Patricia Anne Virc

The plaintiff, Jack Ganz Consulting Ltd. (JGC), brought a motion for an order compelling the defendant, Recipe Unlimited Corporation, to produce additional documents for inspection under Rules 30.06 and 30.08.

The defendant resisted, arguing that the plaintiff was attempting to vary a prior scheduling order, that issue estoppel applied, that sufficient discovery had already occurred, and that the requests were speculative and irrelevant, particularly in the context of a pending summary judgment motion.

The Master found jurisdiction to hear the motion and that issue estoppel did not apply.

However, the Master largely denied the plaintiff's specific requests for further production, concluding that the plaintiff had already received substantial discovery and that many of the requested documents were not relevant or proportionate to the pending summary judgment motion, or that the plaintiff had not provided convincing evidence of their existence or necessity.

Costs were ordered to be "in the cause."

The appellants, owners of a residential property in Caledon, Ontario, appealed a decision dismissing their application against the Ontario Heritage Trust and a local resident.

The appellants' property is accessible only via a 1 km driveway through parkland owned by the OHT, over which they hold an easement for ingress and egress.

The appellants claimed the easement granted them exclusive use of the driveway and sought to prevent public access by hikers using trails on the OHT property.

The court upheld the lower court's decision, finding that the deed of easement did not grant exclusive use, that public use by hikers did not substantially interfere with the appellants' easement rights, and that an injunction against the publication of a hiking guide was not warranted.

The plaintiff sought leave to amend its statement of claim to plead, in the alternative, breach of the defendant's obligation to give reasonable notice of termination of a consulting agreement, without alleging new facts.

The defendant opposed, arguing it raised a statute-barred new cause of action or lacked particulars.

The court granted leave to amend, finding it was an alternative theory of damages based on existing facts, not a new cause of action, and that sufficient material facts were pleaded.

The plaintiff was ordered to pay $5,000 in costs for the amendment.

The defendant's cross-motion to dismiss the action for non-compliance with a costs order was denied, but its motion to strike certain evidence was granted, with $1,000 costs awarded for that portion.

The appellant lawyer appealed a decision of the Law Society Tribunal Appeal Division, which upheld the Hearing Division's finding that she knowingly participated in mortgage fraud in six real estate transactions and revoked her licence.

The appellant argued the Hearing Division lacked jurisdiction to render a decision with only two members, improperly relied on an expert report, and unreasonably found she had the requisite intent.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding that the Statutory Powers Procedure Act permitted the two remaining members to complete the hearing, the expert report was properly used to understand red flags of fraud, and the finding of knowing participation in fraud was reasonable.

The appellant appealed an order of the Superior Court of Justice dated October 20, 2017.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the motion judge's reasons and dismissed the appeal.

Costs were awarded to the respondent in the sum of $15,000 on a partial indemnity basis inclusive of disbursements and HST.

Following the dismissal of the applicants' application, the respondents sought costs.

One respondent settled their costs claim, while the other, represented by pro bono counsel, sought substantial indemnity costs due to the applicants' conduct.

The court held that pro bono representation does not preclude a costs award and that ordinary costs rules apply.

The court found the applicants' conduct expanded the litigation but did not rise to the level of reprehensible conduct required for substantial indemnity.

The court awarded partial indemnity costs to the pro bono respondent in the amount of $84,836.79.

The defendants moved to compel the plaintiff to answer follow-up questions regarding customer information and certain refusals during discovery.

The plaintiff cross-moved to compel the personal defendants to answer questions refused at their examinations for discovery.

The court ordered the plaintiff to disclose redacted customer names and contact information, subject to strict confidentiality protocols.

The court refused to compel the plaintiff to interview a third-party business advisor or disclose information related to employee witness statements, citing litigation privilege.

On the cross-motion, the court found questions regarding the defendants' rationale for selling the business irrelevant to the alleged sabotage and properly refused.

Most refusals on both sides were upheld.

The applicants sought a declaration of exclusive use over a right-of-way (ROW) connected to their property and permanent injunctions against the Ontario Heritage Trust (OHT) and Nicola Ross.

The OHT, as the servient tenement owner, permitted public access to the ROW, which also served as access to the Bruce Trail.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the easement did not grant exclusive use to the applicants and that there was no substantial interference with their rights.

