Court of Justice

The father brought a motion for unsupervised access to his eight-year-old daughter, who had been in the de facto custody of the mother since the parties' separation over one year prior.

The mother opposed the motion, alleging a history of violence and substance abuse by the father.

The court found insufficient evidence of a pattern of domestic violence or substance abuse, noting that the only incident post-separation was an isolated occurrence more than one year prior.

The supervised access reports demonstrated a warm, loving relationship between father and child with no observed anxiety.

The court granted the motion and ordered unsupervised access to continue on the existing schedule with conditions regarding alcohol consumption and physical discipline.

The applicant brought a motion pursuant to section 24(1) of the Charter seeking a stay of proceedings on the basis of a violation of the right to be tried within a reasonable time under section 11(b) of the Charter.

The applicant was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a blood-alcohol level above the legal limit on January 26, 2013.

The information was sworn on February 13, 2013, and the trial began on February 21, 2014, but was adjourned due to witness unavailability.

The trial resumed on November 28, 2014, resulting in a total delay of 653 days.

The court found that the applicant had established a breach of section 11(b) rights and granted the stay of proceedings.

The accused was charged with assault causing bodily harm against his former girlfriend following an alleged incident on June 3, 2012.

The Crown's principal evidence was a 911 tape in which the complainant alleged the accused punched her in the mouth, breaking a tooth, and choked her.

The complainant was uncooperative at trial, denying recognition of her own voice on the tape and recalling nothing about the incident.

Police officers observed a broken tooth and torn dress but limited other visible injuries.

The court acquitted the accused, finding the Crown failed to prove the case beyond a reasonable doubt despite admitting the 911 tape as evidence under the principled exception to the hearsay rule.

The Crown applied to admit evidence of prior discreditable conduct by the accused, specifically a prior conviction for assault, threatening death, and failing to comply with bail conditions.

The accused was charged with assault, unlawful confinement, choking, threatening death, and mischief involving the same complainant.

The court considered whether the probative value of the similar fact evidence outweighed its potential prejudice under the framework established in R. v. Handy.

The court found that while there were similarities between the prior conduct and current allegations, the five-year time gap, the presence of mental health issues at the time of the prior incident (which were not evident in 2013), and the inference being based on a single prior act rendered the probative value insufficient to outweigh potential prejudice.

The application was dismissed.

The applicant mother brought a motion for summary judgment seeking a final restraining order against the respondent father, prohibiting him from communicating directly or indirectly with the mother and children and from coming within 500 metres of them.

The father had engaged in physical, verbal, and psychological abuse of the mother and children during the marriage and made multiple death threats shortly after separation.

The father was charged with four counts of uttering death threats and one count of uttering threat to damage property.

The court found that the evidence established a history of abuse but dismissed the restraining order motion without prejudice, finding that the mother and children were adequately protected by the father's absence from Canada and the outstanding criminal charges that would result in his arrest upon entry.

However, the court granted a no-contact order formalizing existing restrictions on the father's communication with the mother and children.

This is a costs endorsement following motions to change a child support order.

The court previously determined that no support was owing by either party as of December 31, 2014, and set out the respondent's ongoing support obligations for two children.

Both parties sought costs.

The respondent sought $18,654.56 and the applicant sought $10,000.

The court found the respondent was the substantially successful party based on the positions taken at the hearing and the offers to settle.

The respondent's offer was close to the final result, while the applicant's offer was significantly less favourable.

The court awarded costs to the respondent in the amount of $7,000, payable at $500 per month starting March 1, 2015.

The Crown appealed the acquittal of a defendant charged with permitting fill to be placed on property without a permit, contrary to the Town of Whitchurch-Stouffville By-Law No. 2008-016-RE.

The trial justice misdirected himself on the applicable legal issue, focusing on whether the defendant transported new fill rather than whether fill was placed or dumped.

Both parties agreed the decision should be set aside.

