Robert B. Reid

The lien claimants appealed a decision declaring that the respondent's mortgage had priority over their construction liens.

The respondent challenged the Divisional Court's jurisdiction, arguing the priority decision was not a 'judgment' under the Construction Lien Act.

The court held it had jurisdiction because the priority decision was a final order.

On the merits, the court upheld the motions judge's factual finding that the mortgage funds were advanced to the owner as a joint borrower, rather than merely serving as collateral security, thereby giving the mortgage priority under section 78(6) of the Act.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed a trial judge's damages award in an undefended defamation action involving statements made by his nephew on Facebook.

The appellant sought $1,000,000 in damages, arguing the trial judge's award of $30,000 in general and aggravated damages was too low.

The Divisional Court dismissed the substantive appeal, finding the trial judge made no palpable or overriding error and the award was within the appropriate range for personal defamation.

The appeal was allowed only to rectify typographical errors in the formal judgment to reflect the trial judge's actual award and to add pre-judgment interest.

The appellants appealed a summary judgment order that found they breached a settlement agreement regarding trademark infringement and directed a reference to fix damages.

The Divisional Court raised the issue of its jurisdiction to hear the appeal.

The court held that under s. 19(1.2) of the Courts of Justice Act, an order directing a reference for damages where the claim exceeds $50,000 does not fall within the Divisional Court's monetary jurisdiction.

The appeal was quashed for lack of jurisdiction and transferred to the Court of Appeal.

The Crown brought an application for a ruling on the admissibility of post-offence conduct evidence against three accused in a first-degree murder trial.

The court deferred the decision on the admissibility of vehicle cleaning evidence, finding it premature to balance probative value against prejudicial effect until further trial evidence was presented.

However, the court granted the admission of evidence regarding alleged witness intimidation by one accused, finding its probative value outweighed its prejudicial effect, subject to proper jury instructions and prior identification evidence.

The Crown sought a ruling on the admissibility of cell phone evidence and the use of a PowerPoint presentation summarizing call detail records at a first-degree murder trial.

The court permitted non-expert telecommunications company representatives to testify about the "general rule" regarding cell phone location in relation to towers, acknowledging exceptions.

The court also allowed the use of a PowerPoint presentation as demonstrative evidence, provided it was amended to be neutral, fact-based, and accurate, with consistent formatting and scale for maps, and subject to limiting instructions to the jury.

In a first-degree murder trial, the Crown sought to admit thermal-imaging video evidence, lay opinion evidence from a surveillance technician interpreting heat signatures, and demonstration evidence.

The defence objected to the lay opinion and demonstration evidence, and requested the full unedited video.

The court reserved decision on the lay opinion evidence pending further qualification of the witness, disallowed the demonstration evidence due to its high prejudicial effect outweighing its probative value, and permitted the Crown to present an edited version of the thermal-imaging video, finding the timestamp sufficient to convey time gaps.

The accused, indicted for first-degree murder, applied for an order requiring the Crown to produce criminal records and police occurrence reports for all Crown witnesses.

The Crown agreed to provide criminal records but opposed the production of occurrence reports, arguing they were not first-party disclosure and that the third-party disclosure procedure had not been followed.

The court found that occurrence reports from the investigating police service (NRPS) for nine specific Crown witnesses fell within the Crown's first-party disclosure obligation under *Stinchcombe* and *McNeil*, as credibility was a live issue and the reports related directly to the investigation.

However, the court declined to order disclosure from other police services, deeming them third parties, and dismissed the third-party disclosure application due to procedural non-compliance under *O'Connor*.

Hamilton Cab Company Inc. and John Dean sought summary judgment against Jaspal Gill and related numbered companies concerning outstanding debt, mortgage enforcement, and a counterclaim for professional negligence.

The court granted Hamilton Cab's motion for possession of mortgaged properties and partial summary judgment for $470,487.62, with additional debt to be determined on a reference.

The court dismissed the Gill defendants' counterclaim against John Dean, finding no genuine issue for trial regarding the validity of the agreements or the solicitor's standard of care.

The applicant, estate trustee for the deceased common-law spouse, brought a motion to enforce an unsigned settlement agreement against the respondent estate.

The parties had exchanged correspondence agreeing to transfer a property to the spouse in exchange for a release of her dependent's relief and constructive trust claims.

Before formal minutes of settlement were signed, the spouse died, and the respondent estate refused to complete the transfer, arguing no binding agreement existed and that the spouse's death materially changed the circumstances.

The court found that a binding contract was formed when the essential terms were agreed upon in correspondence, and declined to exercise its discretion to refuse enforcement, ordering the net proceeds of the property sale to be transferred to the applicant.

The applicant, a Greek Orthodox parent, sought a declaration of parental authority and an order requiring the respondent school board to provide advance notice of curriculum topics conflicting with his religious beliefs, specifically regarding human sexuality, and to allow his children to be withdrawn from those classes.

The applicant argued the board's equity policy infringed his freedom of religion under s. 2(a) of the Charter and the Human Rights Code.

The court dismissed the application, finding the board's decision to deny the accommodation was reasonable as it proportionately balanced the applicant's Charter rights with the statutory objectives of inclusion and equality.