The court also found the applicants lacked "clean hands" due to misleading evidence and dismissed the injunction claim against Ms. Ross, noting her statements were consistent with OHT's position and not made with malice.

The appellant, a minority shareholder, appealed a summary judgment decision dismissing part of his oppression remedy claim as statute-barred.

The motions judge found the appellant was aware of the constituent elements of his claim regarding a corporate dilution transaction more than three years before commencing the action.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the motions judge's conclusion on discoverability, noting that a fresh and discrete act of oppression did not occur to extend the limitation period.

The applicants brought a motion to strike portions of the respondents' affidavits filed in a pending application regarding a right of way dispute and defamation claims.

The applicants argued the impugned paragraphs contained irrelevant, prejudicial, and hearsay evidence.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the evidence was either withdrawn from objection by the applicants or was admissible as it went to the respondents' state of mind, responded directly to issues raised by the applicants, or provided relevant narrative history rather than being offered for the truth of its contents.

The appellants brought an action to enforce promissory notes and a claim for fraudulent conveyance.

The motion judge granted summary judgment to the appellants on the promissory notes but dismissed their fraudulent conveyance claim.

On appeal, the appellants argued the motion judge erred in dismissing the fraudulent conveyance claim when the defendants had not moved for summary judgment.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, confirming that summary judgment may be granted against a moving party.

The cross-appeal was allowed in part on consent to reduce the damages awarded on the promissory notes from $710,000 to $650,000.

A former director and investor brought a motion for summary judgment alleging negligent misrepresentation by corporate directors, the chief financial officer, and an engineering consultant arising from a private placement investment that later became worthless after the corporation entered receivership.

The plaintiff alleged misrepresentations concerning reserve reports, a bank borrowing base notice, and the intended use of proceeds of the financing.

The court held that many alleged representations were made to the plaintiff in his capacity as a director rather than as an investor, raising significant duty of care issues and rendering reliance problematic.

The court also found genuine issues requiring a trial regarding whether misrepresentations occurred, whether they were negligent, and whether reliance was established.

In addition, most claims were found to be statute‑barred under the Limitations Act, 2002.

Multiple motions were brought in related commercial proceedings seeking security for costs and leave to amend pleadings.

The defendants sought security for costs against an individual plaintiff on the basis that the action was allegedly frivolous and vexatious and that the plaintiff lacked sufficient assets in Ontario.

The court held that the claim was not clearly devoid of merit and there was insufficient evidence that the plaintiff lacked assets, so security was refused.

In separate corporate actions, the moving parties also sought security for costs against a corporate plaintiff, but the court found their evidence of financial insufficiency was speculative and failed to meet the Rule 56.01 threshold.

However, leave to amend the statements of defence to challenge the validity of an assignment of claims and to plead reliance on legal advice was granted, as no prejudice would result.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment dismissing his defamation action.

The action arose from a statement of defence in a wrongful dismissal suit alleging the appellant installed undisclosed surveillance cameras in employee living accommodations.

The motion judge found the respondents established the substantial truth of the allegations, noting the appellant failed to file responding affidavit material as required by Rule 20.02(2).

The Court of Appeal found sufficient evidence supported the motion judge's conclusion and dismissed the appeal.

Following a change in corporate control, the new management of Echo Energy Canada Inc. sought to assess the paid accounts of three law firms retained by the former management.

The application judge dismissed the application, finding no 'special circumstances' under s. 11 of the Solicitors Act.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal allowed the appeal in part.

The Court found that the application judge erred in principle by adopting a lawyer-focused perspective and failing to consider evidence that the former directors may not have acted in the company's best interests when approving the accounts of litigation counsel (Lenczner and Voorheis).

Special circumstances were established for those accounts.

However, the appeal regarding the corporate counsel (McCarthy) was dismissed as no special circumstances were shown.

The respondent, as president and chairman of the appellant corporation, ruled at an annual shareholders' meeting that certain proxy votes could only be used to vote for the management slate of directors, based on the advice of corporate counsel.

This ruling was later overturned in court, and costs were awarded against the respondent.

The respondent sought indemnification from the corporation for his legal costs under s. 136(1) of the Ontario Business Corporations Act.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the respondent was entitled to indemnification because he acted honestly and in good faith with a view to the best interests of the corporation, particularly by reasonably relying on the advice of corporate counsel.