Court of Justice

The accused sought judicial interim release (bail) following charges of failing to provide necessaries of life, criminal negligence causing bodily harm, forcible confinement, and multiple counts of assault against his two minor sons over a three-year period.

The Crown sought detention on primary, secondary, and tertiary grounds.

The court found the Crown met its onus on the primary ground due to the serious nature of charges and lack of community ties, and on the tertiary ground based on the horrific nature of the allegations, vulnerability of child victims, and strength of the Crown's case.

The court rejected the secondary ground.

The accused was detained pending trial.

The accused pleaded guilty to multiple offences including forcible confinement, robbery, assault with a weapon, trafficking in a controlled substance, possession of property, theft of motor vehicle, breach of probation, and unauthorized use of a credit card.

The court imposed a joint submission sentence of three years custody less 146 days of presentence custody credit, resulting in a remnant sentence of 949 days.

The court also imposed lifetime firearms prohibitions under Section 109 of the Criminal Code and a no-contact order under Section 743.21 with respect to specified individuals.

The accused was convicted after trial of accessing, possessing, making, and making available child pornography.

The sentencing decision addresses the gravity of offences involving child sexual abuse material, including 125 images and 3 videos found on the accused's devices, as well as sadistic and depraved chat logs depicting discussions of violent sexual abuse of children.

The court imposed a global sentence of four years imprisonment, emphasizing denunciation and deterrence as paramount sentencing principles for child pornography offences.

The decision also addresses ancillary orders including sex offender registration and DNA sampling requirements.

The defendant was charged with driving with excess blood alcohol (over 80 mg per 100 mL of blood).

Officers conducted a RIDE spot check and the defendant failed a roadside screening test.

Two breath samples were provided at the station, registering 160 mg and 150 mg respectively.

The defence raised two Charter-based arguments and two substantive challenges: (1) that the presumption of identity in s. 258 of the Criminal Code does not survive its repeal (the Shaikh issue), and (2) that the Crown failed to establish the accuracy of the Intoxilyzer tests (the Flores-Vigil issue).

The court rejected both defence arguments, finding that the presumption of identity applies to pre-amendment offences and that the Crown established the preconditions for the presumption of accuracy through viva voce evidence.

The defendant was found guilty.

This is a ten-day trial involving a status review application for three children and a protection application for a fourth child.

The court determined that all four children should be placed in the custody of the mother under section 102 of the Child, Youth and Family Services Act.

The father's access was ordered to be supervised, occurring every other week for two hours at a Supervised Access Centre.

The court found that the children were at risk of harm while in the father's care, that the father had engaged in a campaign to undermine the mother's relationship with the children, that the children had thrived in the mother's care since March 2018, and that the father lacked insight into his shortcomings and was ungovernable by court orders or the child protection agency.

The applicant was charged with impaired driving and refusing to provide a breath sample.

She applied for a stay of proceedings based on a breach of her right to be tried within a reasonable time under section 11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The main issue was whether a five-month period during which the Crown failed to provide video disclosure in a playable form constituted defence delay.

The court found that the three-week adjournment after receiving the playable video constituted defence delay, and that the applicant failed to demonstrate meaningful and sustained steps to expedite the proceedings by not seeking a judicial pre-trial earlier.

The net delay fell below the 18-month presumptive ceiling, and the applicant failed to establish that the delay was unreasonable.

The application for a stay was dismissed.

A 20-year-old offender pleaded guilty to kidnapping with a firearm, extortion with a firearm, aggravated assault, possession of a loaded restricted firearm, possession for the purpose of trafficking in crack cocaine and methamphetamine, and breach of probation.

The offender, along with two co-accused, kidnapped and assaulted a victim over four hours using a loaded handgun, threatening the victim and his family, and ultimately obtaining $200.

The offender was subsequently found in possession of significant quantities of Schedule I drugs.

The sentencing court imposed a global sentence of eight years less pre-trial custody credit, balancing the serious nature of firearm-related offences with the offender's youth, genuine remorse, guilty plea, and rehabilitation prospects.

The defendant was charged with impaired driving, driving with excess blood alcohol concentration, and dangerous driving following a traffic stop.

The Crown withdrew the first two charges, leaving only the dangerous driving charge for trial.

The court found that the defendant's driving over approximately 25 kilometres, characterized by sustained lane violations, erratic speeds, failure to maintain control, and resistance to police intervention, constituted dangerous driving under the Criminal Code.

The defendant was found guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of dangerous driving.

The applicant challenged the validity of a search warrant issued to search his residence on the grounds of alleged violations of s. 8 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The applicant argued that the Information to Obtain (ITO) contained inaccuracies and omissions that rendered the warrant invalid.

The Crown contended that the warrant was valid on both facial and subfacial analysis.

The court conducted a voir dire and examined three main areas of challenge: non-disclosure of relevant information, misdescription or omission of identification evidence, and grounds to believe items were at the premises.

The court found that despite certain inaccuracies in the ITO, the issuing justice could have properly granted the warrant based on the totality of the evidence presented.

The accused was charged with 24 offences including possession for the purpose of trafficking of prohibited substances (heroin, cocaine, crack cocaine, and crystal methamphetamine), firearms offences relating to possession and careless storage of a handgun and ammunition, and possession of proceeds of crime.

The preliminary inquiry judge assessed whether the Crown had adduced sufficient evidence to establish the essential elements of possession—knowledge and control—through circumstantial evidence.

The judge found that the Crown's proposed inferences were speculative and did not logically flow from the established facts.

The accused was discharged on all counts.

This is a costs endorsement following a two-day trial on a motion to change parenting orders for three-year-old twin girls.