The appellate court declined to amend the information to substitute "dumping" for "placing" and enter a conviction, finding that the defendant would be prejudiced by such an amendment at the appellate stage.

The court remitted the matter for retrial and permitted the Crown to amend the information to include the alternative means of committing the offence.

Media representatives applied for a copy of the Agreed Statement of Facts filed in support of guilty pleas by the accused.

The court granted the application and ordered that the Agreed Statement of Facts be provided to the media.

However, the court reminded all parties that a publication ban under s.539 of the Criminal Code applies to all common evidence heard at the preliminary hearing and continues until all parties have been discharged or completed trial, as two co-accuseds remained in ongoing preliminary hearings.

The accused brought a Charter application under s. 11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms seeking a stay of proceedings for assault contrary to s. 266 of the Criminal Code.

The accused alleged that his right to be tried within a reasonable time had been violated due to institutional delay of 449 days (approximately 15 months) between the information being sworn and the scheduled trial date.

The court found that the delay exceeded the Morin guidelines of 8 to 10 months and that the accused had suffered actual prejudice including stress from the adjourned trial date, employer oversight of criminal proceedings, restrictions on access to his daughter, and increased legal fees.

The court granted the stay of proceedings.

The accused was charged with impaired operation of a motor vehicle and failing or refusing to provide a breath sample.

The Crown alleged the accused was pulled over for traffic violations, exhibited signs of impairment, and failed to provide a suitable breath sample.

The defence challenged both the validity of the breath demand and whether impairment was proven.

The court found that the officer lacked both subjective and objective reasonable and probable grounds to make the breath demand, having confused the lower "reasonable suspicion" standard applicable to approved screening device demands with the higher "reasonable and probable grounds" standard required for breath demands.

The court also found the Crown failed to prove impairment beyond a reasonable doubt, noting inconsistencies in officer observations, the absence of translation of field sobriety test instructions, and the accused's apparent competent performance on the tests.

The applicant brought a motion for a stay of proceedings under section 11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, alleging a breach of the right to trial within a reasonable time.

The charges were laid on October 5, 2013, with trial scheduled for March 25, 2015, a delay of approximately 17.5 months.

The applicant also sought costs.

The court found that while there was institutional delay, the applicant had not satisfied the burden of demonstrating a Charter violation.

The court attributed responsibility for the adjournment of the first trial dates to the defence rather than the Crown, and found minimal prejudice to the applicant.

Both the stay application and the costs application were dismissed.

The applicant was charged with operating a motor vehicle while the concentration of alcohol in his blood exceeded the legal limit on December 18, 2013.

His trial was scheduled for February 24, 2015, approximately 14 months after the charge.

The applicant brought a motion for a stay of proceedings alleging a violation of his right to a trial within a reasonable time under s. 11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The court found that while the overall institutional delay exceeded the applicable guidelines of 8-10 months, the applicant had suffered actual prejudice and the case was not complex.

The court granted the application and stayed the proceedings.

A criminal lawyer pleaded guilty to fraud under $5,000 for defrauding his client's sister of $1,000.

The accused falsely represented that he could obtain the dismissal of criminal charges against his client through bribery of police officers.

After the Crown decided to stay the charges, the accused continued the fraudulent scheme, threatening that the case could be reopened if payment was not made.

The court imposed a six-month custodial sentence followed by two years of probation, finding that incarceration was necessary to reflect denunciation and general deterrence given the accused's position of trust as a lawyer and the serious breach of professional integrity.

This is a temporary care and custody motion under Part III of the Child and Family Services Act.

The Halton Children's Aid Society sought an order that a 13-year-old child remain in the temporary care and custody of her maternal grandmother, subject to supervision and conditions prohibiting the maternal grandfather from being left alone with the child and from sleeping in the family residence at night.

The grandfather faced criminal charges for historical sexual offenses involving multiple alleged victims.

The grandparents sought to have the child remain in their joint care without supervision or with minimal conditions.

