Family and Matrimonial Law - ODC

The moving party brought a motion for leave to appeal a lower court decision.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal and ordered the moving party to pay costs of $5,000 to the responding party.

The applicant father brought a motion for an extension of time to perfect his appeal of a parenting order.

The father filed his notice of appeal in March 2024 but failed to perfect it within the required 30 days, eventually filing materials in July 2024.

The court applied the factors for extending time and found that the father provided no reasonable explanation for the delay, the appeal lacked merit as it attempted to relitigate issues already decided, and the delay prejudiced the mother and the special needs child who required finality.

The motion was dismissed, and the father was ordered to pay costs of $3,500.

The moving party brought a motion for leave to appeal the decision of the lower court dated June 17, 2024.

The Divisional Court granted the motion for leave to appeal and reserved the costs of the motion to the panel hearing the appeal.

The appellant's counsel brought a motion to be removed as solicitor of record in the Divisional Court proceedings due to a breakdown in the solicitor-client relationship.

The appellant did not oppose the motion, but the respondent opposed it, citing concerns about the timing given an impending motion in the Superior Court of Justice.

The Divisional Court granted the motion to remove counsel effective March 29, 2024, noting that the removal applies only to the Divisional Court proceedings and is without prejudice to the pending matters in the Superior Court of Justice.

Following the dismissal of the appellant's appeal from final orders of the Family Court, the parties made written submissions on costs.

The respondent sought $4,000 in costs as the successful party.

The appellant also sought $4,000, arguing the respondent's counsel acted unreasonably by making paragraph numbering errors.

The Divisional Court rejected the appellant's argument, finding the cited conduct did not justify depriving the successful party of costs.

The court awarded the respondent costs on a partial indemnity basis, fixed at $3,000 to account for the appellant's limited financial circumstances.

The appellant appealed an interim order that dismissed her motion for spousal support and section 7 expenses for prematurity.

The To Be Spoken To (TBST) judge had previously directed the parties to attend an urgent case conference on these issues.

However, the case conference judge mistakenly treated the attendance as a motion and dismissed it for lack of urgency under the Family Law Rules.

The Divisional Court granted the appeal, finding that the case conference judge erred by failing to follow the TBST judge's direction and by hearing a substantive motion at a case conference without the parties' consent.

The order was set aside, and the appellant was permitted to schedule her motion.

The moving party brought a motion for leave to appeal an order dated November 22, 2022.

The Divisional Court granted leave to appeal with costs fixed at $3,000, payable in the discretion of the appeal panel.

The court ordered the appeal to be heard on an expedited basis and scheduled a case management teleconference to set a schedule.

The moving party sought an extension of time to appeal an interlocutory order that gave the respondent carriage of the sale of a property.

The court applied the factors for granting an extension of time and found that while the delay was short and explained, the proposed appeal lacked merit as it sought to appeal matters not finally determined and took issue with the motion judge's reasons rather than the order itself.

The motion for an extension of time was dismissed.

The mother appealed a summary judgment order concerning the protection of and access to her child.

At the hearing, the parties presented a mutually acceptable agreement to dismiss the appeal on consent.

The Children's Aid Society undertook not to place the child for adoption without consent for seven months, to evaluate the possibility of reintegration, to increase access to at least twice a month, and to bring an early status review application if reintegration is deemed possible.

The Divisional Court granted the consent endorsement request and dismissed the appeal on those terms.

The moving party brought a motion for leave to appeal an unreported order.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal.

As neither party filed costs outlines, no costs were ordered.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Social Benefits Tribunal upholding the denial of her application for social assistance under the Ontario Works Act, 1997.

The appellant's spousal support payments were being garnished 100% by the Family Responsibility Office to repay an overpayment of child support.

The Administrator determined that the garnished spousal support payments constituted income because they were made on behalf of or for the benefit of the appellant to reduce her debt.

The Divisional Court found the Tribunal's interpretation of the clear and unambiguous statutory provisions to be reasonable and dismissed the appeal.

The applicant, a daycare teacher, sought judicial review of decisions by the respondent children's aid society verifying an allegation of risk of sexual harm against him.

The Divisional Court found that the respondent's investigation was fundamentally flawed, superficial, and failed to follow mandatory investigative steps, such as interviewing key witnesses and examining the physical layout of the daycare.

The court quashed the respondent's decisions, finding them unreasonable, and awarded costs to the applicant.

The appellant father appealed a summary judgment order granting sole custody of the children to the mother with supervised access for the father under the Child and Family Services Act.

The father argued the motion judge erred by refusing an adjournment, proceeding by summary judgment, and applying child protection principles instead of family law principles.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no errors of law or fact.

The court noted the father had been given an opportunity to present his case and that the evidence supported the finding that the children were in need of protection due to the father's mental health and parental conflict.

The appellant mother appealed a final order granting Crown wardship with no access for the purpose of adoption of her child.

She argued the trial judge erred in finding the child was in need of protection, improperly applied expert psychological evidence, and placed undue weight on her mental health history and lack of cooperation with the child protection agency.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable or overriding error in the trial judge's conclusion that Crown wardship was the only viable plan to protect the child and serve the child's best interests.

The appellant mother appealed a trial judge's decision declaring her child a Crown ward without access.

The mother argued the trial judge erred by placing too much importance on her young age, ignoring her efforts to remedy parenting deficiencies, and failing to properly apply the tests for the child's best interests, maximum time in care, and termination of access.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's factual conclusions or application of the law, including the consideration of the child's African Francophone heritage and the assessment of alternative plans.

The Trustee in Bankruptcy brought a motion to quash an appeal filed by the bankrupt's former spouse.

The former spouse had appealed an order made by a Master, arguing the Master acted in her capacity as a Superior Court Master rather than a Registrar in Bankruptcy, which would give the Divisional Court jurisdiction.

The Divisional Court found that the Master was acting in her capacity as a Registrar in Bankruptcy when she dismissed the motion to vary.

Consequently, the Divisional Court lacked jurisdiction to hear the appeal, as appeals from a Registrar in Bankruptcy must be brought before a single judge on the Commercial List.

The motion to quash the appeal was granted.

The appellant mother appealed a trial judge's order making her three children Crown wards, with no access for the purpose of adoption.

She argued the Children's Aid Society failed to provide a proper written Plan of Care, the trial judge failed to consider returning the children under supervision, and the trial judge erred in denying access.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error or error of law.

The trial judge properly considered the Plans of Care, correctly concluded that a supervision order would not work, and reasonably found that access would not be beneficial and would impair adoption opportunities.

The appellant mother appealed a summary judgment order making her daughter a Crown ward without access.

She argued the motion judge erred in denying her an adjournment to retain new counsel and present additional evidence, and in granting the order on the record before him.

The Divisional Court admitted fresh evidence regarding a new parenting assessment but found it did not raise a genuine issue requiring a trial.

The court concluded the motion judge made no errors in denying the adjournment or in finding that Crown wardship without access was in the child's best interests.

The appeal was dismissed.

The court issued an endorsement regarding costs following a motion.

Applying the principle that costs follow the event and considering the factors in Rules 49 and 57.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the court awarded the respondent costs of $5,000 on a partial indemnity scale.

The appellant mother appealed a motion judge's order varying child support and dismissing her claim for retroactive support.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, finding the motion judge made palpable and overriding errors in applying the 40% shared custody rule without a trial, improperly averaging the father's income over five years under section 17(1) of the Guidelines, and dismissing the retroactive support claim.

Applying the Supreme Court's decision in D.B.S., the Court awarded the mother $40,879.73 in retroactive child support dating back to her effective notice in 2001.