Criminal and Quasi-Criminal Law - OCJ

The accused, Dominic Wright, faced charges related to drug trafficking and possession of proceeds of crime under the CDSA and Criminal Code, as well as breaches of a release order.

The central issue at trial was whether the accused was in constructive possession of controlled substances and cash found in a condo unit.

The court found the accused in constructive possession of fentanyl and cash in the kitchen and bedroom closet, applying the principles of circumstantial evidence from R. v. Villaroman.

However, the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused was in constructive possession of fentanyl found in the dryer.

The accused was found guilty of most charges, including possession for the purpose of trafficking (oxycodone, MDMA, fentanyl in kitchen/closet), possession of proceeds of crime, and most breaches of a release order, but not guilty of possession of fentanyl in the dryer or the cell phone breach.

The Crown sought directions regarding the disclosure of police records concerning a young person (M.A.) involved in an incident related to a murder charge against the accused.

The court determined that records pertaining to extrajudicial measures (EJM) taken with M.A. are presumptively non-disclosable under section 119(4) of the Youth Criminal Justice Act (YCJA) to protect the young person from stigmatization.

However, information about the underlying incident, such as a fight and its reason, and any animus between M.A. and the deceased, is disclosable and permissible for witness questioning, provided it does not reveal police involvement or EJM details.

The court suggested an Agreed Statement of Facts as a means to address the defence's need for full answer and defence without violating YCJA provisions.

In a criminal trial for failing to provide a breath sample, the Ontario Court of Justice acquitted the defendant.

The court found that the Crown failed to prove the necessary mens rea beyond a reasonable doubt.

The defendant's refusal was conditional on being allowed a sip of water, a request denied by police based on an unproven "rule" of the qualified technician.

The court determined that the refusal was not unequivocal and that the police had rushed to conclude a refusal without providing a "last chance warning" or recording the final interaction in the breath room.

The accused, Islamunddin Attayee, was charged with assaulting his spouse and an intervening member of the public.

The primary issue at trial was the identity of the assailant, as the spouse was uncooperative.

The court found the in-dock identification by witnesses insufficient to prove identity beyond a reasonable doubt, citing the need for caution as per R. v. Hibbert.

Additionally, the court noted disturbing surreptitious communications between a testifying police officer and the officer in charge during the Zoom trial, which undermined the fairness of the process and led to the accused being left without counsel.

The Crown's inaction in investigating these communications was criticized, emphasizing the Crown's heightened duty of fairness and disclosure as per R. v. Ahluwalia.

The accused was acquitted of all charges.

The defendant pleaded guilty to common assault after initially facing a sexual assault charge.

The assault occurred at the defendant's residence during a party where the defendant, then 20 years old, engaged in non-consensual sexual contact with the complainant, a 15-year-old friend of his younger sister.

The defendant partially inserted his penis into the complainant's vagina without consent on two separate occasions despite her explicit objections.

The court imposed a 90-day intermittent jail sentence (served on weekends) followed by two years of probation with strict conditions including no contact with the complainant or her family, a 200-metre exclusion zone, and mandatory counselling on relationships and consent.

A five-year weapons prohibition was also imposed.

The accused was convicted of attempted murder after stabbing his co-worker multiple times in the head and neck on January 6, 2016, leaving the victim permanently and severely disabled.

The sole issue at trial was whether the accused suffered from a mental disorder rendering him incapable of knowing his actions were wrong.

The court found the accused probably suffered from mental illness and depression but retained the ability to know right from wrong.

The accused was sentenced to 17 years imprisonment, with credit for pre-trial custody reducing the remaining sentence to 12 years and 9 months.

The court balanced the brutal nature of the offence and devastating injuries to the victim against the accused's mental illness as a mitigating factor.

The defendant brought two applications to re-open trial proceedings following conviction.

The first application sought to challenge the admissibility of text messages on the basis that they were intercepted without authorization under Part VI of the Criminal Code.

