Robert Healey

The Union sought document production in a grievance arbitration.

On consent, the Arbitrator ordered the Employer to make its best efforts to provide all arguably relevant documents created between January 1, 2019, and January 25, 2022, relating to specific curriculum training, as well as emails and documents in the possession of a retired employee.

The Employer brought a preliminary motion regarding the available remedies in a termination grievance of a correctional officer.

The grievor had pled guilty to assault and received a conditional discharge for an incident involving an inmate.

The Employer argued that under the Crown Employees Collective Bargaining Act, the criminal disposition constituted conclusive evidence of excessive use of force, limiting the arbitrator's jurisdiction to reinstate the grievor to a position outside the secure part of a facility.

The Union argued the assault charge did not necessarily equate to excessive force under the Act and raised mitigating medical factors.

The Arbitrator upheld the Employer's motion, finding the guilty plea and conditional discharge triggered the mandatory provisions of the Act, precluding relitigation of the excessive force allegations and limiting remedial jurisdiction.

Several trade unions and the Canadian Labour Congress brought motions for leave to intervene as added parties or as friends of the court in an action challenging the constitution of the Amalgamated Transit Union.

The moving parties argued they had an interest in the proceeding because their own constitutions contained similar provisions and they could be adversely affected by the precedent.

The court dismissed the motions, finding that an interest based solely on the potential precedential effect of a decision is insufficient for intervention as an added party under Rule 13.01.

The court also denied leave to intervene as friends of the court under Rule 13.02, concluding that the proposed interveners' submissions would largely duplicate the arguments of the defendant union and would not provide a materially different perspective.

The moving parties sought leave to appeal a CCAA judge's decision dismissing their motion to reinstate other post-employment benefits (OPEBs) to retirees of U.S. Steel Canada Inc. The CCAA judge had dismissed the motion but ordered a one-time payment of $2.7 million towards benefits.

The Court of Appeal applied the stringent test for leave to appeal in CCAA proceedings and found no prima facie merit to the appeal.

The court emphasized the broad discretion of the CCAA judge and the fact-specific nature of the decision, which did not raise issues of significance to insolvency practice.

Leave to appeal was denied with costs fixed at $2,500.

Following a successful application declaring the applicant remained president and a member of a union organization, the court addressed costs.

The applicant sought substantial indemnity costs relying on an informal settlement offer and alleged improper conduct by the respondents in attempting to remove him from office.

The court held that the circumstances required for substantial indemnity costs were not present, including the absence of a valid Rule 49 offer or litigation misconduct.

Considering the factors under Rule 57.01 and s.131 of the Courts of Justice Act, the court reduced the applicant’s requested costs due to litigation conduct, including late retention of counsel and a shift in litigation position.

The applicant filed a human rights application alleging discrimination and harassment in employment on the basis of race, colour, ancestry, ethnic origin, and disability.

The respondents requested that the application be dismissed for delay, as the last alleged incident occurred more than one year before the application was filed.

The applicant argued that the delay was due to waiting for his union to take action and being unaware of the limitation period.

The Tribunal found that waiting for the outcome of another process and ignorance of rights did not constitute a good faith explanation for the delay.

The application was dismissed for delay.

The appellant union appealed an order of the Divisional Court regarding an arbitrator's decision.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, agreeing with the dissenting reasons of Aston J. at the Divisional Court.

The Divisional Court's order was set aside, the arbitrator's decision was quashed, and costs of $10,000 were awarded to the appellant.

The applicant filed a human rights application alleging discrimination and reprisal with respect to employment.

The Tribunal issued a Notice of Intent to Defer because the applicant had also filed a union grievance regarding a suspension and termination of employment.

The Tribunal found that the grievance process was at a more advanced stage and dealt with the same factual matrix.

To avoid inconsistent factual and legal conclusions, the Tribunal deferred the application pending the completion of the grievance process.

The applicant filed a human rights application alleging discrimination and harassment based on disability.

The respondent and the applicant's union requested that the Tribunal defer the application pending the outcome of an ongoing WSIB internal appeal and a related grievance process.

The Tribunal found that the WSIB appeal involved overlapping factual issues regarding accommodation, making deferral appropriate.

The Tribunal deferred the application until the WSIB Appeals Officer issues a decision, but declined to defer to the grievance process due to its uncertain status.

The applicant alleged that her employer and its president discriminated against her on the basis of age and sex, specifically alleging sexual harassment and reprisal leading to her termination.

