ODC 2017

The plaintiff appealed an interlocutory order of a Master to the Divisional Court instead of a single judge of the Superior Court.

The defendant successfully moved to quash the appeal, and the plaintiff's motion to extend time to appeal was dismissed.

In this costs endorsement, the court awarded the defendant full indemnity costs for the motion to quash, noting the plaintiff pursued the wrong appellate route despite repeated warnings.

The court also awarded partial costs for the motion to extend time, fixing total costs at $7,497.49.

The appellant appealed a Small Claims Court decision dismissing his action against his insurer for breach of contract and conversion.

The appellant claimed $25,000 in damages, including for psychological distress, after the insurer automatically renewed his motorcycle insurance policy and withdrew a premium payment, which was promptly returned upon cancellation.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's conclusion that the policy remained in force until expressly cancelled, and that the claimed damages were not reasonably foreseeable.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Assessment Review Board classifying thirty-two natural gas gate station properties as Industrial Property Class rather than Commercial Property Class.

The Board found that adding a legally required odorant to natural gas constituted 'processing' because it changed the product's character and made it more marketable.

The Divisional Court upheld the Board's decision, finding it reasonable that a legal requirement to add an odorant to permit the gas to be legally sold renders the gas more marketable.

The appeal was dismissed.

The moving party sought to set aside a decision of a single judge of the Divisional Court who had dismissed her appeal from a Small Claims Court judgment regarding an unpaid loan.

The Divisional Court panel dismissed the motion for lack of jurisdiction, holding that under the Courts of Justice Act, a single judge's decision on a Small Claims Court appeal is a decision of the Divisional Court, and any further appeal lies only to the Court of Appeal with leave.

Section 21(5) of the Act, which allows a panel to set aside a single judge's decision, applies only to motions, not appeals.

The appellant appealed a final costs order requiring him to pay $25,000 to the respondent following the settlement of their matrimonial proceedings.

The trial judge had based the costs award on a finding that the respondent had proposed the fundamental framework of parallel parenting and the appellant had unreasonably rejected it.

The Divisional Court found this to be a palpable and overriding error, as the appellant's earlier offer had actually proposed parallel parenting, while the respondent's initial offers sought weekend access.

The costs order was set aside, and no costs were awarded for the trial or the appeal.

The appellant appealed a judgment ordering the estate of Doreen Duffey to pay $11,862.31 to the estate of Frederick Duffey.

The appellant argued the application judge erred in interpreting the will regarding funeral expenses and characterizing certain house expenditures as capital rather than repairs.

The Divisional Court found no error in the judge's interpretation of the will or characterization of the expenses.

The appeal was allowed only to the extent of a conceded $939.00 deduction, and otherwise dismissed.

The Attorney General appealed a decision ordering the full forfeiture of $29,900 in seized cash under the Civil Remedies Act, 2001, despite the parties reaching a settlement to return $4,000 to the claimant.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, holding that proceedings under the Act are in rem and affect the world at large, meaning the court cannot simply rubber-stamp a settlement.

Because the cash was found to be proceeds of unlawful activity and there was no evidence establishing the claimant as the legitimate owner, mandatory forfeiture of the entire amount was required under section 3(1) of the Act.

The appellant appealed a Small Claims Court decision dismissing his claim for unpaid immigration consulting services.

At trial, the appellant's paralegal closed their case without calling the appellant to testify.

After the respondent testified, the appellant attempted to take the stand to give evidence-in-chief, which the trial judge refused as an improper splitting of the case.

The Divisional Court found no reversible error in the trial judge's management of the trial process and dismissed the appeal.

The defendants moved to set aside a Registrar's administrative order dismissing their appeal to the Divisional Court for delay, and sought an extension of time to perfect the appeal.

The underlying action involved a claim for unpaid accounting invoices where default judgment had been partially set aside by a Master.

The court found that the defendants had engaged in contumelious delay throughout the proceedings, failed to provide a valid explanation for failing to perfect the appeal, and that the proposed appeal lacked merit.

The motion was dismissed with costs.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment finding him liable for civil fraud and ordering him to pay $30,526 plus costs.

The respondent had paid the appellant's CRA tax lien to clear title to a jointly owned family residence transferred to her pursuant to a family law settlement, and subsequently sued him after he declared bankruptcy, alleging his failure to disclose the tax debt constituted fraudulent misrepresentation.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal and dismissed the action, finding the trial judge erred in law by applying a test for fraudulent non-disclosure rather than the strict four-part test for fraudulent misrepresentation, and made palpable and overriding errors of fact unsupported by the evidence.

