Court of Appeal

The appellant was injured in a motor vehicle accident and received income replacement benefits.

After the insurer terminated her benefits, she signed a full and final release in exchange for a lump sum.

She later sued the insurer for breach of contract, bad faith, and mental distress without first returning the settlement funds or proceeding to mandatory mediation.

The Court of Appeal upheld the summary judgment dismissing her action, confirming that her claims were 'in respect of' statutory accident benefits and therefore subject to the mandatory mediation scheme under the Insurance Act.

The appellant was injured in a motor vehicle accident and submitted an application for accident benefits without a disability certificate.

The respondent insurer denied the claim.

More than two years later, the appellant sought mediation and subsequently commenced an action, which was dismissed on summary judgment as statute-barred.

On appeal, the appellant argued the limitation period did not begin until a valid claim, including a disability certificate, was denied.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the application was valid without the certificate and that allowing a claimant to delay the limitation period indefinitely by withholding a certificate would undermine the statutory regime's purpose of timely resolution.

The appellant appealed a Rule 21 motion decision that dismissed her proposed class action claims for constructive and common law fraud against the respondent trustees.

The motion judge found the claims were released by a CCAA settlement and were statute-barred.

The Court of Appeal upheld the decision, finding that the appellant had all material facts necessary to discover her claim when the Monitor's 39th report was issued in February 2010.

Because she issued her notice of action more than two years later in August 2012, the claim was statute-barred under the Limitations Act, 2002.

The appellant sought leave to appeal a costs award made by the Superior Court of Justice.

Neither party appeared at the hearing.

The Court of Appeal found no basis to interfere with the costs award and refused leave to appeal.

The Crown appealed an acquittal, arguing the trial judge erred by failing to give effect to the 'on or about' language in the indictment and by refusing to amend the indictment.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that an expansive interpretation of the date would be unfair given the alibi defence presented, and that the Crown's request to amend the indictment during closing submissions was too late and would prejudice the accused.

Following a successful appeal where the matter was remitted for trial, the Court of Appeal considered the parties' costs submissions.

The court applied the presumption that a successful appellant is entitled to costs and awarded the appellant $10,000 inclusive of disbursements and taxes.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment awarding damages for past and future loss of income and earning capacity to the respondent following a motor vehicle accident.

The appellant argued the trial judge erred by making an award based on ownership income without proper financial statements, a business valuation, or a specific formula.

The appellant also challenged the trial judge's allowance of a per quod claim by the respondent's corporation.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge's assessment of loss of earning capacity was reasonable and owed deference.

The court also upheld the trial judge's factual finding of an employer-employee relationship supporting the per quod claim.

The appellant appealed the summary dismissal of his mandamus application, which sought to overturn the Crown's decision to stay his private prosecution.

The appellant alleged that the Attorney General was in an inherent conflict of interest, constituting an abuse of process.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming the motion judge's finding that there was no evidence of an abuse of process to justify reviewing the Attorney General's prosecutorial discretion under section 579 of the Criminal Code.

The appellant appealed an order requiring her to file a fresh Statement of Claim in the Superior Court rather than transferring her existing Small Claims Court claim.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the motion judge correctly required a fresh claim because the original included improper references to settlement discussions and presented procedural issues.

The court also found no reasonable apprehension of bias and upheld the motion judge's decision to make no order as to costs.

The applicant, convicted of sexual assault and sexual interference against young children and sentenced to four years' imprisonment, applied for bail pending appeal.

The Crown conceded the appeal was not frivolous and the applicant would surrender, leaving the public interest as the sole issue.

The Court of Appeal found the applicant's appeal grounds to be weak, particularly his arguments regarding the trial judge's credibility findings and use of prior consistent statements.

Balancing the weak appeal against the serious nature of the offences and the lengthy sentence, the court concluded that the public interest favoured immediate enforcement of the sentence.

The application for judicial interim release was dismissed.

The 76-year-old appellant pleaded guilty to fraud over $5,000 involving a breach of trust against a friend.

She was initially sentenced to 18 months' imprisonment and ordered to pay $84,336.41 in restitution.

On appeal, the court admitted fresh evidence that the appellant had made full restitution after selling her house.

Given her age, poor health, and the Crown's original position supporting a conditional sentence upon restitution, the Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and imposed a 15-month conditional sentence.

The appellant appealed his sentence, arguing the sentencing judge erred in the treatment of pre-sentence custody.

The Crown conceded the appeal based on a companion case.

The Court of Appeal accepted the concession and varied the sentence from 46 months to 36 months imprisonment by increasing the pre-sentence custody credit from 20 months to 30 months.

The appellant appealed an order granting the respondent employment agency's motion for summary judgment and dismissing her claim.

The motion judge found no evidence that the agency was contractually obliged to forward her application for a specific position.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the motion judge's conclusion that the claim was based on bare allegations.

The appeal was dismissed, and the appellant was ordered to pay costs of $4,500.

The appellant sought leave to appeal a decision of the summary conviction appeal court, which had dismissed his appeal from a conviction.

The Court of Appeal denied leave, finding that no question of law of general importance was raised and that the appellant failed to demonstrate any clear legal error in the lower court's reasons.

The appellant was convicted of operating a motor vehicle while disqualified after being stopped driving an e-bike with inoperable pedals.

The trial judge and summary conviction appeal judge found the device was a motor vehicle under the Criminal Code because it could not be propelled by muscular power.

The appellant sought leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal, arguing he did not require a license under the Highway Traffic Act.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the application for leave, finding the appellant raised no question of law alone.

The appellants, members of a Serbian Orthodox Church congregation, appealed a decision dismissing their application for a declaration that the congregation's elected trustees held the congregational properties in trust.

The diocesan administrative board had removed the executive board and replaced it with a temporary trusteeship following a dispute.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the application judge did not err in considering internal church documents and correctly concluded that the temporary trusteeship held the properties in trust under the Religious Organizations' Lands Act.

The Court also held that the American 'neutral principles of law' doctrine is not mandatory in Ontario church property disputes.

The appellant, a general contractor, appealed a summary judgment dismissing its breach of contract action against a sprinkler system subcontractor as statute-barred.

The appellant argued the limitation period began when the respondent refused to pay an invoice for repair costs under a 'save harmless' clause, rather than when the water damage occurred 3.5 years prior to the lawsuit.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the motion judge's finding that the cause of action arose, and was discovered, when the water damage occurred and the appellant put the respondent on notice of its responsibility.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual assault, uttering a death threat, and choking, as well as his 4.5-year sentence.

He argued the trial judge should have recused himself for having presided over a prior bail review, and that the verdict was unreasonable.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no reasonable apprehension of bias and no errors in the trial judge's credibility assessments or application of the W.(D.) framework.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the 4.5-year term was fit given the violence, threats, and the appellant's criminal record.

The appellant was convicted of fraud, uttering a forged document, and breach of recognizance after amassing a large hotel bill and paying with a forged cheque.

Police conducted a warrantless search of his hotel room, which the trial judge found violated his s. 8 Charter rights, but the evidence was admitted under s. 24(2).

The appellant appealed his convictions and his consecutive four-year sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's application of the Grant factors and upholding the sentence given the appellant's extensive criminal record and the lack of a factual nexus between his various frauds.

The appellants appealed the dismissal of their application for certiorari, which sought to quash their committal for trial.

The Court of Appeal upheld the certiorari judge's finding that the preliminary inquiry judge reasonably inferred from circumstantial evidence that the appellants had constructive possession of the entire contents of a stash house.

The appeal was dismissed.