Richard A. Lococo

The Respondent father brought an emergency motion to prevent the Applicant mother from moving their two children (aged six and five) outside of St. Catharines, Ontario.

The mother had filed an application seeking leave to move with the children to Watertown, New York, and intended to make an interim move to Kingston, Ontario.

The court, confirming the urgency previously determined by a Triage Judge, found that while the existing custody order did not explicitly preclude the move, it would significantly impact the father's access.

The court granted the father's emergency motion, issuing a temporary order prohibiting the mother from moving the children's residence outside St. Catharines without the father's prior written consent or further court order, pending the final determination of the mobility application.

The applicant, Sisto Seven Marquette, brought an application under s. 24(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, alleging breaches of his rights under s. 9 (arbitrary detention), s. 10(b) (rights to counsel), and s. 8 (search and seizure) following a roadside traffic stop.

He sought the exclusion of evidence under s. 24(2).

The court dismissed the application, finding no Charter breaches.

It held that police questioning during the traffic stop was within permissible highway-related purposes, the right to counsel was superseded by the requirement to provide a breath sample forthwith, and subsequent searches of his vehicle and person were lawful incidents to arrest.

Randy Calmusky, as executor, brought an application to determine entitlement to joint bank accounts and a Registered Income Fund (RIF) held by his deceased father, Henry Calmusky, with his twin brother, Gary Calmusky.

Randy also claimed occupation rent and other expenses against Gary for his use of estate assets.

The court applied the presumption of resulting trust from Pecore v. Pecore to both the joint accounts and the RIF beneficiary designation, finding that Gary failed to rebut the presumption that these assets belonged to Henry's estate.

Consequently, Gary was ordered to pay the proceeds of these accounts to the estate.

However, the court dismissed the claim for occupation rent against Gary, finding no unjust enrichment due to Gary's early intention to purchase the property and the estate's significant financial gain from the property's increased value.

Gary was held liable for a limited amount of other expenses related to his use of estate assets.

The appellant appealed a Landlord and Tenant Board decision ordering his eviction from a non-profit housing co-operative.

The Board found that the appellant's conduct, which included verbal harassment and laying siege to the co-op office, seriously impaired the safety of the property manager.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no error of law in the Board's formulation of the test for serious impairment of safety and no palpable and overriding error of fact in its evidentiary findings.

The appellant, a registered massage therapist, appealed a decision of the Discipline Committee of the College of Massage Therapists of Ontario finding him guilty of sexual abuse and revoking his license.

The Divisional Court upheld the findings of fact and dismissed allegations of bias.

However, the Court found the Panel erred by applying 2017 mandatory revocation amendments retrospectively to 2014 conduct.

Finding permanent revocation disproportionate for a first-time offender under the prior discretionary regime, the Court substituted the revocation with a suspension ending on the date of judgment.

The applicant sought judicial review of an interest arbitration award that imposed a non-contracting out provision for a newly created Customer Service Agent position.

The applicant argued it was denied procedural fairness because both parties had agreed in written submissions that the issue of contracting out would be left for a future arbitrator, yet the arbitrator decided the issue anyway.

The Divisional Court held that the arbitrator breached procedural fairness by deciding an issue without giving the parties notice or an opportunity to make submissions.

The application for judicial review was allowed in part, and the relevant portions of the award were set aside and remitted to the arbitrator.

The appellant, counsel for plaintiffs in the Indian Residential Schools Settlement Agreement proceedings, appealed a decision of the Eastern Administrative Judge refusing to recuse himself from determining a request for costs against her personally.

The Divisional Court found that the judge's prior direction, which contained substantive findings against the appellant without notice or opportunity to respond, created a reasonable apprehension of bias.

The appeal was allowed, the costs orders were set aside, and the costs matter was remanded to a different judge.

The applicant, a police officer, sought judicial review of a decision by the Ontario Civilian Police Commission upholding a finding of misconduct for the unlawful arrest of a videographer during the G20 summit.

The applicant argued the Commission erred in its standard of review and that the Hearing Officer's reasons were inadequate.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that the Commission reasonably concluded the reasons were adequate for appellate review and that the finding of misconduct was reasonable given the lack of good and sufficient cause for the arrest.

The defendants brought a motion for security for costs under Rule 56.01(1)(e) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, arguing the plaintiff's action for breach of fiduciary duty regarding mortgage investments was frivolous and vexatious.

The plaintiff, who lost his pension funds in the investments, was admittedly impecunious.

The court dismissed the motion, finding the defendants failed to establish at the first stage that the action was plainly devoid of merit or pursued for vexatious reasons.

The appellant rented a unit and subsequently rented a bedroom in that unit to the respondent.

The appellant locked the respondent out of the unit without an eviction order.

The Landlord and Tenant Board found the respondent was a subtenant and awarded damages for unlawful eviction.

On appeal, the Divisional Court found the Board erred in its application of the subtenancy provisions, as the appellant had not vacated the unit for a specified term.

However, the Court upheld the Board's remedial order, finding that the Residential Tenancies Act still applied because the appellant met the broad statutory definition of a landlord and the respondent met the definition of a tenant.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Social Benefits Tribunal refusing to reopen his appeal after his ODSP application was initially closed as incomplete.

The Disability Adjudication Unit subsequently accepted the application as complete but denied benefits on the merits.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding the Tribunal properly refused to reopen the appeal as it was moot.