The appellant tenant appealed a Landlord and Tenant Board decision ordering her eviction so the landlords' daughter could move into the unit.

The tenant argued she was denied procedural fairness and that the Board erred in applying the genuine intention test and refusing relief from eviction.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no denial of procedural fairness, no error in the Board's application of the genuine intention test under s. 48(1) of the Residential Tenancies Act, and no error in refusing relief under s. 83(3).

The appellant, an independent health facility, appealed a Small Claims Court decision ordering it to pay fees to the College of Physicians and Surgeons of Ontario for practice assessments.

The appellant argued the College lacked statutory authority to charge these fees.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding that under the integrated legislative scheme of the Independent Health Facilities Act and the Regulated Health Professions Act, the College had the authority to enact by-laws charging fees to non-members for assessments it was required to conduct.

The appellant physician appealed a Discipline Committee decision finding he committed professional misconduct by sexually abusing a patient and revoking his license.

The appellant argued the defence of officially induced error, abuse of process by the College Registrar, and that the mandatory revocation provisions violated section 7 of the Charter.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal on all substantive grounds, finding the sexual relationship was concurrent with the doctor-patient relationship and that the court was bound by Court of Appeal precedent upholding the constitutionality of mandatory revocation.

The court only allowed the appeal in part to vacate an order requiring the appellant to post security for the patient's potential future therapy costs.

The applicant, a paediatrician facing allegations of sexual abuse of a minor patient, applied for judicial review of an interim order by the College's Inquiries, Complaints and Reports Committee (ICRC).

The order imposed practice restrictions, including requiring a dedicated practice monitor and direct notification to patients of the restrictions.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that the ICRC's decision was reasonable and based on some evidence of potential harm to patients, given the serious nature of the allegations and the committee's mandate to protect the public.

The applicant child protection agency brought a motion to set aside an order extending the respondent mother's time to perfect her appeal of a Crown wardship order, and to dismiss the appeal for delay.

The court found that the motion judge had properly exercised his inherent jurisdiction and considered the relevant factors, including prejudice and the mother's difficulties with legal aid, when granting the extension.

The agency's motion was dismissed, and the court set peremptory deadlines for the perfection and hearing of the appeal.

The plaintiff brought two motions for leave to appeal orders made by the motion judge regarding the settling of a formal order and the extension of time for the defendant to file a statement of defence.

The court directed the Registrar to give notice under Rule 2.1.01 that it was considering dismissing the motions as frivolous, vexatious, or an abuse of process.

After reviewing the plaintiff's written submissions, the court found no merit to the complaints, noting that no appeal lies from the settling of a formal order and that the extension of time was a necessary exercise of discretion.

Both motions for leave to appeal were dismissed as frivolous and an abuse of process.

The applicant union sought judicial review of an arbitrator's decision denying a grievance over the termination of retiree benefits following a plant closure.

The arbitrator found that the employer had the right to terminate the benefits because the collective agreement incorporated an insurance master contract containing a minimum participation provision, which was no longer met.

The Divisional Court applied the reasonableness standard of review and concluded that the arbitrator's decision was defensible in respect of the facts and the law.

The application for judicial review was dismissed.

The appellants, representing a local union, appealed a trial judgment that dismissed their claims for breach of fiduciary duty and breach of confidence against former union employees who left to form a competing union.

The respondents cross-appealed the trial judge's finding that they breached their duty of loyalty by soliciting union stewards before resigning, and the damages awarded for that breach.

The Divisional Court upheld the trial judge's findings on liability, concluding that the former business manager was not a fiduciary and that the employees breached their duty of loyalty by competing while still employed.

However, the court allowed the cross-appeal on damages, reducing the awards to nominal damages of $500 per employee because the union failed to prove the breach caused actual financial loss.

The appellant appealed an order confirming a worldwide Mareva injunction against him, arguing that an Ontario court cannot grant such an injunction when the defendant has no assets in the jurisdiction.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the court's in personam jurisdiction allows it to grant a Mareva injunction even if the defendant has no assets in Ontario, provided it is just and convenient.

The court also upheld the motion judge's discretionary decision to accept an undertaking as to damages from a foreign corporate non-party.

The appellant, a co-op unit owner, appealed a trial judgment granting the respondent housing co-op's claim to enforce a lien against his unit for clean-up costs and dismissing his counterclaim.

The clean-up was necessitated by a Toronto Fire Services Inspection Order citing excessive combustibles.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding the appellant failed to demonstrate any palpable and overriding errors in the trial judge's factual findings, noting the appellant had agreed to proceed without a trial transcript.