This argument had been rejected by multiple appellate courts and trial courts.

The second application sought to re-open the entrapment hearing based on newly disclosed production order data showing the volume of responses to undercover police advertisements.

The court found that neither application met the legal test for re-opening and dismissed both applications.

The defendant was charged with operating a motor vehicle while having an excess blood alcohol concentration contrary to section 253(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The defendant challenged the approved screening device demand on the basis that it was not made "forthwith" as required by law, arguing violations of sections 8, 9, and 10(b) of the Charter.

The court found that while there was a five-minute delay between the formation of reasonable suspicion and the provision of the demand, the delay was reasonably necessary given the defendant's exceptional chattiness and the operational context of a roadside stop.

The court found the demand was made forthwith and no Charter violation occurred.

The defendant was found guilty.

The accused was charged with dangerous driving causing bodily harm and possession of marijuana following an incident in a parking lot where she struck a person with her vehicle.

The accused admitted to possession of marijuana but claimed self-defence for the dangerous driving charge.

The court found that the accused had been lured to a location where she was surrounded by a hostile group of twelve people, some of whom had previously assaulted her.

The court determined that the accused reasonably believed she faced a threat of force and that her actions in attempting to escape were reasonable in the circumstances.

The dangerous driving charge was dismissed on the basis of self-defence, but the accused was convicted of possession of marijuana.

The accused was charged with failing or refusing to comply with a demand to provide a breath sample into an approved screening device contrary to s. 254(5) of the Criminal Code.

The Crown's only witness, a police officer, testified that he read the accused an approved instrument demand under s. 254(3) rather than the required approved screening device demand under s. 254(2)(b).

The defence conceded all elements of the offence except whether a proper demand was made.

The court found that the Crown failed to establish that a proper demand was made and acquitted the accused.

The accused was charged following a domestic assault incident.

Police responded to a 911 call reporting an assault in progress and entered the accused's residence without a warrant to ensure the safety of occupants.

Upon locating the accused in the basement, officers did not immediately inform him of the reasons for his detention or his rights to counsel.

The accused made incriminating statements during this period.

The court found that while the warrantless entry was justified under exigent circumstances, the failure to promptly inform the accused of his Charter rights under sections 10(a) and 10(b) constituted a breach.

The incriminating statements were excluded under section 24(2) as their admission would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The accused was charged with two counts of sexual assault against the same complainant on December 20, 2012, and January 22, 2013.

The trial involved a Charter application regarding the admissibility of the accused's police interview, which was ultimately admitted.

The Crown relied primarily on the complainant's evidence and the accused's police statement.

The defence raised the issue of consent and honest but mistaken belief in consent.

The court found that the accused engaged in non-consensual sexual contact on three separate occasions and rejected his defence of honest but mistaken belief in consent, finding instead that he was reckless as to the existence of consent or willfully blind to the possibility that the complainant might not consent.

The Crown applied for an order under section 117.05(4) of the Criminal Code to forfeit the Firearms Possession Acquisition Licence of the respondent and to prohibit him from possessing weapons for five years.

The application arose from multiple incidents involving the respondent's alcohol abuse, mental health issues, violent threats against family members, and aggressive behaviour.

The respondent admitted to being an alcoholic and acknowledged his alcohol abuse contributed to violent outbursts.

The court found that it was not desirable in the interests of safety that the respondent possess weapons and ordered forfeiture of the licence and a three-year prohibition on weapon possession, reduced from the maximum five years to allow for treatment and rehabilitation.

The applicant brought a motion pursuant to Section 11(b) of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms alleging that his right to be tried within a reasonable time had been infringed.

The applicant was charged with drive with excess alcohol and drive impaired on June 6, 2015, with the information sworn on June 12, 2015.

The total delay from charge to trial completion was 16 months.

The court applied the new framework established in R. v. Jordan, which sets a presumptive ceiling of 18 months for provincial court cases.

