Roger Chown

The applicant accepted the respondent's offer to settle parenting issues, which included a term that the applicant pay costs on a full indemnity basis.

The respondent subsequently claimed over $120,000 in costs.

The court analyzed the principles of full indemnity costs in family law, noting that reasonableness, proportionality, and the reasonable expectations of the paying party still apply.

The court awarded the respondent $49,000 in costs, discounting the claim due to a lack of docket detail, the inclusion of pre-litigation fees, and fees incurred after the offer was accepted.

The plaintiff's counsel requested a further capacity assessment, alleging the appointed assessor conducted the interview in Hindi rather than Punjabi and exhibited bias.

The court dismissed the request, noting the concerns were only raised after the report found the plaintiff lacked capacity.

The court accepted the assessor's finding, declared the plaintiff incapable of instructing counsel, and appointed the Public Guardian and Trustee as litigation guardian pursuant to Rule 7.04.

The plaintiff's counsel failed to attend a scheduled video conference hearing, requesting a last-minute adjournment because a medical assessment report was not ready.

The court adjourned the matter, ordered the plaintiff's counsel to provide a written explanation for his absence and the delay in obtaining hospital records, and issued directions to the assessor to complete the report.

In a judge-alone criminal trial subject to a publication ban, the Crown alleged sexual exploitation, sexual assault, invitation to sexual touching, and breach of a prohibition order arising from the accused's interactions with two young complainants.

The court accepted the evidence of the older complainant on the core events and substantially accepted the younger complainant's evidence on the toe-related incident, finding that the accused groomed the complainants through money, alcohol, attention, and sexualized conversation.

Applying s. 273.1(2)(c) of the Criminal Code, the court held the accused occupied and knew he occupied a position of trust toward the older complainant, negating consent.

Findings of guilt were entered on all five counts, subject to further submissions on the application of the Kienapple principle before convictions were formally entered.

The appellant, a self-represented lawyer, appealed a Small Claims Court deputy judge's costs award of $3,772.24 against him.

The deputy judge had found 'special circumstances' under Rule 15.07 of the Small Claims Court Rules to award costs exceeding the $100 limit for a motion, concluding the claim was an abuse of process.

In these additional reasons, the Divisional Court dismissed the appeal of the costs award, finding no error in principle.

The court noted that while it might not have allowed certain disbursements, the claim was completely lacking a reasonable foundation and the overall costs amount was proportional and reasonable.

The plaintiff commenced an action against her husband's children and the lawyers who acted for him in prior divorce proceedings, alleging conspiracy, abuse of process, and other torts.

The defendants moved to strike or dismiss the claims under Rule 21.

The court dismissed the claims against the adverse lawyers, finding no duty of care was owed to the plaintiff.

The court also dismissed the tort claims for abuse of process, conspiracy, and intentional interference with economic relations as an abuse of process by relitigation, as they sought to undermine the final settlement reached in the divorce proceedings.

The defamation and intentional infliction of mental suffering claims were struck with leave to amend.

The appellant, a lawyer, appealed the dismissal of his Small Claims Court action against Legal Aid Ontario (LAO) and its employees.

The appellant had sued for unpaid accounts, wrongful removal from LAO panels, and defamation.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding that the Small Claims Court lacks jurisdiction over legal aid fee disputes, which are governed by a complete code under the Legal Aid Services Act.

The court also held that the defamation claim was a waste of time as the impugned statements were made during a quasi-judicial process and protected by absolute privilege.

During a proceeding regarding whether payments made by the plaintiff were gifts or loans, concerns arose regarding the plaintiff's capacity to instruct counsel.

The court noted frailties in the plaintiff's evidence and suggestions of undue pressure from family members.

The court ordered a capacity assessment to determine whether a litigation guardian is required under Rule 7.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, with the assessment to be funded by the defendants.

The plaintiff brought an ex parte motion to extend the time for service of a statement of claim arising from a slip and fall.

The delay in service was caused by the plaintiff failing to keep her lawyers informed of her contact information, rather than difficulty in serving the defendants.

The court adjourned the motion and directed that the defendants be served with the notice of motion, as it was desirable and preferable for them to be heard on the issue of prejudice.

The accused was convicted of sexually assaulting a highly intoxicated complainant who lacked the capacity to consent.

The Crown sought a sentence of three to five years, while the defence sought 12 months.

The court considered the predatory nature of the offence, the accused's concocted story to police, and mitigating factors including his youth, lack of criminal record, and good employment history.

The court sentenced the accused to 28 months' imprisonment, along with a 10-year weapons prohibition, a DNA order, a no-contact order, and a 20-year Sex Offender Registry order.

