Robert Douglas Jeffrey Rogers

The applicant, a 14-year-old high school student, sustained a mild traumatic brain injury when she was struck by a car as a pedestrian.

She applied for non-earner benefits, which the insurer terminated after 104 weeks.

The arbitrator found that the applicant's post-accident life was significantly altered by cognitive fatigue, reduced processing speed, and anxiety, requiring extensive accommodations and therapy to complete high school.

Rejecting the insurer's medical assessments, the arbitrator concluded the applicant suffered a complete inability to carry on a normal life and awarded ongoing non-earner benefits and interest.

The appellant suffered a heart attack while driving, causing his van to crash and become stranded over a ditch.

The damage to the van prevented a bystander from immediately administering CPR, resulting in a delay in treatment and severe neurological impairment.

The arbitrator initially found the incident was not an 'accident' under the Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule, concluding the heart attack was an intervening event.

On appeal, the Director's Delegate reversed the decision, finding that the appellant's continued use of the vehicle delayed treatment and directly contributed to his impairment, satisfying the causation test for an accident.

The applicant's son was catastrophically injured in a motor vehicle accident, requiring 24-hour attendant care.

The applicant provided this care and received $6,000 monthly from her son's attendant care benefit.

The insurer reduced the applicant's income replacement benefit to zero, arguing the attendant care payments constituted post-accident income from self-employment under section 7(3) of the Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule.

The arbitrator found that the applicant was not engaged in a business and did not provide care with a view to profit.

The payments were not considered income from self-employment.

The insurer was ordered to pay the withheld benefits with interest, but no special award was granted as the insurer's position was not unreasonable.

The applicant suffered a heart attack while driving, causing him to lose control of his vehicle and crash into a ditch.

The position of the vehicle prevented a bystander from administering immediate CPR, and the resulting delay in medical assistance led to severe neurological impairment.

The applicant sought statutory accident benefits, arguing the incident was an 'accident' under s. 3(1) of the Schedule.

The arbitrator found that while the purpose test was met, the causation test was not.

The heart attack, rather than the use or operation of the vehicle, was the direct cause and dominant feature of the impairment.

The application was dismissed.

Following a trial and appeal regarding an employment dispute, the court determined the costs of the trial.

The defendant, who was successful on her counterclaim, sought costs based on an offer to settle.

The court found the offer to settle complied with Rule 49 and that the judgment was more favourable than the offer.

Finding the defendant's claimed costs of over $71,000 to be disproportionately high, the court fixed costs at $55,000 inclusive of disbursements and HST.

The applicant was injured in a motor vehicle accident and sought statutory accident benefits.

Following an arbitration where the applicant was found subject to the Minor Injury Guideline and denied funding for disputed treatment plans, the insurer sought its expenses.

The arbitrator considered the parties' degree of success and written offers to settle.

Finding that the insurer was completely successful and that the applicant failed to accept the insurer's offer to settle on a timely basis, the arbitrator awarded the insurer its reasonable expenses of $10,701.50 inclusive of HST.

Following settlement of personal injury claims arising from a motor vehicle–pedestrian collision, a defendant sought an order apportioning the plaintiffs’ party-and-party costs between two groups of defendants.

The moving party argued the other defendants should bear a greater share because its insurer’s contribution enabled settlement and protected the others from personal exposure.

The responding parties argued that insurance considerations were irrelevant and proposed equal contribution.

The court held that it was unnecessary to determine whether insurance was a relevant factor and instead relied on the pleadings and the Negligence Act principle that where relative fault cannot be determined, parties are deemed equally at fault.

Costs were therefore apportioned equally between the taxi defendants collectively and the other defendants.

Following the conclusion of the action, the successful defendants sought partial indemnity costs exceeding $100,000 including legal fees, HST, and expert disbursements.

The plaintiff opposed aspects of the fee claim, arguing duplication of counsel time due to a late change in representation and asserting that a costs award would impose financial hardship.

The court held that financial hardship alone does not justify departing from the general rule that costs follow the event.

While accepting the defendants’ entitlement to costs, the court reduced certain hourly rates and hours claimed to account for the complexity of the case and potential duplication.

Costs were awarded to the defendants in the reduced amount.

The plaintiff sought damages arising from a motor vehicle accident in which liability was admitted, leaving damages to be determined by a jury.

After the jury awarded modest damages, the defendants brought a threshold motion under s. 267.5(5) of the Insurance Act arguing the plaintiff had not proven a permanent serious impairment of an important function.

The court reviewed medical and psychological evidence and assessed the plaintiff’s credibility, noting significant inconsistencies, surveillance evidence contradicting reported limitations, and unreliable self-reports relied upon by experts.

Accepting the defence expert evidence and rejecting the plaintiff’s subjective complaints, the court held the plaintiff failed to establish that his injuries met the statutory threshold.

The defendants’ motion was granted and the action dismissed.

The Applicant was injured in a motor vehicle accident and applied for a determination of catastrophic impairment.

The parties agreed on a 34% physical whole person impairment but disputed the mental and behavioural impairment rating.

The arbitrator preferred the evidence of the Applicant's psychological expert, finding that the Applicant suffered a marked impairment in adaptation to work environments due to severe panic disorder and agoraphobia.

The arbitrator concluded that the Applicant sustained a catastrophic impairment under both clause 2(1.2)(g) (marked mental impairment) and clause 2(1.2)(f) (combined physical and mental impairment of 60%).

The appellant was struck by a car and suffered significant physical injuries that led to chronic pain and mental disorders.

