Civil Litigation - Defendant - OCA

A landlord leased commercial property to a tenant who operated a contracting business.

The tenant modified the property by dumping landfill in a regulated flood plain without proper authorization, leading to environmental remediation orders.

The landlord and tenant had an oral agreement whereby the tenant would pay rezoning costs and complete required site plan modifications.

When the tenant failed to complete remediation work and the relationship broke down, the landlord terminated the lease and seized the tenant's commercial equipment on the property.

The landlord sued for unpaid rent and property damage; the tenant counterclaimed for conversion of the seized chattels and lost business income.

The trial judge awarded damages to both parties and set them off.

Both parties appealed on liability and damages.

Canadian National Railway Company moved for a stay of the Court of Appeal's June 2018 order requiring CN to reopen the James Street Bridge in Thunder Bay for vehicle traffic and maintain it in accordance with a 1906 agreement between Grand Trunk Pacific Railway Company and the Town of Fort William.

CN sought the stay pending its application for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada.

The motion judge declined to grant the stay, finding that CN's leave application lacked sufficient merit to warrant a stay despite CN's potential irreparable harm from financial commitments to reconstruction work.

The appellants appealed a summary judgment order dismissing their action against the police services board and an officer for missing and damaged property that had been seized.

The appellants argued their action was an enforcement of a court order under section 16(1)(b) of the Limitations Act, which has no limitation period.

The Court of Appeal held that the appellants' true cause of action was for monetary damages based on allegations of neglect or refusal to return goods and damage to property, not enforcement of the original order of disposition.

Since the action was commenced more than two years after the appellants knew the property had been forfeited to the Crown, it was barred by the two-year limitation period under section 4 of the Limitations Act.

Following a successful appeal, the appellants sought costs for both the trial and the appeal.

The Court of Appeal awarded substantial indemnity costs for the trial from the date of the appellants' first Rule 49 offer, noting that the respondents' self-represented status was not a reason to deny such costs.

However, the court reduced the requested amount to ensure proportionality with the amount in issue, fixing trial costs at $30,000 and appeal costs at $15,000.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of his action for abuse of statutory authority and defamation against the Institute of Chartered Accountants of Ontario and its officials.

The appellant argued that an allegedly defamatory e-mail was not protected by qualified privilege because it was made maliciously.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no basis to interfere with the trial judge's conclusion that the e-mail was sent on an occasion of qualified privilege, without malice, and within the scope of a confidential regulatory process.

The appellants moved under Rule 49.09 for judgment in the terms of an alleged settlement agreement.

The motion judge dismissed the motion, stating that he could not determine on the affidavit evidence whether a binding settlement had been reached, but concluded by stating the proceeding would continue as if there had been no accepted offer.

The appellants appealed to the Court of Appeal.

The Court of Appeal quashed the appeal, holding that the motion judge's order was interlocutory because he did not make a final determination that no settlement existed, but rather found he could not decide the issue on the record before him.

As the order was interlocutory, the Court of Appeal lacked jurisdiction.

The appellant appealed an order of the Superior Court of Justice that struck a jury notice and ordered security for costs.

The respondents brought motions to quash the appeal on the basis that the order was interlocutory, not final, and therefore the Court of Appeal lacked jurisdiction.

The Court of Appeal agreed, holding that while the right to a jury trial is a substantive right, an order striking a jury notice is collateral and does not determine the substantive issues in dispute.

The security for costs order was also held to be procedural and interlocutory.

The motions to quash the appeals were granted, with the Court noting that the delay caused by appealing to the wrong court should not be held against the appellant if he seeks leave to appeal to the Divisional Court.

The appellant appealed an order dismissing his action against several defendants, including his former partner, her lawyer, and a Quebec civil registry official, as frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process.

The action arose following a long history of paternity disputes and the appellant's conviction for criminal harassment.

The Court of Appeal found no basis to interfere with the motion judge's decision, noting that the claims against the registry official and the lawyer lacked foundation, and the action against the former partner was properly deemed an abuse of process.

The appellants appealed an order striking out their statement of claim against the federal government for discrimination, defamation, malice, and Charter breaches.

The motion judge found the action was an abuse of process, as it attempted to re-litigate complaints about a British Columbia legal proceeding and lacked any factual basis connecting the complaints to the federal government.