The Court also held it lacked jurisdiction to determine the appellant's eligibility for benefits, as there was no Tribunal decision on entitlement before it.

The court determined costs following a four-day family law trial concerning parenting schedules and school location for the parties' son.

Victoria (Respondent) was deemed substantially successful on the key trial issues, including the parenting schedule and the location of the child's school, despite some mixed success on specific aspects.

Applying the presumption of costs in favour of the successful party under the Family Law Rules, the court awarded Victoria $35,000 in costs, payable by Keith (Applicant) within 60 days, emphasizing proportionality and reasonableness in fixing the amount.

The respondent, Andrew Witt, sought $200,000 in costs following a 14-day family law trial where he was largely successful in his claims for expanded access, varied child support, and dismissal of the applicant's spousal support claim.

The applicant, Shannon Witt, opposed the costs request, arguing she was the successful party due to Andrew's alleged reprehensible conduct, and sought her own costs while challenging the quantum of Andrew's claim and requesting time to pay due to modest financial resources.

The court found Andrew to be the successful party, presumptively entitled to costs, and rejected Shannon's arguments regarding Andrew's conduct and her re-characterization of trial findings.

The court fixed Andrew's costs at $125,000, including disbursements, payable by Shannon in three annual installments, after considering the principles of reasonableness and proportionality, the impact of Andrew's offers to settle, and Shannon's financial situation.

Following a trial that determined the parties' date of separation, the applicant sought costs.

The applicant had served an offer to settle that was less favourable than the trial outcome, entitling her to full recovery costs from the date of the offer.

The court applied the principles of proportionality and reasonableness, reducing the claimed disbursements for investigative services but largely accepting the applicant's fee claims.

Costs were fixed globally at $200,000 inclusive of disbursements and tax.

The respondent, Larry Bruni, brought a motion to change seeking to terminate his child support obligations for his two children, Taylor (22) and Brandon (19), and to recover alleged overpayments.

The applicant, Catherine Bruni, sought ongoing child support and contribution to extraordinary expenses.

The court determined that Brandon remained a "child of the marriage" until April 2020, and Taylor for specific periods (May-August 2018 and January 2019-April 2020), with a gap from January 2016 to August 2017.

Ongoing child support was set at $915 per month for both children based on the father's 2018 income.

The court found the father had overpaid child support by $7,071 for prior periods.

The father was ordered to contribute to post-secondary education expenses and other extraordinary expenses, with a 40% share for the father, 26.67% for the mother, and 33.33% for the children for college fees.

After offsetting the overpayment, the father was ordered to pay the mother $3,935.80 for past expenses.

The parties, Keith Bradley Stouffer and Elizabeth Victoria Stouffer, separated after two and a half years of marriage, with one surviving child, Myles.

The trial addressed key unresolved issues including Myles's parenting schedule, school location, and child support.

The Applicant (father) sought to maintain Myles's current school in St. Catharines and a near-equal parenting schedule.

The Respondent (mother) proposed changing Myles's school to Smithville, near her new residence, and a parenting schedule with more school-day time for her.

The court ruled in favor of the Respondent, permitting Myles to attend school in Smithville from September 2019, finding it to be in the child's best interests.

A new four-week revolving parenting schedule was adopted, which reduced the father's parenting time but was deemed consistent with the maximum contact principle.

Child support was ordered from the father to the mother based on the Federal Child Support Guidelines, with section 7 expenses shared equally, considering the mother's upcoming maternity leave.

This application concerned the interpretation of a commercial lease following a fire at the leased premises, a bar and restaurant.

The applicant tenant sought a declaration that the respondent landlord was responsible for repairing fire and water damage to the walls, ceilings, and flooring, and for abating rent until repairs were complete, pursuant to Article 9.03 of the lease.

The landlord argued the damage was minor, its repair obligations were limited, and the tenant's subsequent conduct supported its interpretation.

The court found that the premises were "not fit for occupancy" or "unsafe to use or occupy" due to accelerant odour, inoperative sprinklers, and fire/water damage, triggering Article 9.03.

The court rejected the landlord's narrow interpretation of its repair obligations and its estoppel by convention argument, declaring the landlord responsible for full repairs to a comparable pre-fire state and rent abatement until completion.

The plaintiffs in a construction defect action brought a mid-trial motion for leave to file additional and supplemental expert reports.

The plaintiffs sought to introduce a new structural engineering expert to address an allegation of bias raised against their original expert shortly before trial, and to file a supplemental report addressing newly discovered cracks.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that granting leave would cause undue delay and prejudice to the defendants, who would not have sufficient time to obtain responding reports before the trial resumed.

The court also noted that the plaintiffs failed to provide an adequate explanation for the delay in seeking leave.

The Town of Pelham, as the successful applicant in a prior application, sought costs against Fonthill Gardens Inc. The respondent argued for no costs, claiming the Town's success was incomplete as the judgment did not fully clear title for a third-party sale.

The court awarded costs to the Town on a partial indemnity basis, but with a downward adjustment to $14,000, acknowledging the Town's less than complete success on the application's practical outcome.

The respondents sought costs following their substantial success on a motion to dismiss the applicant's application for access to personal information.

The self-represented applicant argued he was successful because he was granted leave to amend, and objected to costs being awarded to in-house counsel.

The court found the respondents were substantially successful and awarded them partial indemnity costs fixed at $3,000, noting that section 36 of the Solicitors Act permits costs awards for in-house counsel.