She applied for enhanced statutory accident benefits, claiming a catastrophic impairment under s. 2(1.1)(g) of the SABS.

A designated assessment centre and an arbitrator found she met the criteria because she had a marked impairment in one category of daily living, and they included physical pain in their assessment of her mental disorder.

The director's delegate upheld this decision.

The Divisional Court overturned the delegate's decision on judicial review.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the Divisional Court erred by applying a correctness standard of review.

Applying the reasonableness standard, the Court of Appeal found the delegate's interpretation of s. 2(1.1)(g)—that a single marked impairment is sufficient and that physical pain can be considered cumulatively with a mental disorder—was reasonable.

The applicant insurer sought judicial review of a Director's Delegate's decision finding that the respondent suffered a catastrophic impairment under s. 2(1.1)(g) of the Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule.

The Divisional Court granted the application and set aside the decision, holding that the Delegate erred in law by concluding that a marked impairment in only one of four areas of functioning was sufficient for a catastrophic impairment designation.

The Court further held that the Delegate erred by failing to exclude pain associated with physical injuries when assessing impairment due to mental or behavioural disorder, as required by the AMA Guides incorporated into the legislation.

The appellants successfully sued the respondents for damages from a motor vehicle accident.

Prior to trial, the respondents' insurer twice refused the appellants' requests to participate in mandatory mediation under the Insurance Act, claiming the injuries did not meet the statutory threshold.

The trial judge awarded partial indemnity costs, finding the insurer's refusal was a genuine available position.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that participating in mediation is a mandatory statutory obligation with no exceptions.

The Court increased the trial costs award by $40,000 as a remedial penalty for the insurer's failure to mediate.

The appellant insurer appealed an arbitrator's decision finding that the respondent pedestrian sustained a catastrophic impairment under clause 2(1.1)(g) of the Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule.

The insurer argued that the arbitrator erred by requiring a marked impairment in only one of four areas of functioning, rather than an overall marked impairment, and by failing to separate physical pain from psychological impairment.

The Director's Delegate dismissed the appeal, holding that the plain language of the Schedule requires only a single marked impairment in one area of functioning.

The Delegate also found no error in the arbitrator's conclusion that the respondent's marked impairment in activities of daily living was due to a mental or behavioural disorder, specifically a pain disorder associated with both psychological factors and a general medical condition.

The insurer appealed an arbitrator's order requiring it to disclose information regarding its setting of reserve amounts in respect of the insured's claim for statutory accident benefits.

The Director's Delegate allowed the appeal, finding that reserve information is generally irrelevant to an insurer's conduct in assessing a claim and is protected by a zone of privacy.

The arbitrator's order was rescinded, and the insurer was not required to disclose its reserves.

The respondent was injured in a motor vehicle accident and applied for long-term disability (LTD) benefits from her group insurer, which were denied.

She subsequently settled her LTD claim for a lump sum.

Her automobile insurer then refused to pay income replacement benefits (IRBs), arguing it was entitled to deduct the hypothetical LTD benefits she might have received had she successfully litigated the LTD claim.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the automobile insurer's appeal, holding that the LTD benefits were not 'available' to the respondent since they had been denied, and that she had not abandoned her application by settling the claim.

The applicant, a minor injured in a motor vehicle accident, sought a determination of catastrophic impairment.

The insurer's section 42 multidisciplinary assessors opined that the applicant sustained a catastrophic impairment.

However, the insurer sought a paper review from Brigham & Associates and subsequently denied the catastrophic impairment designation.

The applicant brought a preliminary issue hearing to determine the admissibility of the Brigham & Associates reports at the upcoming arbitration.

The pre-hearing arbitrator declined to rule on the admissibility, finding that it was an evidentiary issue properly within the province of the hearing arbitrator who would determine the substantive issue of catastrophic impairment.

The issue was deferred to the hearing arbitrator.

The applicant was injured in a pedestrian motor vehicle accident and sought a determination that she suffered a catastrophic impairment under the Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule.

The arbitrator found that while the applicant's combined physical and psychological impairments resulted in a 39% whole person impairment, falling short of the 55% threshold under clause (f), she did meet the criteria under clause (g).

Specifically, the arbitrator accepted the CAT DAC assessment that the applicant's pain disorder and physical limitations resulted in a Class 4 marked impairment in her activities of daily living.

The arbitrator held that a single marked impairment is sufficient to meet the definition of catastrophic impairment.

The applicant moved to exclude expert reports obtained by the insurer from Brigham & Associates Inc. via a 'paper review' of his medical records, arguing the insurer breached his privacy rights and the PIPED Act by disclosing his records without consent.

The Arbitrator dismissed the motion, finding that the insurer did not breach the Schedule or the applicant's reasonable expectation of privacy, as the records were disclosed to the insurer's agent for the purpose of responding to the application.

The Arbitrator also found no breach of the PIPED Act, applying the personal purposes exemption, and held that the reports were admissible.

The insurer was not required to fund rebuttal reports.

The defendant in a motor vehicle accident action served a jury notice.

At the commencement of trial, the plaintiffs moved to strike the jury notice, arguing the main plaintiff, a Muslim-Canadian woman of Afghani descent, would not receive a fair trial due to post-9/11 racism and the political climate.

The trial judge struck the jury notice, taking judicial notice of a reasonable apprehension of bias.

The Divisional Court allowed the defendant's appeal, holding that the trial judge erred in taking judicial notice of such bias without evidence, as the facts were not so notorious as to be beyond reasonable debate.

The matter was remitted to a different trial judge.