The court also held it lacked jurisdiction to hear the standalone Human Rights Code claim.

The applicants sought a penalty for the respondent, who was previously found in contempt for multiple breaches of six court orders related to the disclosure of financial information for several franchise businesses.

The court found that the respondent deliberately and continuously flouted the orders to frustrate the applicants' ability to monitor the businesses, which ultimately lost all value.

The court sentenced the respondent to consecutive terms of imprisonment totaling between 18 and 21 months less a day, and ordered him to pay substantial indemnity costs of $369,644.26.

The plaintiffs, stepchildren of the deceased, challenged the deceased's 2010 will, arguing that she and her late husband (the plaintiffs' father) had executed mutual wills in 1998.

The 1998 wills left their respective estates to each other, with the remainder divided equally among their four children.

After her husband's death, the deceased executed a new will leaving her entire estate to her own two daughters.

On a motion for summary judgment, the court found clear and convincing evidence of a verbal contract between the spouses that neither could change the effect of their 1998 wills without the other's consent.

The court declared the 1998 wills to be mutual wills and ordered the estate to be held in trust and divided equally among the four children.

The applicants brought motions for contempt against the respondents, specifically Fateh Singh Sidhu, for breaching eight court orders related to the disclosure of financial and operational information regarding several Popeye's franchises.

The court found that the orders were clear and unequivocal, and that Sidhu deliberately and willfully disobeyed them.

The court concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that Sidhu was in civil contempt and adjourned the matter for a penalty hearing.

The plaintiffs brought a motion to preclude the tort defendants from raising the issue of the identity of the driver and owner of the defendant vehicle based on issue estoppel, following a summary judgment that dismissed the claim against the plaintiff's insurer, Unifund.

Alternatively, the plaintiffs sought to set aside the summary judgment.

The court dismissed the motion to set aside the summary judgment, finding no accidental slip or change in material facts.

The court also dismissed the issue estoppel argument, concluding that the tort defendants, who took no position on the summary judgment motion, were not parties to that proceeding for the purpose of issue estoppel.

The plaintiff, a 50-year-old American, was transferred by his employer to manage a distribution centre in Ontario.

After 5.5 years of total service, he was terminated for alleged incompetence and substandard performance.

The court found the employer failed to prove just cause, as the plaintiff was not given adequate warning or reasonable time to correct the inherited problems at the facility.

The court awarded eight months' pay in lieu of notice, along with benefits and vacation pay, but dismissed claims for relocation costs, moral damages, and punitive damages.

The employer's counterclaim for tax overpayments was allowed.

Former clients sought to include additional family members as parties in a solicitor’s bill assessment proceeding after the limitation period had expired.

The solicitor moved for a declaration that the additional claimants were barred by the limitation period under the Solicitors Act and the Limitations Act, 2002.

The court held that only one client had requested an assessment within the two‑year limitation period and that the other family members had been advised of the deficiency yet failed to amend the appointment.

No “special circumstances” justified extending the limitation period.

The court granted the solicitor’s motion barring the additional claimants from participating in the assessment proceeding and declined to suspend interest on any overpayment.

The accused brought a Charter application seeking exclusion of cocaine and cash seized during a warrantless search following a traffic stop.

He alleged breaches of ss. 8, 10(a), and 10(b) of the Charter after police concealed the true reason for his detention and delayed advising him of his right to counsel.

The court found no s. 8 breach because reasonable and probable grounds existed based on wiretap intelligence and surveillance.

However, deliberate breaches of ss. 10(a) and 10(b) occurred when police misled the accused about the reason for detention and failed to promptly advise him of his right to counsel or facilitate a requested call.

Applying the s. 24(2) Grant analysis, the court held the breaches were brief and had minimal practical impact, and that society’s interest in adjudication on the merits favoured admission of the reliable physical evidence.

The accused, charged with second-degree murder, brought a motion for a mistrial following the Crown's opening address.

The defence argued the Crown's remarks were inflammatory, included personal opinions, and improperly commented on the anticipated defence strategy, thereby undermining the accused's right to silence and reversing the burden of proof.

The court agreed, finding the Crown's characterization of the accused as an 'animal' and its pre-emptive arguments irreparably damaged the fairness of the trial.

The motion was granted and a mistrial was ordered.

The applicant sought exclusion of intercepted private communications on the basis of an admitted s. 8 Charter breach arising from the failure to identify her as a known person in a wiretap authorization.

Applying the Grant framework under s. 24(2), the court held that the breach was serious because private communications attract a high expectation of privacy and authorization materials must be accurate and complete.

However, the impact on the applicant’s protected interests was modest because her conversations were intercepted only through communications with a properly named target and would have been captured regardless.

Given the reliability and centrality of the evidence and society’s interest in adjudication on the merits, exclusion was refused.

The defendants sought leave to appeal to the Divisional Court from interlocutory orders dismissing their motions to transfer the action from Hamilton to Toronto and to strike portions of an affidavit based on settlement privilege.

The court denied leave to appeal on both issues, finding no conflicting decisions, no good reason to doubt the correctness of the orders, and that the proposed appeals did not involve matters of general importance.