The court found reasonable grounds to believe the child was at risk of sexual abuse by the grandfather based on credible hearsay evidence of multiple allegations, the pattern of alleged abuse, and the child's age falling within the grandfather's apparent victim profile.

The court rejected a proposed bedroom lock condition as placing inappropriate responsibility on the child and granted the Society's motion, ordering the child to remain in the grandmother's temporary care and custody subject to supervision and the requested conditions.

A bus driver employed by the Toronto Transit Commission was charged with failing to stop at a red light and careless driving following a collision with a pedestrian that resulted in death.

The defendant was operating a bus that struck and killed a pedestrian at an intersection controlled by traffic signals.

The Crown presented three civilian witnesses and an expert in collision reconstruction.

The defence called the defendant and an expert in driving instruction.

The court found the defendant not guilty of both charges, determining that the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant ran a red light, and that the defendant's driving did not constitute careless driving under the applicable legal standard.

A young Aboriginal offender, age 18 at sentencing (17 at the time of offences), was convicted of two counts of discharging a firearm with intent to endanger life and possessing a firearm without a licence.

The offender fired two shots at police officers during an armed confrontation, resulting in the offender being shot four times by police.

The offender sustained severe injuries including loss of sight in one eye, brain injury, and permanent nerve damage.

The court imposed a 24-month probation sentence with strict conditions rather than custody, applying Gladue principles and considering the offender's Aboriginal heritage, background of intergenerational trauma from residential schools, history of bullying, and significant physical and psychological injuries sustained as a result of the incident.

Mary Wagner was charged with breach of probation and mischief interfering with private property arising from her attendance at a Toronto abortion clinic, where she attempted to intercede with patients by offering roses and pamphlets.

The trial focused not on whether the Crown could prove the acts alleged, but on whether Wagner was justified in her conduct based on defences of self-defence of others and necessity.

Wagner argued that a foetus has the status of a human being and that she was duty-bound to intervene to protect unborn lives.

The court rejected all of Wagner's constitutional and legal defences, finding her guilty on all counts.

The judgment provides extensive analysis of the legal status of the foetus under Canadian law, the scope of self-defence provisions, the doctrine of necessity, and the rule of law.

The accused was charged with four counts of sexual assault and four counts of sexual interference involving his grandchildren between 2010 and 2011, and with historical charges of gross indecency and indecent assault between 1975 and 1979.

Following a lengthy trial with evidence heard over multiple days, the court dismissed all charges.

The court found the two younger complainants not credible, as they admitted to fabricating stories and lies to get people in trouble.

The court also found that the conduct involving the third grandchild did not constitute sexual assault, as it involved appropriate parental instruction and medical care.

Regarding the historical charges, the court granted a stay of proceedings due to the loss of critical investigative evidence, and alternatively found the Crown had not proven guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

A costs decision following a motion to change child support.

The applicant sought $15,000 in costs (60% of total costs claimed of $24,000), while the respondent argued for $4,000.

The applicant was largely successful in obtaining the relief sought, including the precise table amount of support, nearly all of the post-secondary contribution, and a considerable amount of arrears.

The court awarded $15,000 in costs, finding the applicant acted reasonably by making two reasonable offers to settle that came very close to the ultimate result, while the respondent acted unreasonably by failing to make any offer to settle, failing to make timely disclosure, and taking unreasonable positions on multiple issues.

The defendant was charged with assault causing bodily harm following an incident on a Keswick street where he struck the complainant, causing serious head injuries requiring brain surgery.

The defendant admitted striking the blow but claimed self-defence, asserting he believed the complainant was about to strike him.

The incident followed a confrontation at a local bar the previous evening where the complainant made threats and displayed aggressive behaviour.

The court examined conflicting eyewitness accounts and found the defendant's evidence, while not without blemish, raised a reasonable doubt regarding his guilt.

The court acquitted the defendant on the basis that the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant did not act in self-defence.