ODC 2016

The appellants appealed the dismissal of their motion for summary judgment.

The underlying action was a subrogated claim brought by an insurer in the names of the respondents for damages arising from a fuel oil spill.

The appellants argued the action was a nullity because the respondents were undischarged bankrupts when the claim was issued, meaning their causes of action had vested in their Trustees.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding that the insurer's subrogation rights crystallized before the husband's assignment in bankruptcy, and the Trustee had disclaimed interest in the insurance claims.

Thus, the insurer was entitled to commence the action in the husband's name.

The applicants, cancer researchers at the University Health Network, sought judicial review of the hospital CEO's decision affirming an investigation committee's finding that they committed research misconduct.

The committee found the applicants guilty of falsification, fabrication, and material non-compliance, resulting in a suspension of their research activities.

The Divisional Court held that the CEO's decision was subject to judicial review and reviewable on a reasonableness standard.

The court quashed the findings of falsification and fabrication as unreasonable because the committee could not identify who altered the images.

However, the court upheld the finding of material non-compliance based on systemic flaws in the applicants' laboratory management.

The matter of sanction was remitted for reconsideration.

The moving party sought leave to appeal an interlocutory order requiring him to pay $100,000 in interim disbursements to the responding party in a family law proceeding.

He argued a denial of natural justice and that the motions judge lacked jurisdiction due to a prior order.

The Divisional Court found no good reason to doubt the correctness of the order, noting the moving party had notice and the prior order was not issued or entered.

The court also found the proposed appeal did not raise questions of general importance.

The motion for leave to appeal was dismissed with costs awarded to the responding party.

The appellants appealed a decision enforcing an arbitration award against them for breach of trust and oppression.

The respondents had entered into a sales agency agreement with the corporate appellant to distribute a film.

The directing mind of the corporate appellant restructured the film distribution operations, transferring assets to other companies and leaving the original corporation unable to remit distribution revenues owed to the respondents.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, upholding the application judge's findings that the distribution revenues were trust funds, that the appellants were liable for knowing assistance in a breach of trust, and that the restructuring constituted oppressive conduct designed to defeat creditors.

The plaintiffs were successful on a bifurcated motion for leave to appeal a class action certification order.

They sought costs of $65,000 on a partial indemnity basis for the portion of the motion dealing with the remaining issues.

The defendant opposed an award of costs at this time, arguing for a single costs award at the end of the appeal.

The court rejected the defendant's argument, finding that the issues were discrete and an attendance-by-attendance award was appropriate.

The court fixed costs at $55,000, payable forthwith, after adjusting for duplication of time by senior counsel.

The landlord brought an urgent motion to quash the tenant's appeal of a Landlord and Tenant Board eviction order, or alternatively to lift the automatic stay.

The tenant argued he was a purchaser in interim occupancy, not a tenant, challenging the Board's jurisdiction.

The court declined to quash the appeal, finding an arguable question of law.

Balancing the hardship to the landlord's pending third-party sale against the tenant's loss of his home, the court granted the tenant a brief final opportunity to secure financing to purchase the property, failing which the stay would be lifted.

The appellants appealed an order removing their lawyers of record, which was made during a motion to consolidate and extend time.

The Divisional Court found the motions judge clearly erred by proceeding without proper notice, without supporting evidence, without allowing responding evidence, and on a motion brought by a respondent who lacked standing.

The appeal was allowed, the order was set aside, and costs were awarded against the respondent personally.

The appellant auto body repair business appealed a Small Claims Court decision regarding storage fees for a damaged vehicle.

The appellant claimed the vehicle owner agreed to a storage rate of $100 per day for 64 days, while the respondent insurer argued the rate was excessive and paid funds into court under the Repair and Storage Liens Act to release the vehicle.

The Divisional Court upheld the trial judge's finding that there was no binding agreement for the total storage amount and that $60 per day for 40 days was a reasonable rate.

The court also confirmed the insurer had standing to bring the application despite ultimately denying coverage.

The children's aid society and the prospective adoptive parents sought judicial review of decisions by the Child and Family Services Review Board regarding the adoption placement of a child.

The Board had rescinded the society's decision to refuse another foster family's adoption application and confirmed the termination of the prospective adoptive parents' adoption placement.

The Divisional Court allowed the applications for judicial review, finding that the Board's conduct during the hearing, including uneven treatment of the foster families and inappropriate questioning of witnesses, gave rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias.

The Court set aside the Board's decisions and ordered a new hearing before a newly constituted panel to determine the child's current best interests.

The appellant, diagnosed with schizophrenia, appealed a decision of the Consent and Capacity Board confirming his treating psychiatrist's finding that he was incapable of consenting to treatment with anti-psychotic medication.

The appellant argued that his auditory hallucinations and paranoia were spiritual experiences, not manifestations of a mental disorder, and that medication was contrary to his religious beliefs.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding the Board's conclusion that the appellant was unable to appreciate the reasonably foreseeable consequences of a decision regarding treatment was reasonable and supported by clear, cogent, and compelling evidence.

