Peter W. G. Carey

The applicants brought a motion under s. 21(5) of the Courts of Justice Act to set aside an order quashing their application for judicial review of ongoing regulatory disciplinary proceedings.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion, agreeing with the motion judge that the application for judicial review was premature because the issues should be determined at first instance by the regulatory hearing panel.

Costs of $15,000 were awarded to the respondent on consent.

The applicant, as Note Trustee of the Maple Trust, brought a motion for an order approving a marketing and sale process for the trust's assets following an Event of Default.

The motion was contested by a party who argued that any sale must obtain prior court approval.

The court approved the sale process but ordered that it include a provision requiring prior court approval for any transaction, applying the Soundair principles, to ensure the best possible price is obtained without unnecessary delay.

The respondent, IIROC, brought a motion to quash an application for judicial review commenced by the applicants, an investment dealer and its CEO.

The applicants sought to quash a notice of hearing and other disciplinary steps taken by IIROC.

The Divisional Court granted the motion to quash, finding it plain and obvious that the application could not succeed.

The court held that it lacked jurisdiction under section 2(1) of the Judicial Review Procedure Act because IIROC's disciplinary powers arise from contract, not statute or public authority.

Furthermore, the application was premature as the issues should be determined at first instance by the IIROC Hearing Panel.

The applicant brought a motion to adduce fresh evidence, consisting of 11 publications, to be added to its application for leave to appeal.

The underlying case involved the failure to immediately disclose a Mary Carter-type settlement agreement.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the motion, holding that affidavit evidence is generally not helpful in determining whether a legal issue is of public importance under section 43 of the Supreme Court Act.

The Court found that the proposed materials merely illustrated the straightforward nature of the legal issues and provided no additional assistance to the leave panel.

The appellants appealed a partial summary judgment awarding the respondent a financing fee of $249,547.49 under a contract.

The appellants argued the contract was ambiguous as to whether the fee was payable upon securing financing or only upon the closing of an acquisition.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the contractual language clear that fees were payable at two different points in time, including immediately upon raising capital, regardless of whether the transaction closed.

The plaintiff and defendant in a construction dispute entered into an agreement capping the plaintiff's damages to whatever the defendant could recover from the third party.

The fourth party appellant discovered the agreement months later and moved to dismiss the third and fourth party claims as an abuse of process.

The Court of Appeal held that while the agreement was not champertous, the failure to immediately disclose it to the other parties and the court constituted an abuse of process.

The appeal was allowed and the third and fourth party proceedings were stayed.

The appellants appealed an order requiring them to execute a specific release and indemnity in favour of the respondent bare trustees before the trustees would convey certain lands.

The Court of Appeal found that the release requested by the respondents was broader in scope than the release provided for in the underlying trust agreement.

The appeal was allowed, and the order was varied to require the appellants to execute a release only in the terms set out in the trust agreement.