Patrick J. Flynn

The applicant sought an order requiring the respondent to pay $84,610 in interim disbursements pursuant to Rule 24(12) of the Family Law Rules in advance of trial.

The motion was heard shortly before trial and significant affidavit evidence was excluded under Rule 14(20)4, limiting the applicant’s evidentiary record.

The court reviewed the principles governing interim disbursements, including the need to demonstrate that the claim has sufficient merit and that the moving party lacks the financial ability to pursue the litigation without assistance.

Although there was a significant income disparity between the parties, the applicant failed to establish that the requested disbursements were necessary, reasonable, or that she was incapable of funding the litigation, particularly where substantial amounts had already been paid.

The motion was dismissed and costs were awarded to the respondent.

The plaintiff logistics company sued the defendants for breach of an alleged exclusive four‑year transportation and logistics services contract, seeking damages for lost business after the defendants used other carriers.

The court found that the purported agreement lacked essential elements of a binding contract, including certainty as to the parties, period, and price, and contained no ascertainable pricing formula.

The court also held that the employee who signed the document on behalf of the defendants lacked actual, apparent, or ostensible authority to bind them.

The agreement was further unenforceable for lack of consideration and uncertainty, and ambiguities were construed against the plaintiff under the contra proferentem rule.

The plaintiff’s claim was dismissed, and the defendants’ counterclaim was also dismissed for lack of supporting evidence.

The appellant appealed a conviction for operating a motor vehicle with blood alcohol exceeding the legal limit.

The central issue was whether breath samples were taken “as soon as practicable” as required to rely on the statutory presumption.

Although the second sample was taken within the two‑hour statutory window, there was an unexplained 28‑minute delay between the first and second tests, exceeding the typical 17–20 minute interval.

The appeal court held that the trial judge erred by failing to properly address whether the second test met the “as soon as practicable” requirement despite the unexplained delay.

As the Crown failed to establish this requirement, the conviction could not stand.

Following an earlier ruling granting the applicant a partial advance of funds significantly lower than requested, the court addressed the issue of costs.

The applicant sought 70 percent of her bill of costs totaling $4,854.77.

The court noted that the applicant achieved only limited success, obtaining one-fifth of the amount originally requested.

Applying that degree of success to the partial indemnity costs, the court fixed costs at $680 payable by the respondent forthwith.

The applicant spouse sought an advance of $250,000 on a future equalization payment in ongoing family property litigation.

The court accepted that the applicant would almost certainly receive a substantial equalization payment exceeding $800,000 but held that the requested amount was not supported by evidence of a reasonable requirement for funds.

Applying the test from Laamanen v. Laamanen and related authorities, the court found the applicant had demonstrated the need for some funds to pursue litigation, including legal and expert expenses.

Exercising its discretion, the court ordered a more modest advance to level the litigation playing field while avoiding undue prejudice to the respondent’s corporate assets.

An interim advance of $50,000 on equalization was granted.

Following a motion in which the corporate plaintiff’s claim was dismissed and the individual plaintiff’s action was stayed for non‑compliance with an earlier costs order, the court determined the defendant’s entitlement to costs.

The defendant sought partial indemnity costs for the motion and for defending the corporate plaintiff’s action.

The self‑represented plaintiff opposed costs on grounds unrelated to the amounts claimed and attempted to revisit the merits of the earlier motion.

Applying the principles governing reasonable expectations of the losing party, the court held the claimed partial indemnity costs were fair and reasonable.

Costs of $10,343 were awarded to the defendant for the motion and one‑half of the action costs.

The defendants brought a motion under Rule 13.1.02 of the Rules of Civil Procedure seeking to transfer a civil action from Kitchener to Oshawa.

The action alleged assault, false arrest, and false imprisonment by police officers arising from an incident in Oshawa, while the plaintiff resided in Cambridge and suffered much of his damages there.

The court reviewed the venue transfer factors in Rule 13.1.02(2)(b), including where the events occurred, where damages were sustained, community interest, witness convenience, and availability of court facilities.

Applying the governing principles that a plaintiff’s choice of venue should not be lightly disturbed and that the moving party must show the proposed venue is significantly better in the interests of justice, the court found the factors largely neutral or balanced.

