Ran He

This appeal concerned the beneficial ownership of a residential property following the separation of common-law partners who had operated successful immigration businesses.

The appellant argued the motion judge erred by isolating the property dispute from the parties' broader financial arrangements, including an agreed 60/40 profit split from their businesses.

The Court of Appeal affirmed the motion judge's finding that the respondent held a 50% beneficial interest in the property, noting the case was pleaded solely on that issue and the appellant had not advanced a counterclaim.

The appellant's motion to admit fresh evidence, alleging depression and anxiety to explain a failure to plead a claim, was dismissed for not meeting the Palmer test.

The appellants sued their former lawyer and her firm for negligence, breach of fiduciary duty, and breach of contract, alleging she failed to proceed promptly with motions, incurred unnecessary costs, and obtained inadequate costs awards.

The trial judge dismissed the action, finding the lawyer was successful in her conduct of the litigation and was not responsible for the delays or the quantum of costs awarded.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's conclusions and agreeing that expert evidence was required to establish the standard of care regarding a settlement offer.

The appellant appealed an order vacating its claims for a construction lien and dismissing its breach of contract claims.

The appellant argued it was a 'contractor' under the Construction Act by virtue of an undisclosed assignment agreement, rather than a 'subcontractor'.

The Divisional Court upheld the Associate Justice's finding that there was no triable issue regarding the assignment, meaning the appellant was a subcontractor whose lien was registered out of time.

The court confirmed that the Associate Justice applied the correct test for a motion under section 47 of the Construction Act and did not improperly convert it into a summary judgment motion.

The appellants sought to overturn a summary judgment granting the respondent recovery on a $460,000 loan secured by a promissory note.

They argued the motion judge erred in applying the summary judgment test from Hryniak v. Mauldin, failing to apply the Statute of Frauds, and enforcing an oppressive interest rate.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding errors in the motion judge's conclusion that there was no genuine issue requiring a trial.

The court affirmed that the promissory note was valid and enforceable, the Statute of Frauds did not apply due to existing written documentation and the parties' conduct, and the agreed-upon interest rate was valid.

This endorsement concerns a motion for summary judgment that was adjourned due to the absence of necessary parties (a mortgagee and another partner in a declared partnership) and improper uploading of voluminous materials to Caselines.

The court directed the moving party to serve the necessary parties, re-upload exhibits separately, and provide hyperlinks in factums, adjourning the motion for a full day hearing.

The plaintiffs sued their former lawyer and her law firm for negligence, breach of fiduciary duty, and breach of contract, primarily alleging she mishandled a security for costs motion and other procedural steps, resulting in higher legal fees.

The court found that the action was essentially a fee dispute cloaked as a negligence claim.

The plaintiffs failed to tender expert evidence to establish the standard of care for the lawyer's advice, and the court found no clear error or egregious conduct in her handling of the file.

The action was dismissed, and the plaintiffs were ordered to pay $80,000 in costs on an elevated scale due to their improper motives in bringing the litigation.

This costs endorsement followed a successful appeal by the appellant, Dong Jin Qiu, regarding the quantum of damages.

The appeal resulted in the respondent, Biao Liu, owing the appellant $10,496.68.

The court determined that the appellant was the successful party at both trial and appeal, contrary to the respondent's argument for partial indemnity costs based on a forfeited deposit.

As the appellant did not request costs, no order for trial costs was made.

The moving party, who was the respondent on a previous appeal, brought a motion under Rules 37.14 and 59.06 of the Rules of Civil Procedure to vary the Court of Appeal's decision and dismiss the appeal.

The moving party argued the court erred by misreading the record regarding the interpretation of a partnership agreement.

The court found Rule 37.14 inapplicable as it pertains to specific procedural errors, and Rule 59.06 (accidental slip or omission) also inapplicable, as the submission was a re-argument of a point already considered and not supported by the trial judge's findings or the agreement's wording.

The motion was dismissed with costs.

The plaintiff sought costs on a substantial indemnity basis following a trial judgment in its favour for fraudulent misrepresentation.

The defendants argued for partial indemnity costs.

The court found that while the defendants engaged in fraudulent misrepresentation, it was not the egregious conduct that typically warrants substantial indemnity costs.

Exercising its discretion under section 131 of the Courts of Justice Act, the court awarded costs to the plaintiff at a mid-point between partial and substantial indemnity, fixed at $100,000 all-inclusive.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment that awarded the respondent damages for a failed agreement of purchase and sale.

The appellant argued that the respondent's sales representative made a misrepresentation regarding future property price increases, which induced him to enter the agreement.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming the motion judge's finding that the alleged misrepresentation was a non-actionable prediction, not a statement of fact, and there was no evidence it was made dishonestly or negligently.

This case concerns a claim for fraudulent misrepresentation and breach of contract related to the purchase of personal protective equipment (PPE).

Following a prior summary judgment against one defendant for breach of contract, the court proceeded to trial to determine fraud claims against the corporate principals and a related company.

The court found that the individual defendants, as directing minds of the primary corporate defendant, made knowing false representations about a "factory direct" relationship with the PPE manufacturer and the direct transfer of funds, thereby inducing the plaintiff to enter the agreement and suffer financial loss from undelivered goods.

The court pierced the corporate veil, holding the individual defendants and a sister company jointly and severally liable for the fraudulent misrepresentation.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment regarding the measure of damages for breach of a joint venture partnership agreement.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's finding of a binding partnership agreement and its breach but found an error in the quantification of damages.

The trial judge had incorrectly awarded the respondent the extra capital he invested as damages.

The Court of Appeal clarified that damages should be limited to the cost of borrowing the additional capital incurred due to the breach, up to the date of trial, less a retained deposit.

The appeal was allowed with costs to the appellant.

The applicant brought an application which was heard on an expedited schedule.

The Divisional Court issued a brief endorsement dismissing the application with no order as to costs, noting that full reasons would follow in due course.

The plaintiff landlord sought a Mareva injunction ex parte against the defendant indemnifier and her co-owning spouse to restrain the disposition of a residential property, alleging default on a commercial lease and a risk of asset dissipation.

The court dismissed the motion, finding no "extraordinary urgency" to proceed ex parte, insufficient admissible evidence to establish a "serious risk of removal or dissipation of property" and that the balance of convenience favored dismissal, partly because the injunction would indirectly affect a party against whom no strong prima facie case was made and would function as an improper Certificate of Pending Litigation.

The Plaintiff moved to strike paragraph 19 of the Statement of Defence and Counterclaim, arguing it disclosed statements protected by settlement privilege or, alternatively, pleaded evidence contrary to Rule 25.06(1).

The court declined to rule on settlement privilege, deeming it premature, but granted the motion to strike paragraph 19 on the basis that it pleaded evidence.

Partial indemnity costs were awarded to the Plaintiff.