Patrick J. Flynn

Following a motion concerning better particulars, striking the statement of claim, and transfer of venue, the defendant sought partial indemnity costs of $8,000–$10,000.

The court noted the defendant’s primary success was obtaining a transfer of the proceeding to London but found the motion was premature and that several claims for relief were rejected.

The court also observed that the plaintiff’s pleading unnecessarily complicated the proceeding with multiple causes of action.

Concluding that both parties achieved limited success and lost something through the motion, the court determined that fairness required each party to bear their own costs.

Following a motion in which the corporate plaintiff’s claim was dismissed and the individual plaintiff’s action was stayed for non‑compliance with an earlier costs order, the court determined the defendant’s entitlement to costs.

The defendant sought partial indemnity costs for the motion and for defending the corporate plaintiff’s action.

The self‑represented plaintiff opposed costs on grounds unrelated to the amounts claimed and attempted to revisit the merits of the earlier motion.

Applying the principles governing reasonable expectations of the losing party, the court held the claimed partial indemnity costs were fair and reasonable.

Costs of $10,343 were awarded to the defendant for the motion and one‑half of the action costs.

The applicant spouse sought an advance of $250,000 on a future equalization payment in ongoing family property litigation.

The court accepted that the applicant would almost certainly receive a substantial equalization payment exceeding $800,000 but held that the requested amount was not supported by evidence of a reasonable requirement for funds.

Applying the test from Laamanen v. Laamanen and related authorities, the court found the applicant had demonstrated the need for some funds to pursue litigation, including legal and expert expenses.

Exercising its discretion, the court ordered a more modest advance to level the litigation playing field while avoiding undue prejudice to the respondent’s corporate assets.

An interim advance of $50,000 on equalization was granted.

The defendants brought a motion under Rule 13.1.02 of the Rules of Civil Procedure seeking to transfer a civil action from Kitchener to Oshawa.

The action alleged assault, false arrest, and false imprisonment by police officers arising from an incident in Oshawa, while the plaintiff resided in Cambridge and suffered much of his damages there.

The court reviewed the venue transfer factors in Rule 13.1.02(2)(b), including where the events occurred, where damages were sustained, community interest, witness convenience, and availability of court facilities.

Applying the governing principles that a plaintiff’s choice of venue should not be lightly disturbed and that the moving party must show the proposed venue is significantly better in the interests of justice, the court found the factors largely neutral or balanced.

The defendants failed to demonstrate that Oshawa was a significantly better venue than Kitchener.

The applicant father sought shared custody of his biological daughter, access to his step-daughter, and a determination of child support and equalization.

The court granted sole custody of both children to the respondent mother, maintaining the status quo for access.

The court imputed an income of $36,000 to the applicant due to his failure to disclose financial information.

The court ordered the applicant to pay child support for both children, apportioning the step-parent support obligation based on the biological father's higher income.

For equalization, the court discounted a $38,500 mortgage debt owed by the applicant to his father to nil, finding it was unlikely to ever be repaid, resulting in a $75,000 equalization payment owed to the respondent.

The defendant brought a motion to strike the plaintiff’s statement of claim or compel further and better particulars, and sought transfer of the action from Kitchener to London.

The court held that pleadings should contain concise material facts rather than evidence and that motions to strike should only succeed in the clearest of cases.

Several paragraphs of the statement of claim were struck where they duplicated issues in a related London action or pleaded matters involving parties not before the court.

Other allegations were permitted to stand, with leave granted to amend certain pleadings to clarify material facts.

The action was ordered transferred to London so that related proceedings concerning the same property dispute could be managed together.

The landlord sought a declaration that the tenant’s share of property taxes under a commercial lease should be calculated on a proportionate share basis following the elimination of separate tenant assessments under amendments to the Assessment Act.

The tenant argued that the lease required the parties to determine what a separate assessment would have been using official information from MPAC valuation records.

The court interpreted the lease according to the parties’ intentions at the time of contracting and held that MPAC valuation records constituted sufficient official information to estimate a separate assessment.

Because the lease contemplated this scenario, the tenant’s taxes were properly calculated using the assessed value approach rather than proportionate share.

The landlord’s application for a declaration was dismissed.

Following litigation concerning the affairs of an incapable person, the court determined costs between family members and the Office of the Public Guardian and Trustee.

One party sought substantial full indemnity costs from the incapable person's estate and additional amounts from another family member.

The court emphasized proportionality in estate litigation involving incapable persons and rejected the expectation that legal costs will routinely be borne by the incapable person's estate.

While finding misconduct and escalation of litigation by multiple parties, the court held that the primary responsibility for prolonging the litigation rested with one party.

The court ordered that each party bear their own costs except that one party pay $10,000 toward another party’s costs, and that the cost of a capacity assessment be reimbursed from the incapable person's estate.

Following a family law trial in which the applicant was completely successful, the court determined the appropriate costs award.

The applicant sought substantial indemnity costs of $72,000, arguing the respondent’s unreasonable litigation position forced the matter to trial.

The court found the respondent’s insistence that the applicant support herself unreasonable given the caregiving demands of raising two severely autistic children, but also concluded the applicant pursued the case with excessive litigation effort and sought inflated recovery.

Considering the parties’ financial circumstances and the principles of fairness and proportionality, the court fixed costs at a reduced all-inclusive amount.