The Court of Appeal agreed, holding that the appellants could not make an indirect attack on the B.C. proceedings by suing the federal government in Ontario.

The appeal was dismissed with no costs.

The appellant appealed an order of the Superior Court of Justice and sought further disclosure.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the motion judge's disposition and dismissed the appeal.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment finding that a contract existed between the two individuals, C. Brar and S. Brar.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding there was evidence to support the trial judge's conclusion.

The respondent cross-appealed regarding a fraudulent conveyance.

The Court of Appeal allowed the cross-appeal, declaring the transfer of assets from the numbered company to SKLF Doors to be a fraudulent conveyance, as agreed by counsel for S. Brar and the numbered company.

Costs of $7,500 were awarded to the respondent.

The appellant appealed a finding of contempt for breaching a non-compete clause in a court order.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding ample evidence that the appellant had the requisite knowledge of the order or was wilfully blind to it.

Furthermore, the appellant admitted to breaching the clause after being personally served with the contempt motion.

The appeal was dismissed with costs awarded to the respondent.

The respondent municipality brought a motion to quash the appellant's second appeal as an abuse of process.

The appellant brought a responding motion to set aside the Registrar's order dismissing its first appeal for delay.

The Court of Appeal granted the motion to quash the second appeal, finding it was an abuse of process because the first appeal on the merits had already been dismissed for delay.

However, the Court exercised its discretion to set aside the Registrar's order dismissing the first appeal, accepting the delay in settling the formal judgment as an adequate explanation, subject to strict conditions regarding representation, filing an amended notice of appeal, and ordering transcripts.

The parties settled their dispute prior to the hearing.

The Court of Appeal endorsed that the appeal was abandoned without costs.

The appellant defaulted on a mortgage, leading the respondents to issue a notice of sale.

The appellant challenged the redemption amount, specifically a three-month interest prepayment penalty, and appealed the motion judge's order.

The appellant also sought to set aside a registrar's order dismissing a related appeal, arguing the registrar was not bilingual as required by the Courts of Justice Act.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal regarding the prepayment penalty, found the bilingual rights issue moot because the mortgage had already been redeemed, and declined to determine the final redemption amount, leaving it to the master.

The moving party, a self-represented mortgagor, sought leave to appeal an order quashing his appeal to the Divisional Court regarding the amount required to redeem a mortgage.

The Court of Appeal agreed the appeal to the Divisional Court was properly quashed because the original order was final, meaning the appeal lay to the Court of Appeal as of right.

Recognizing the moving party's consistent intention to appeal the substance of the original order, the Court treated the motion as one for an extension of time to appeal and granted it.

The Court directed written submissions on the merits of the appeal concerning a disputed prepayment fee.

The self-represented applicant brought a motion for leave to appeal an order of the Divisional Court that quashed his appeal of an order fixing mortgage arrears.

The Court of Appeal agreed the Divisional Court appeal was properly quashed because the original order was final, not interlocutory.

However, recognizing the applicant's consistent intention to appeal the merits of the original order, the Court treated the motion as one for an extension of time to appeal the original order and granted the extension.

The Court directed written submissions on the specific issue of a prepayment penalty.

The appellant, a former prison guard, commenced an action against the Crown and several individuals for workplace discrimination, harassment, and defamation.

The motion judge struck the action on the basis that the essential character of the dispute fell within the exclusive jurisdiction of the grievance procedure under the Public Service Staff Relations Act and the collective agreement, or alternatively the Canadian Human Rights Act.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming that the essential character of the dispute was workplace discrimination and harassment, which must be resolved through the statutory and collective agreement mechanisms rather than the courts.

The appellants appealed an order of the motions judge refusing to set aside a default judgment.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the motions judge that the appellants did not meet the test to set aside the default judgment.

Costs were fixed at $7,500.

The appellant doctor performed cosmetic surgery on the respondent's eyelid.

The respondent suffered complications and required revisionary surgeries.

She sued for negligence based on a lack of informed consent.

The trial judge found that a reasonable person in the respondent's position, if informed of the material risks, would not have proceeded with the surgery at that time due to her financial situation and career plans.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the doctor's appeal, holding that the trial judge correctly applied the modified objective test for causation from Reibl v. Hughes, properly considering the respondent's special circumstances.