A hearing regarding a capacity assessment was scheduled during a trial.

Plaintiff's counsel failed to appear.

The court adjourned the hearing to a later date and noted that the parties had reached an agreement on the identity and funding of a capacity assessor if one is ordered.

During a sexual assault trial, the court held a ruling on whether the defence of honest but mistaken belief in communicated consent should be left with the jury.

The alleged assault occurred in a dark room where multiple people were sleeping after consuming alcohol.

The accused claimed the complainant initiated sexual contact, while the complainant testified she awoke to being assaulted and did not consent.

Applying the air of reality test, the court found that the accused's evidence, if assumed true, put the defence in play.

The court ruled the defence would be left with the jury, as it was for the jury to assess whether the accused took reasonable steps to ascertain consent.

The applicant brought a motion for further disclosure, and the respondent Jamie McDonald brought a motion to suspend or vary a previous order directing the sale of four jointly owned farm properties.

The court granted the disclosure requests, ordering both sides to produce specified financial and operational records, noting that while some information should have been sought during earlier questioning, it was necessary for trial preparation.

The court dismissed the respondent's motion to vary the sale order, finding it was an impermissible attempt to re-litigate an issue he had previously elected not to participate in, and that delaying the sale would be unfair to the applicant.

The plaintiff sued the Landlord Tenant Board (LTB) and the Crown for alleged breaches of her Charter rights and various torts, seeking damages.

The defendants brought motions under Rule 21 to dismiss or strike the claim.

The court granted the motions, finding that the LTB is not a suable entity and that the Crown is not vicariously liable for the actions of independent LTB tribunal members.

The statement of claim was struck in its entirety without leave to amend.

Following a trial, the court raised the issue of whether the plaintiff was a party under disability requiring a litigation guardian.

The Public Guardian and Trustee took no position and stated it lacked authority to investigate.

The defendants indicated an intention to bring a motion for a capacity assessment, which the plaintiff opposed.

The court scheduled a voir dire hearing to determine its jurisdiction to order a capacity assessment, whether one should be ordered, and how it would be funded.

The plaintiff, a 98-year-old woman, sued her daughters and son-in-law for the recovery of money alleged to have been loaned, which the defendants claimed was a gift.

During the trial, the court raised concerns about the plaintiff's capacity to instruct counsel and maintain the action, despite her counsel's assurances.

The court issued an interim order, declining to make a final determination on the merits until the Public Guardian and Trustee (PGT) has an opportunity to investigate the plaintiff's capacity and provide submissions on appropriate next steps.

This endorsement from a trial readiness conference outlines the outstanding issues for the second phase of a bifurcated trial.

The court clarified that a previous 2021 valuation of the home farm was for settlement purposes only and would not govern compensation, and confirmed that the order refusing the sale of the home farm was a final order not to be re-litigated.

The endorsement also set deadlines for disclosure and undertakings motions, identified remaining trial issues including valuation of farm equipment, equalization, support claims, and trust claims, and scheduled further conferences and trial dates.

The applicant and respondent disputed the proper venue for their family law proceeding concerning parenting time, specifically whether it should be Bruce County (where children formerly lived) or Simcoe County (where they now live).

The court applied Rule 5(1)(b) of the Family Law Rules and s. 22(2) of the Children’s Law Reform Act, which define "habitual residence." The court found that the applicant had impliedly consented to the children's move to Simcoe County, making Simcoe County their habitual residence.

Consequently, Barrie was determined to be the correct courthouse for the proceeding.

The respondent brought a motion to amend his answer to claim occupation rent after the parties had reached a partial settlement on spousal support and the sale of the matrimonial home.

The applicant opposed, arguing that the proposed amendment would cause non-compensable prejudice and was an attempt to circumvent the partial settlement.

The court found that the issues of occupation rent, matrimonial home sale, and spousal support were interconnected and that allowing the amendment would undermine the benefits of partial settlements.

The respondent's motion to amend his answer to claim occupation rent was dismissed, while other amendments were permitted.

The court also ordered the applicant to sign a Miglin release as per the partial settlement, with consequences for non-compliance.

This motion concerned the sale of five jointly owned farm properties following a marital breakdown.

The applicant sought an order for sale, while the respondents argued that section 11 of the Family Law Act prohibited such a sale for an operating farm.

The court determined that section 11 of the Family Law Act applies to jointly owned farms and that the "home farm" was indispensable to the operation and should not be sold.

However, the court found that the other jointly owned properties could be sold without seriously impairing the farm's operation, and that reasonable alternative methods existed to satisfy any equalization award.