ODC 2018

The applicant sought judicial review of a Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario decision dismissing his application as out of time, and a subsequent reconsideration decision.

The Tribunal found the application was filed outside the one-year limitation period under the Human Rights Code and there was no evidence the delay was incurred in good faith.

The Divisional Court dismissed the applicant's motion to admit fresh evidence, finding it did not meet the test for admission on judicial review.

The Court held there was no denial of procedural fairness and the Tribunal's decisions were reasonable, dismissing the application for judicial review.

The moving party brought a motion to vary an order of the Divisional Court that had dismissed her application for judicial review as frivolous, vexatious, or an abuse of process under Rule 2.1.01.

The court dismissed the motion to vary, finding that it lacked jurisdiction under s. 21(5) of the Courts of Justice Act to review a Rule 2.1.01 order.

The proper route to challenge the order is an appeal to the Court of Appeal for Ontario.

The moving party sought leave to appeal, which was denied.

The court initially awarded $2,000 in costs, penalizing the responding party for failing to file costs submissions five days prior to the hearing.

The responding party subsequently clarified that costs submissions were withheld because of the existence of offers to settle, in accordance with counsel's interpretation of a practice direction.

The court rescinded its initial endorsement, finding that the responding party had complied with the practice direction.

The court dismissed the application for leave to appeal and awarded the responding party costs fixed at $5,000.

The landlord brought a motion to quash the tenants' appeal of a Landlord and Tenant Board eviction order.

The tenants had not paid rent since November 2017 and admitted to withholding rent to invest in their business.

The Divisional Court found the appeal was manifestly devoid of merit as it raised no questions of law, but rather challenged factual findings and procedural matters from a separate application that was not appealed.

The court quashed the appeal, lifted the stay of the eviction order, and awarded costs to the landlord.

The applicant sought an extension of time to bring a motion to vary or set aside an order that affirmed the Registrar's dismissal of his judicial review application for delay.

The underlying application concerned police street checks.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion, finding that the applicant's delay in seeking the extension was unreasonable, there was no reasonable explanation for the entirety of the delay, the respondents would suffer prejudice, and the merits of the appeal were not high.

The appellant appealed an eviction order from the Landlord and Tenant Board.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal in part, finding that the Board erred in law by determining the individual appellant was a tenant, as the lease was solely in the name of his numbered company.

The court ordered the individual's name removed as a party but upheld the eviction order against the numbered company, finding the Board acted reasonably in refusing an adjournment request.

The self-represented appellant brought a motion to review a single judge's order requiring him to post $10,000 in security for costs for his pending appeal of a Small Claims Court decision.

The Divisional Court found no error of law or palpable and overriding error in the motion judge's conclusion that the appeal was frivolous and vexatious and that the appellant had insufficient assets to pay a costs award.

The motion to review was dismissed with costs.

The applicant sought judicial review of a decision by the Office of the Independent Police Review Director (OIPRD) to screen out his complaints against Toronto Police Service officers.

The OIPRD declined to proceed because it lacked jurisdiction over events occurring before its creation in 2009, and because the passage of time made it unlikely that an investigation into a 2013 incident would find misconduct.

The Divisional Court found the OIPRD's decision reasonable based on the record and dismissed the application.

The appellant, a lawyer, appealed a Small Claims Court decision dismissing his claim for unpaid legal fees against his family's business.

The appellant argued he had a historical oral retainer with the company, established when his father ran it, which should apply to the disputed accounts.

The trial judge found no oral agreement existed for the specific accounts, noting the appellant delayed billing until after his sister took over the company and failed to inform her of the liability.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's factual findings and rejecting the appellant's new argument of unjust enrichment because it was not pleaded at trial.

The appellant appealed a Small Claims Court judgment ordering him to pay $16,215.95 for the early termination of a vehicle lease agreement.

At trial, the appellant claimed he did not sign the lease agreement and had an oral agreement that no penalty would apply for early return.

The Deputy Judge found as a fact that the appellant had signed the agreement.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the Deputy Judge's factual findings and credibility determinations were entitled to deference and revealed no palpable and overriding error.

The applicant sought judicial review of a decision by the Office of the Independent Police Review Director (OIPRD) not to proceed with his complaint against the police.