The court declined to order payment of costs from the respondent’s locked-in retirement account under the Family Law Act.

Four appellants appealed the dismissal of their Small Claims Court motions for judgment based on alleged settlements.

The deputy judge had previously set aside default judgments against the respondents and found that no settlements had been concluded.

When the appellants later brought motions to enforce the alleged settlements, the deputy judge dismissed them on the basis of res judicata.

The Divisional Court upheld the deputy judge's findings, concluding there was no conflict of interest and that the issue of settlement was res judicata as it had been squarely raised and decided in the prior motion.

The appellants appealed four Small Claims Court decisions dismissing their motions for judgment based on alleged settlements.

The deputy judge had previously set aside default judgments against the respondents, finding no settlements were concluded.

On the subsequent motions to enforce the settlements, the deputy judge dismissed them on the basis of res judicata.

The Superior Court dismissed the appeals, finding no error in the deputy judge's refusal to recuse himself and agreeing that the issue of settlement was res judicata as it had been squarely raised and decided in the prior motions.

The appellant appealed his conviction for impaired driving, arguing that the verdict was unreasonable and that the trial judge improperly relied on evidence obtained following a breach of the right to counsel under s. 10(b) of the Charter.

Although the breath test results were excluded under s. 24(2), the appellant contended that other observations made after the breach should also have been excluded.

The appeal court held that the trial judge properly assessed the evidence and that police observations of impairment, including driving behaviour and physical indicia of intoxication, were admissible and sufficient to support the conviction.

No error in principle or palpable and overriding error was established.

The conviction was upheld.

The plaintiffs sought damages following a slip and fall in the lobby of a hotel property that resulted in a knee injury.

Liability proceeded by default as the defendant did not appear, and the court conducted an assessment of damages.

The court accepted that the plaintiff continued to experience knee pain and reduced mobility but found the evidentiary record lacked sufficient expert medical evidence establishing causation, diagnosis, or long-term prognosis.

The court concluded the injury likely represented an aggravation of a pre-existing condition and awarded modest general damages along with limited damages under the Family Law Act and special damages.

Costs were reduced in light of the modest recovery and the fact the claim fell within the Small Claims Court monetary jurisdiction.

The applicant and the respondent separated in 2006.

The respondent died in 2010 before the trial concluded.

The applicant converted her family law claims into a dependant's relief claim under the Succession Law Reform Act.

The estate was insolvent, but the respondent had a $1 million life insurance policy naming his daughters as beneficiaries.

The court found the applicant was a dependant entitled to adequate provision and awarded her a lump sum of $430,000 from the life insurance proceeds, after accounting for equalization, child support, and occupation rent.

The balance of the policy proceeds was ordered to be paid to the daughters.

Following a motion concerning the continuation of spousal support, the court determined the appropriate costs payable by the respondent to the partially successful moving party.

The moving party sought costs on a full indemnity basis exceeding $25,000, while the responding party argued the bill of costs was excessive and should be assessed on a partial indemnity basis.

The court held that there were no circumstances justifying substantial or full indemnity costs and that the time claimed for cross-examination was excessive.

Applying the principle that costs should be reasonable and reflect the reasonable expectations of the losing party, the court fixed costs on a partial indemnity basis.

A lump sum costs award was ordered.

The appellant mother appealed a child protection order making her child a Crown ward without access for the purpose of adoption under the Child and Family Services Act.

She alleged multiple errors of fact and law by the trial judge, including improper weighing of the Society’s plan against her plan of care and reliance on outdated expert evidence.

The Superior Court emphasized the deferential standard of review applicable to factual findings in child protection proceedings and the requirement to demonstrate a palpable and overriding error.

The court found the trial judge had carefully considered the evidence, including the mother’s instability, lack of cooperation with the Society, and the child’s long-term placement with a foster family willing to adopt.

The appellant failed to rebut the presumption against access to a Crown ward, and the order was upheld.

The moving defendants sought summary dismissal of a cross‑claim arising from a three‑vehicle motor vehicle collision.

The responding defendants alleged the moving defendants’ excessive speed caused or contributed to the plaintiff’s injuries.

The court held that causation regarding speed and injury severity required expert evidence and that the responding defendants had produced none.

Given the expert reconstruction evidence filed by the moving defendants indicating the collision was unavoidable and injuries would have been similar at the posted speed limit, the court found no genuine issue requiring a trial and granted summary dismissal of the cross‑claim.

The court issued a brief endorsement to correct a clerical error in its previous reasons dated November 22, 2006.

The judge clarified that by ordering a new trial, the appeal was allowed, not dismissed, and amended paragraph 23 accordingly.

The appellant appealed a Small Claims Court judgment regarding a swimming pool construction contract.

The trial judge had awarded the respondents $6,400.87 but failed to provide adequate legal analysis or demonstrate the application of proper legal principles in his reasons.

The appellate court found that the trial judge's reasons were insufficient for appellate review, as neither party could point to the legal path taken to reach the conclusion.

The appeal was dismissed, and a new trial was ordered pursuant to section 134(1)(b) of the Courts of Justice Act.

Following the release of reasons on June 10, 2003, the parties reached an agreement on costs.

The court fixed costs in the agreed amount of $3,436.50, payable by the appellant to the successful respondents.