The Tribunal found the applicant's evidence regarding the alleged sexual and age-related comments to be unreliable and uncorroborated by witnesses.

The Tribunal concluded that no sexual solicitations or advances occurred, the employer had no duty to investigate as it was unaware of any allegations, and the termination was based on work performance issues rather than discriminatory factors.

The application was dismissed.

The applicant filed a human rights application against her employer and several individuals.

The corporate respondent filed for bankruptcy protection and argued the application was stayed under the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act.

The applicant requested to amend her application to withdraw all monetary claims against the corporate respondent.

The Tribunal granted the amendment and held that because the applicant was no longer seeking monetary remedies, she was not a creditor with a claim provable in bankruptcy, and therefore the proceedings were not stayed.

The Tribunal also addressed requests to withdraw against two individual respondents, a request to expedite, and a request for document production.

The employer sought judicial review of an arbitrator's decision regarding an employee's refusal to follow a directive to go to a hospital emergency department.

The arbitrator found that under s. 33(1) of the Act, the employee had the right to make the initial choice of health professional, and that the 'obey now, grieve later' rule did not apply because grieving later would be meaningless.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding the arbitrator's interpretation of the statute correct and the application of the 'obey now, grieve later' exception reasonable.

The applicant sought judicial review of two Ontario Labour Relations Board decisions dismissing his complaint against his union for failing to advance his grievance to arbitration, and denying reconsideration.

The OLRB had dismissed the complaint due to a 16-year delay and prejudice to the respondents, rejecting the applicant's medical explanation.

The Divisional Court found the OLRB's decisions were not patently unreasonable and dismissed the applicant's allegations of bias and Charter discrimination.

The application for judicial review was dismissed with costs.

The intervenor requested an adjournment fifteen minutes prior to the scheduled consultation due to counsel's illness.

The applicant requested costs if the adjournment was granted, noting it was the third adjournment in two months.

The Board granted the adjournment but denied the request for costs, consistent with its jurisprudence.

A new date was set for the consultation.

The applicant, an employee in the Southwestern Ontario bargaining unit, filed an application alleging the union violated the Labour Relations Act by failing to provide adequate notice of a ratification vote.

The union had provided individual written notice to employees with known addresses and published advertisements in local newspapers.

The applicant, who received individual notice and voted, argued that newspaper advertisements were inadequate because some employees allegedly did not see them.

The Board dismissed the application, finding that the union took reasonable steps to inform employees of the vote in a timely manner, especially given the lack of a common workplace.

The Board also noted the applicant's delay in filing and the substantial prejudice that would result from setting aside the vote.

The Ontario Labour Relations Board heard a procedural motion to determine which party should call its evidence first in an application involving a conflict of interest objection under section 14(4).

The majority of the Board directed the employer to call its evidence first, reasoning that the employer possessed the specific knowledge regarding the alleged conflict of interest and that requiring the union to prove a negative across hundreds of sites would unnecessarily prolong the proceedings.

The applicant, Ensign Security Services Inc., acquired security contracts at three sites in Ottawa previously held by Pinkerton's and Burns.

The United Steelworkers of America held bargaining rights for the predecessor employers' employees, while the Canadian Security Union held municipal-wide bargaining rights for Ensign's employees.

Ensign applied to the Ontario Labour Relations Board under sections 64 and 64.2 of the Labour Relations Act to resolve the conflict in bargaining rights resulting from the intermingling of employees.

The Board found that section 64.2 acts as a doorway to section 64, and does not mandate site-specific bargaining rights that override broader-based rights.

To avoid severe fragmentation and administrative difficulties, the Board declared that Ensign is no longer bound by the predecessor's collective agreement with the Steelworkers, and that the Canadian Security Union is the bargaining agent for all Ensign security guards in the region.

In an application for certification of a large unit of security guards, the parties agreed to a representation vote but disputed the union's request for the disclosure of employee addresses.

The employer argued the Board lacked jurisdiction to order disclosure and raised confidentiality concerns.

The Board held it had jurisdiction under section 105(2)(f) of the Labour Relations Act to make the direction.

Balancing the union's need to communicate with the electorate against the employer's confidentiality interests and employee privacy, the Board directed a compromise: the employer must produce address labels, and the union may attend the employer's offices to jointly label and mail sealed envelopes containing campaign literature at the union's expense.