The OIPRD had screened out the complaint as frivolous under section 60(4) of the Police Services Act, finding no air of reality to the allegations of hacking, being followed, and police corruption.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, holding that the OIPRD's decision was reasonable based on the record before it.

The applicant filed an application for judicial review regarding the Deputy Judges Council's alleged failure to respond to complaints against two deputy judges.

The Ministry of the Attorney General requested the application be dismissed under Rule 2.1.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure as frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process.

The court found the applicant's materials unintelligible, scandalous, and lacking any evidentiary value.

The application was dismissed as an abuse of process.

The appellant HVAC rental company appealed a Small Claims Court decision ordering it to return $17,334.09 to the respondent consumer.

The consumer had been forced to pay the amount to discharge liens registered against his home when he sold it, pursuant to a 10-year rental contract.

The trial judge found the buyout and lien provisions were onerous terms in a contract of adhesion that had not been brought to the consumer's attention, applying the Tilden principle.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's factual findings.

The applicant sought judicial review of two costs orders made by FSCO adjudicators after her claim for a $1,378.68 medical assessment expense was dismissed due to her failure to attend a required medical examination.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application regarding the first-instance costs order as premature because an internal appeal was still pending.

The court dismissed the application regarding the appeal costs order on its merits, finding the Director's Delegate's decision was reasonable, procedurally fair, and justified given the applicant's complete lack of success and conduct that prolonged the proceedings.

The defendant brought a motion to extend the time to serve and file an appeal from a Small Claims Court decision that struck its defence and awarded damages to the plaintiff.

The defendant had repeatedly failed to comply with court orders, failed to pay costs, and failed to attend trial with its witness.

Applying the Laczko factors, the Divisional Court found that while the defendant intended to appeal and explained the delay, the appeal lacked merit and the plaintiff would suffer prejudice.

The motion to extend time was dismissed.

The appellant appealed a decision reducing her spousal support, arguing the motions judge erred by not directing a trial and by failing to properly account for the compensatory nature of her support.

The appellant also sought to introduce fresh evidence of her historical tax returns.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion to introduce fresh evidence, finding it did not meet the Palmer test.

The court dismissed the appeal, holding that the motions judge made no palpable and overriding error in her factual findings, including the finding that the appellant had cohabited with her new partner prior to marriage, and correctly applied the law regarding material change in circumstances.

The respondent obtained a default judgment against the appellant in Small Claims Court.

The appellant successfully moved to set aside the default judgment, but the deputy judge imposed a condition that the appellant pay $25,000 into court.

The appellant appealed this condition to the Divisional Court.

The respondent brought a motion to quash the appeal, arguing the conditional order was interlocutory.

The Divisional Court agreed that the order was interlocutory and that under section 31 of the Courts of Justice Act, there is no right of appeal to the Divisional Court from an interlocutory order of the Small Claims Court.

The motion to quash the appeal was granted.

The appellant appealed a Small Claims Court decision awarding the respondent $3,117.38 for defective mechanical work.

The trial judge had preferred the evidence of the respondent's expert, who testified that a timing belt was incorrectly installed, causing engine damage.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's credibility assessments and factual findings.

The appellants, initially self-represented, filed a claim in Small Claims Court regarding a kitchen installation.

The respondent filed a defence and a Defendant's Claim.

Believing their original claim served as a defence, the appellants did not file a separate defence to the Defendant's Claim, leading to a default judgment against them.

A motion judge refused to set aside the default judgment.

On appeal, the Divisional Court set aside the default judgment, finding that leaving it in place would effectively foreclose the appellants' ability to advance their original claim, which was contrary to the interests of justice.

The appellant appealed from a Landlord and Tenant Board consent order terminating his occupancy and a review order dismissing his request for reconsideration.

The appellant argued that the consent order was invalid because he was the surviving spouse of the deceased tenant and could not waive his rights to continue the tenancy under the Residential Tenancies Act.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding that even if the appellant had acquired the rights of a tenant, he was entitled to consent to the termination of the tenancy under s. 37(3) of the Act, and there was no evidence of mutual mistake, fraud, or other grounds to set aside the consent order.