The appellant brought a motion to set aside an order quashing his appeal to the Divisional Court for want of jurisdiction.

The underlying action claimed $15 million in damages, which exceeds the $50,000 monetary limit for appeals to the Divisional Court under the Courts of Justice Act.

The appellant argued the appeal should have been transferred to the Court of Appeal.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion, noting the appellant had not sought a transfer in his materials and had proceeded in the Divisional Court despite being alerted to the jurisdictional issue.

The appellants appealed a Landlord and Tenant Board Review Order that affirmed the Board's jurisdiction over an Occupancy Agreement and Option to Purchase Agreement.

The Board had relied on a previous Divisional Court decision involving the same landlords and a similarly worded agreement for a different property, concluding the agreements were parallel.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, finding the Board erred in law by failing to conduct a specific inquiry into the true substance of the transaction at issue as required by section 202(1) of the Residential Tenancies Act, 2006.

The matter was remitted to the Board for reconsideration.

The appellant lawyer appealed an order dismissing his motion to enforce a settlement agreement reached with the respondents.

The Divisional Court found the motions judge's one-sentence endorsement lacked adequate reasons, preventing appellate review.

Exercising its jurisdiction under the Courts of Justice Act, the Divisional Court heard the motion on its merits.

The court found that the parties' counsel had reached a binding settlement agreement via email, agreeing on the essential terms of a $15,000 payment and a full and final release.

The respondents' subsequent refusal to sign the documents was an improper attempt to resile from the agreement.

The appeal was allowed and the settlement enforced.

The applicant bank sought leave to appeal an interlocutory order awarding $30,000 in costs to the respondent Crown.

The costs were awarded after the Crown responded to an application involving a dissolved corporation and a void property transfer.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal, finding that the motion judge's discretionary costs award did not meet the strict test for leave under Rule 62.02(4), as there was no conflicting decision, no reason to doubt the correctness of the order, and no matter of general importance.

The Registrar appealed a Licence Appeal Tribunal decision ordering the Registrar not to carry out a proposal to refuse the respondent's registration as a motor vehicle salesperson.

The respondent had a criminal conviction for arson and provided inaccurate details about it during the application process.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, finding the Tribunal erred in law by focusing on whether the respondent deliberately intended to mislead rather than whether he knowingly made false statements.

The Court set aside the Tribunal's decision and directed the Registrar to refuse the registration.

The respondent landlord brought a motion to lift the automatic stay of a Landlord and Tenant Board eviction order pending appeal, or alternatively for an order requiring the appellant tenant to pay rent arrears and ongoing rent.

The tenant had not paid rent since the LTB order but expressed willingness to pay the arrears into court.

The Divisional Court declined to lift the stay but ordered the tenant to pay the LTB order amount, accumulated arrears, and ongoing monthly rent into court pursuant to section 134(2) of the Courts of Justice Act.

The court also imposed a strict timetable for the tenant to perfect the appeal, failing which the appeal would be dismissed and the stay lifted.

The moving parties (Dover) sought leave to appeal a costs order made following an 18-day trial of three issues regarding a joint venture dispute.

The trial judge had awarded Dover partial indemnity costs of $120,000 plus disbursements, significantly reducing their claimed fees and expert costs despite Dover's success on the issues.

Dover argued the trial judge erred in applying the principles of proportionality, settlement offers, and in failing to award substantial indemnity costs due to the opposing party's conduct.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal, finding no error in principle and holding that the trial judge's discretionary costs award was entitled to considerable deference.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Landlord and Tenant Board terminating her tenancy under s. 93 of the Residential Tenancies Act, 2006, on the basis that she occupied a superintendent's premises.

The appellant argued the Board erred in law by refusing to hear certain evidence, reversing the burden of proof, and finding the informal arrangement justified termination.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no errors of law and noting that appeals from the Board are restricted to questions of law.

The appellant tenant appealed a Landlord and Tenant Board order terminating her tenancy for misrepresenting income, permitting illegal acts, and impairing the safety of others after police found loaded handguns belonging to her boyfriend in her unit.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding the Board applied the correct civil standard of proof and had sufficient circumstantial evidence to conclude the tenant knew about the guns and the occupant's presence.

The Court also held that the 'best interests of the child' test does not apply to the Board's relief from eviction analysis under section 83 of the Residential Tenancies Act.

The self-represented appellant appealed a Small Claims Court judgment ordering him to pay damages for breach of a land-clearing contract and dismissing his defendant's claim.

The appellant argued the trial judge's strict time limits, constant interruptions, and refusal to allow closing submissions rendered the trial unfair.

He also appealed the trial judge's exclusion of written witness statements, including an expert report.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, finding the trial judge's inflexible timetable and denial of the right to make closing submissions amounted to a miscarriage of justice.

The court also found the trial judge erred in law by excluding the written statements contrary to the Rules of the Small Claims Court.

A new trial was ordered.