Civil Litigation - Plaintiff - OCA

The appellant appealed a Rule 2.01 order dismissing his action concerning the respondent's mortgage.

The court held the action raised no valid issue and found the motion judge's reasons were thorough.

No error warranting appellate intervention was established.

The appeal was dismissed, with costs fixed to the respondent.

The appellant, Natalie Mouralian, brought a motion for a stay of the Court of Appeal's decision pending her application for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada.

The underlying dispute involved a failed real estate transaction and the forfeiture of a $70,000 deposit, with the Superior Court and Court of Appeal having previously denied relief from forfeiture.

The motions judge denied the stay, finding that the issues raised by the appellant were factual, not legal, and therefore unlikely to meet the Supreme Court's stringent leave criteria for public or national importance.

The judge also noted the respondent's counsel's improper release of the deposit funds despite notice of intent to seek leave, though this did not affect the merits of the stay motion.

This is a motion by Gary Curtis to review an order of a judge of the Court of Appeal for Ontario that provided directions for the perfection of an appeal brought by The Bank of Nova Scotia (BNS).

The original order dispensed with immediate filing of the order under appeal, required BNS to file a draft order for deemed perfection, and set a timeline for Mr. Curtis's factum.

Mr. Curtis argued he was prejudiced and that the motion judge erred in the directions and costs award.

The Court of Appeal panel found no error in principle or unreasonable result, dismissing Mr. Curtis's motion to review, but granted him an extension of time to file his responding materials and perfect his cross-appeal.

The appellant sought to overturn a trial judgment that dismissed her application for a declaration of trust over a residential property and damages.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no basis to interfere with the trial judge's credibility assessments or factual findings, particularly given the trial judge's finding that the appellant's evidence was "inherently improbable" and exaggerated.

No error of law was demonstrated.

The appellant, Myriam Michail, moved to review a case management order that required her motion challenging the constitutionality of s. 136 of the Courts of Justice Act to be treated as a motion for leave to introduce a new issue on appeal and heard concurrently with her appeal, with a 30-day perfection deadline for the appeal.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the review motion, finding no basis to interfere with the motion judge's exercise of discretion.

The court noted that the appellant had other available remedies to obtain access to audio recordings or transcripts of the proceeding below, apart from a constitutional challenge, and had not availed herself of those remedies.

The constitutional challenge was deemed properly dealt with on the appeal itself.

Costs were awarded to the London District Catholic School Board.

The appellant appealed the motion judge's order dismissing his action against the respondents (his former legal counsel) under Rule 21.01(3)(d) of the Rules of Civil Procedure as an abuse of process.

The appellant had alleged that the respondents failed to follow his instructions, misled and deceived him, and failed to provide competent legal services in an unjust dismissal case under the Canada Labour Code.

The motion judge found that the same issue had been previously determined by Adjudicator Monteith, whose findings were upheld by the Federal Court on judicial review.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision, finding no error in dismissing the action as an abuse of process and affirming the costs award.

The respondent appealed a motion judge's order dismissing his motion to compel the moving party to answer discovery questions regarding a pattern of commercially unreasonable conduct.

The respondent had pleaded that the moving party's conduct toward his company was part of a broader pattern of conduct toward multiple borrowers.

The motion judge held the questions were not relevant because the respondent failed to demonstrate sufficient similarities.

The Court of Appeal held the order was interlocutory and the appeal was brought to the wrong court, as appeals of interlocutory orders lie to the Divisional Court with leave.

The appeal was quashed and costs were awarded to the moving party.

The appellant insurer appealed a motion judge's decision that it was obliged to provide underinsured motorist coverage to the respondent truck driver under an OPCF 44R Family Protection Coverage endorsement on his personal automobile policy.

The respondent operated a tractor owned by his corporation and leased to a transport company under fleet insurance.

He suffered serious injuries when struck by an underinsured driver in Florida.

The Court of Appeal adjourned the appeal sine die to allow the parties to enlarge the record with evidence regarding how Ontario-based truck drivers obtain underinsured coverage, recognizing that a ruling could affect thousands of commercial vehicle drivers and their families.

The appellants appealed an order of the Superior Court refusing to enjoin the sale of a development property under power of sale.

The appellants sought to have the court find that the property was sold in bad faith and for an undervalue.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that it was not open to the court to grant the relief sought as the appeal was from the order, not the findings of the application judge.

The court noted that the appellants could pursue an improvident sale action, which had been expressly left open by the application judge.

The court upheld the costs award to the respondent.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed all outstanding motions brought by the appellant in a matter that originated as a Small Claims Court action for professional negligence in dental treatment.

The appellant had persistently brought multiple motions and proceedings before various courts over several years, repeatedly failing to comply with procedural requirements and time limits.