The defendants failed to demonstrate that Oshawa was a significantly better venue than Kitchener.

The defendant brought a motion to strike the plaintiff’s statement of claim or compel further and better particulars, and sought transfer of the action from Kitchener to London.

The court held that pleadings should contain concise material facts rather than evidence and that motions to strike should only succeed in the clearest of cases.

Several paragraphs of the statement of claim were struck where they duplicated issues in a related London action or pleaded matters involving parties not before the court.

Other allegations were permitted to stand, with leave granted to amend certain pleadings to clarify material facts.

The action was ordered transferred to London so that related proceedings concerning the same property dispute could be managed together.

The landlord sought a declaration that the tenant’s share of property taxes under a commercial lease should be calculated on a proportionate share basis following the elimination of separate tenant assessments under amendments to the Assessment Act.

The tenant argued that the lease required the parties to determine what a separate assessment would have been using official information from MPAC valuation records.

The court interpreted the lease according to the parties’ intentions at the time of contracting and held that MPAC valuation records constituted sufficient official information to estimate a separate assessment.

Because the lease contemplated this scenario, the tenant’s taxes were properly calculated using the assessed value approach rather than proportionate share.

The landlord’s application for a declaration was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction for impaired driving, arguing that the verdict was unreasonable and that the trial judge improperly relied on evidence obtained following a breach of the right to counsel under s. 10(b) of the Charter.

Although the breath test results were excluded under s. 24(2), the appellant contended that other observations made after the breach should also have been excluded.

The appeal court held that the trial judge properly assessed the evidence and that police observations of impairment, including driving behaviour and physical indicia of intoxication, were admissible and sufficient to support the conviction.

No error in principle or palpable and overriding error was established.

The conviction was upheld.

The plaintiffs sought damages following a slip and fall in the lobby of a hotel property that resulted in a knee injury.

Liability proceeded by default as the defendant did not appear, and the court conducted an assessment of damages.

The court accepted that the plaintiff continued to experience knee pain and reduced mobility but found the evidentiary record lacked sufficient expert medical evidence establishing causation, diagnosis, or long-term prognosis.

The court concluded the injury likely represented an aggravation of a pre-existing condition and awarded modest general damages along with limited damages under the Family Law Act and special damages.

Costs were reduced in light of the modest recovery and the fact the claim fell within the Small Claims Court monetary jurisdiction.

The applicant and the respondent separated in 2006.

The respondent died in 2010 before the trial concluded.

The applicant converted her family law claims into a dependant's relief claim under the Succession Law Reform Act.

The estate was insolvent, but the respondent had a $1 million life insurance policy naming his daughters as beneficiaries.

The court found the applicant was a dependant entitled to adequate provision and awarded her a lump sum of $430,000 from the life insurance proceeds, after accounting for equalization, child support, and occupation rent.

The balance of the policy proceeds was ordered to be paid to the daughters.

The appellant mother appealed a child protection order making her child a Crown ward without access for the purpose of adoption under the Child and Family Services Act.

She alleged multiple errors of fact and law by the trial judge, including improper weighing of the Society’s plan against her plan of care and reliance on outdated expert evidence.

The Superior Court emphasized the deferential standard of review applicable to factual findings in child protection proceedings and the requirement to demonstrate a palpable and overriding error.

The court found the trial judge had carefully considered the evidence, including the mother’s instability, lack of cooperation with the Society, and the child’s long-term placement with a foster family willing to adopt.

The appellant failed to rebut the presumption against access to a Crown ward, and the order was upheld.

The moving defendants sought summary dismissal of a cross‑claim arising from a three‑vehicle motor vehicle collision.

The responding defendants alleged the moving defendants’ excessive speed caused or contributed to the plaintiff’s injuries.

The court held that causation regarding speed and injury severity required expert evidence and that the responding defendants had produced none.

Given the expert reconstruction evidence filed by the moving defendants indicating the collision was unavoidable and injuries would have been similar at the posted speed limit, the court found no genuine issue requiring a trial and granted summary dismissal of the cross‑claim.