading rather than drafting deficiencies.

The respondents sought costs for two appeals following the release of the court's reasons.

For the first appeal, the court declined to award costs, agreeing with the appellants that their partial success on appeal warranted an offset against the significant unadjusted costs awarded in the court below.

For the second appeal, where the respondents were entirely successful, the court awarded costs fixed at $7,500, noting the appeal was straightforward and took little time.

The appellant landlord appealed a decision dismissing its appeal from a claims officer's ruling in a receivership proceeding.

The appellant argued the claims officer erred in characterizing certain assets as chattels rather than fixtures, improperly placed the burden of proof on the appellant, rejected expert evidence regarding how the assets were secured, and erred in assessing damages.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the factual determination of chattels versus fixtures, and no error in principle regarding the burden of proof or damages assessment.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment finding them liable for fraud, conspiracy, and breach of fiduciary duty in several real estate transactions with the Ontario Realty Corporation.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's findings on most transactions, including orders for disgorgement of profits based on knowing receipt and conspiracy with a fiduciary.

However, the Court allowed the appeal regarding the King's Highway 2A property, finding no basis for disgorgement where no fiduciary breach or damages were proven.

The respondents' cross-appeal was allowed in part, holding a former employee jointly and severally liable for a $300,000 improper price abatement.

The appellant appealed a motion judge's order permitting the respondent to amend their pleadings to correct a misnomer.

The respondent had inadvertently named the wrong, but closely related, corporate entity in a slip and fall claim.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding ample evidence that the appellant had probable knowledge it was the target of the litigation within the limitation period and suffered no irreparable prejudice.

The appellants appealed the imposition of two conditions on an order for the partition and sale of a commercial property, while the respondents cross-appealed seeking to reverse the order for sale.

The Divisional Court upheld the finding of co-ownership but set aside the condition requiring the prior payment of $1 million, finding that conflicting evidence regarding payment required a trial.

The court held that the sale could not proceed until the issues of payment and alleged oppression were resolved at trial.

Both the appeal and cross-appeal were allowed in part.

The appellant appealed a judgment of the Superior Court of Justice.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge gave careful and comprehensive reasons, and her analysis of the facts and case law was impeccable.

Costs were awarded to the respondents in the amount of $20,000.

The applicant sought judicial review of an Ontario Racing Commission decision that upheld Woodbine Entertainment Group's (WEG) indefinite suspension of his racing privileges.

The suspension followed the discovery of Erythropoetin (EPO) in three of the applicant's horses.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that the Commission reasonably balanced WEG's private property and contractual rights with the public interest in maintaining the integrity of the horse racing industry.

The tenants appealed an eviction order and a jurisdictional ruling made by the Landlord and Tenant Board.

The Divisional Court granted the appeal and remitted the matter for a new hearing before a differently constituted Board.

The Court found that meaningful appellate review was impossible due to a malfunction that resulted in missing transcripts for a full day of evidence, combined with the Board member's failure to provide adequate reasons for her decision.

The appellant appealed a decision regarding adverse possession of a disputed strip of land between two properties.

The Court of Appeal upheld the application judge's finding that the respondent regularly used the disputed strip at the front of the houses, defeating the claim for adverse possession there.

However, the Court found that the application judge failed to address the back of the house, where a fence excluded the respondent and established exclusive possession for the appellant.

The judgments were amended accordingly, with costs awarded to the respondent who was substantially successful.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment regarding the ownership of lands under the Riverside Drive bridge and allegations of bad faith.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's findings that the road was a busy public road in the 1880s, the railway never intended to acquire the land under the bridge, and the road was a municipal street owned by the City.

The appellant's argument that the federal Crown owned the land was rejected, as the road was not an unopened road allowance laid out by a Crown surveyor.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The applicant sought judicial review of a decision by the Ontario Racing Commission finding him liable for a strict liability drug offence involving a racehorse.

The Divisional Court allowed the application and quashed the Commission's decision, finding that the Commission failed to identify any evidence that the applicant's conduct fell below a reasonable standard of care.

The court noted that the Commission appeared to have improperly applied a standard of absolute liability rather than strict liability.

The appellants, who were discharged bankrupts, sought to appeal a declaration validating mortgages on their properties.

The respondent mortgagee brought a motion to quash the appeal on the basis that the appellants lacked standing.

The Court of Appeal allowed the motion to quash, finding that the properties remained vested in the trustee in bankruptcy.

Although the trustee took no position on the appeal and consented to the appellants proceeding, it had not abandoned its interest in the properties under section 40(1) of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act.

The appellant, a standardbred owner/trainer, appealed a ruling suspending him for 180 days and fining him $5,000 after his horse tested positive for Phenylpropolamine.

The appellant argued the horse must have come into contact with the drug while in the retention barn.

The Ontario Racing Commission dismissed the appeal, finding that the trainer is strictly liable for the condition of the horse and that the evidence did not establish that the horse was contaminated in the retention barn.