The court found that the appellant's conduct constituted a frivolous, vexatious abuse of process and imposed restrictions on future filings, requiring leave of court and proof of service on respondent's counsel, as well as satisfaction of outstanding costs orders totalling $3,500.00.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment finding them liable for over $10 million for fraudulent misrepresentation and other torts.

The sole ground of appeal was that the trial judge erred in refusing their request for an adjournment on the eve of trial to retain new counsel, after they had filed notices of intention to act in person.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge properly balanced the competing interests, including the appellants' ability to defend themselves, the prejudice to the respondent, and the public interest in the efficient resolution of trials.

The applicant, whose licence to practise law was revoked following discipline proceedings, brought a motion to the Court of Appeal to state a special case regarding the jurisdiction of the Law Society Hearing Panel.

She also sought directions for leave to appeal a 2009 Divisional Court order.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion, holding that Rule 22 of the Rules of Civil Procedure requires the parties to agree to state a special case, which the Law Society did not.

The request for directions was also dismissed as there was no pending motion for leave to appeal and the underlying jurisdictional issue had already been rendered moot by subsequent proceedings.

The appellant appealed a trial decision that awarded him $57,566 on a $135,000 loan, arguing he was entitled to the full amount and that the trial judge erred in dismissing fraudulent conveyance claims against the respondents.

The appellant also alleged the trial was conducted unfairly.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge treated the self-represented appellant fairly, made factual findings regarding loan repayments that were amply supported by the evidence, and correctly dismissed the fraudulent conveyance claims due to a lack of evidence regarding insolvency.

The appellant, an unsecured judgment creditor of the respondent's husband, appealed an order setting aside the transfer of the matrimonial home from the respondent to her husband.

The motion judge had found the transfer was void due to undue influence and, alternatively, that the husband held the property in trust for the respondent.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal in part, holding that the finding of undue influence could not stand because it was not pleaded, depriving the appellant of procedural fairness.

However, the Court upheld the finding that the respondent did not intend to gift the property and held an interest by way of resulting or constructive trust, remitting the matter to determine the extent of that interest.

The appellants appealed a Superior Court decision that set aside an arbitrator's interlocutory orders, an order striking statements of defence, a final arbitral award, and removed the arbitrator.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal in part, holding that the application judge erred in setting aside the interlocutory orders, as the Arbitration Act does not permit judicial intervention for procedural decisions.

However, the Court upheld the setting aside of the order striking the pleadings and the final award, finding that the respondents were treated unfairly because their bankruptcy made compliance with the interlocutory orders legally impossible.

The removal of the arbitrator was also upheld.

The cross-appellants (the sellers) appealed a trial judgment finding them liable for negligent misrepresentation regarding the value of business inventory sold to the respondents (the buyers).

The trial judge had awarded damages to the buyers but reduced the award by 20 percent due to contributory negligence.

On appeal, the sellers argued the buyers did not reasonably rely on the misrepresentation and suffered no detriment, while the buyers argued the finding of contributory negligence was inconsistent with reasonable reliance.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the trial judge's findings of reasonable reliance, detriment, and contributory negligence were supported by the evidence and could co-exist.

The parties, both sophisticated commercial entities, entered into Minutes of Settlement requiring the appellant to pay 1 million EUR over two years.

The agreement stipulated that upon default, the appellant would consent to judgment for 1 million EUR without credit for prior payments.

After paying 380,000 EUR, the appellant defaulted.

The motion judge granted summary judgment for 1 million EUR and dismissed the appellant's claim for relief from forfeiture.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the forfeited amount was neither disproportionate in law nor unconscionable in equity, as the provision was designed to incentivize compliance.

The appellants sought $207,612.83 in partial indemnity costs for the appeal against the respondent Dr. Librach, who proposed $101,571.06.

The Court of Appeal fixed the appellants' partial indemnity costs against Dr. Librach at $100,000 inclusive of taxes, plus disbursements, noting that even the respondent's proposed figure was on the high end.

The appellant appealed an order striking out his statement of claim, which alleged negligence and malfeasance by the ODSP for denying him disability benefits.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the statement of claim lacked material facts regarding his medical condition and how it met the criteria for benefits.

The court held that a mere denial of benefits does not establish negligence or misfeasance in public office, and declined to grant leave to amend.

The Court of Appeal previously dismissed an appeal and cross-appeal, initially indicating there would be no order as to costs due to divided success.

However, the respondent by cross-appeal submitted that he was entirely successful, as his only involvement was responding to the cross-appeal.

The Court agreed, finding no reason to depart from the usual rule that costs follow the event.

The fact that another party may have paid his legal fees did not deprive him of his claim for costs.

Costs of the cross-appeal were fixed at $5,000 on a partial indemnity basis plus disbursements.