The father sought custody and relocation of the children from Niagara Falls to Toronto.

The court dismissed the custody and relocation requests but granted the father extensive access on a graduated basis.

The court found divided success overall, with the father being the more successful party on the dominant issue of parenting time.

The mother's unreasonable behaviour in restricting access and failing to facilitate the father-child relationship warranted costs consequences.

The court awarded costs to the father in the amount of $6,000, inclusive of fees, disbursements and HST, taking into account the mother's limited financial means.

The Crown brought an application to remove counsel for the accused charged with two counts of second degree murder due to a conflict of interest.

The accused's counsel had previously represented a key Crown and defence witness in an unrelated impaired driving matter.

The court found that while a solicitor-client relationship existed, partial disqualification was a sufficient remedy to address the conflict of interest concerns while preserving the accused's right to counsel of choice.

The court ordered that counsel be prohibited from participating in the cross-examination of the witness and from being present when that witness testified.

The defendant was charged with driving while disqualified contrary to section 259(4) of the Criminal Code and breach of recognizance contrary to section 145(3) of the Code following a traffic stop.

The defendant challenged the stop as an arbitrary detention in violation of sections 9 and 10 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The court found that the police lawfully stopped the vehicle based on a citizen complaint regarding solicitation at a liquor store, and that the defendant was not detained in the constitutional sense prior to arrest.

The court found no Charter breaches and convicted the defendant on both counts.

The accused was charged with assault causing bodily harm.

The Crown presented evidence from the complainant, witnesses, and police officers documenting injuries to the complainant's eye and other abrasions.

The defence argued self-defence.

The trial judge found the complainant credible and reliable in his testimony, noting his emotional demeanor and consistency with observations by police.

The defendant's testimony was found less credible and appeared rehearsed.

However, the judge identified a critical contradiction: the defendant's post-incident statement that "no one talks about our family like that" suggested provocative words were spoken in the bedroom, contradicting the complainant's denial.

This contradiction created reasonable doubt as to what occurred in the bedroom.

The accused was acquitted.

The defendants were convicted of wilfully promoting hatred contrary to s. 319(2) of the Criminal Code.

Over a three-year period, the defendants published and edited a community newspaper that promoted hate against Jews and women, glorifying Nazism, denying the Holocaust, and demonizing both groups.

The sentencing decision addresses the appropriate custodial sentence, the application of consecutive versus concurrent sentencing, aggravating and mitigating factors, community impact, and the scope of probation conditions.

The court imposed a one-year jail sentence (six months on each count served consecutively) and declined to impose probation restrictions on publishing activities, finding such restrictions would violate Charter-protected freedom of expression.

The applicant brought a motion to re-open his trial after conviction, claiming ineffective assistance of counsel.

The applicant sought to introduce affidavit evidence regarding ineffective assistance and proposed witnesses.

The court applied the test from R. v. Arabia and R. v. Kowall, considering both the Palmer fresh evidence criteria and whether the application was an attempt to reverse tactical decisions made at trial.

The court found that the decision to call no defence evidence was a deliberate tactical choice made by trial counsel based on professional judgment.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the applicant failed to meet the test for re-opening and that trial counsel's conduct fell within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.

The applicant brought a section 11(b) Charter application seeking a stay of proceedings based on delay.

The applicant was arrested on August 28, 2018, and his trial was scheduled to conclude on February 24, 2020, just four days before the Jordan 18-month presumptive ceiling.

The applicant was in custody awaiting trial.

The court found that while the applicant demonstrated no defence delay and that the case took markedly longer than it reasonably should have, the applicant failed to establish that he took meaningful and sustained steps to expedite the proceedings.

Specifically, the applicant did not bring a severance application after learning that co-counsel scheduling issues would delay trial by almost one year, and took no proactive steps after trial dates were set.

The application was dismissed.

The accused was charged with aggravated assault, assault with a weapon (knife), carrying a weapon for a purpose dangerous to the public peace, and uttering threats following an altercation in which he cut the complainant under the chin.

The central issue was whether the accused acted in self-defence.

The court found the complainant to be an unreliable witness with significant credibility issues, while the accused was found to be credible and consistent.

The court accepted the accused's evidence that he carried the knife for personal protection against the complainant, who had previously attacked him and made repeated threats.

The court found that the accused's use of the knife was a reasonable defensive response to the complainant's aggressive conduct and punch to the face.

All charges were dismissed.

The Crown appealed the dismissal of a charge of failing to yield to a pedestrian contrary to section 144 of the Highway Traffic Act.

The respondent had sought disclosure of witness contact information, which the Crown refused to provide.

The respondent filed a Charter application seeking a stay of proceedings based on non-disclosure and prosecutorial conduct.

The trial justice granted the application and ordered disclosure.

The Crown subsequently elected not to proceed.

On appeal, the Crown argued that the respondent had attempted to relitigate a prior motion that had been dismissed, thereby raising a jurisdictional issue.

The appellate court dismissed the appeal, finding that the respondent had not sought to relitigate the same issue and that the trial justice had properly considered and rejected the Crown's relitigation argument.

The accused brought an application seeking increased legal aid funding for defence counsel to cover the full estimated budget for a constitutional challenge.

The court dismissed the application, finding that while the state has a constitutional obligation to ensure fair trials for indigent accused, the accused's right to a fair trial (not a perfect trial) was not imperiled by the shortfall of approximately $3,000 between the legal aid budget and the defence budget.

The court acknowledged the financial burden on defence counsel accepting legal aid certificates but held that absent evidence that no competent counsel would accept the certificate, the application must fail.