Since the case fell below the ceiling, the burden was on the defence to demonstrate both meaningful steps to expedite proceedings and that the case took markedly longer than it reasonably should have.

The court found that the delay was typical for drinking and driving cases in the jurisdiction and did not markedly exceed reasonable time requirements.

The application was dismissed.

The Crown prosecuted Alpa Lumber Mills Inc. and its supervisor Van Kham Sichantha for failing to ensure that a rip saw machine (Rip Saw #1) was properly shielded or guarded to prevent product or material being processed from endangering worker safety, contrary to sections 25(1)(c) and 27(1)(a) of the Occupational Health and Safety Act and section 26 of Ontario Regulation 851/90.

A worker was injured when a wooden stake was ejected from the machine at high velocity and pierced his arm.

The defendants argued they had taken all reasonable care by relying on the machine's built-in safety features, regular maintenance, and worker training.

The court found both defendants guilty, holding that the hazard of ejected material was reasonably foreseeable based on the manufacturer's own warnings, and that the defendants failed to take all reasonable steps including obtaining and reviewing the correct operating manual, implementing regular inspection of anti-kickback mechanisms, and ensuring workers did not stand in front of the infeed opening.

The defendant pleaded guilty to importing child pornography, making child pornography in Cuba, and multiple counts of sexual interference with children under 16 years of age in Cuba.

The court imposed a sentence of two years and one day plus a 10-year long-term offender designation.

The court found that the defendant posed a substantial risk of sexual re-offence and that there was a reasonable possibility of eventual control of risk in the community through the long-term offender regime.

The court rejected the defence submission for time served and a recognizance order, finding that such measures were inadequate given the severity of the offences and the defendant's demonstrated pattern of escalating sexual abuse of children over many years.

The accused was charged with Operation Impaired and Operation Over 80 following a motor vehicle collision at Highway 401 and Kennedy Road in Scarborough.

The Crown alleged the accused struck and seriously injured a civilian while his blood alcohol concentration was over the legal limit.

The accused raised multiple Charter issues including claims regarding statutorily compelled statements, detention and timely access to counsel, language comprehension difficulties, and lost evidence.

The court found the accused guilty on both counts after addressing the Charter applications and determining that the breath test evidence was admissible.

The accused was charged with driving while disqualified.

A Charter application was brought alleging violations of section 9 (arbitrary detention) and section 10(b) (right to counsel).

The court found no section 9 breach, as the initial stop was justified by reasonable suspicion based on the officer's observation of evasive driving and information about a prohibited driver.

However, a clear section 10(b) breach was established and conceded by the Crown, as the accused was detained and questioned for approximately 30 minutes without being advised of his rights to counsel.

The court found the evidence obtained prior to the breach was not tainted by the subsequent violation, as the connection was too tenuous.

The accused was convicted of driving while disqualified.

A sentence reduction was imposed as a remedy for the Charter violation.

The accused was retried and convicted of impaired driving relating to an accident from 2010.

At the first trial, the accused was sentenced to a 15-month driving prohibition, which was served in full before the conviction was successfully appealed and set aside.

The Crown sought a new driving prohibition upon retrial and conviction.

The court held that imposing a new mandatory driving prohibition would constitute double punishment and violate principles of sentencing and the integrity of the criminal justice system.

The court interpreted section 259(1) of the Criminal Code to permit credit for time already served under the prior prohibition, and imposed a one-day driving prohibition with notation that 15 months had already been served.

A 19-year-old First Nations offender pleaded guilty to robbery after assaulting a victim and stealing a small amount of marijuana.

The victim sustained a broken jaw from a single punch.

The court applied Gladue principles in sentencing, considering the offender's Aboriginal background, criminal history, youth, and genuine remorse.

The Crown sought a mid to upper reformatory range sentence (12 months to 2 years less a day), while the defence sought time served.

The court imposed a sentence of time served (218 days in custody) plus two years probation with conditions including substance abuse counselling and culturally appropriate First Nations-based programming.