Michelle Rumble

This ruling addresses the admissibility of evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter, following findings that five of six judicial authorizations were invalid and police exceeded the "plain view" doctrine during searches.

The court applied the R. v. Grant framework to various items.

Computer and cell phone evidence were excluded due to serious Charter violations and high impact on privacy interests.

Observations of the computer screen were also excluded.

However, handcuffs, a forensic textbook, handwritten notes, and Rogers cell phone records were deemed admissible, as their exclusion would bring the administration of justice into disrepute, despite some Charter breaches, particularly where lawful alternative means to obtain the evidence existed.

The applicant, facing 22 criminal charges including attempted sexual assault and kidnapping, brought a pre-trial application challenging the validity of six judicial authorizations (search warrants and a production order) under section 8 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The court conducted a Garofoli review, finding that while the affiant made full, fair, and frank disclosure, only the initial telewarrant for specific items (sunglasses and gloves) was valid.

However, specific seizures and searches conducted under this initial warrant (handcuffs, a forensic textbook, and activating a laptop screen) were deemed unlawful as they exceeded the warrant's scope or the plain view doctrine.

The subsequent five judicial authorizations, including a second telewarrant for laptop seizure, two warrants to search laptop contents, a warrant to search a cell phone, and a production order for cell phone records, were all quashed due to insufficient grounds or fatal flaws on their face.

The court emphasized that "plausibility" or "possibility" is not the legal standard for issuing warrants, which require "reasonable and probable grounds." The admissibility of the unlawfully obtained evidence will be determined in a subsequent s. 24(2) Charter analysis.

The accused, Antonio Ricciardi, brought a pre-trial application challenging the warrantless seizure of his sweatshirt by police during a court appearance.

The Crown argued the seizure was authorized under s. 489(2) of the Criminal Code as a simple seizure of evidence in plain view.

The court, applying a broad and purposive interpretation of Charter s. 8 privacy rights, held that the non-consensual removal of clothing from a person constitutes a "search and seizure" not merely a "seizure." Since s. 489(2) only authorizes a seizure and not a search, the police action fell outside its scope and violated the accused's s. 8 Charter rights.

The offender was convicted of aggravated assault, mischief under $5,000, and two counts of breach of probation following a trial.

The assault occurred when the offender, armed with a knife, lay in wait for the victim to enter his home after the offender had thrown the victim's belongings onto the front lawn.

The victim suffered a stab wound to the left elbow requiring stitches and resulting in lasting nerve damage that affected his ability to work as a welder.

The offender had an extensive criminal record spanning 21 years with multiple prior convictions for assault, robbery, and various breaches.

The Crown sought two years less a day; the defence sought five months.

The court imposed 21 months in custody less pre-trial credit, followed by three years' probation, emphasizing deterrence and denunciation over rehabilitation given the aggravating circumstances and the offender's poor track record.

The accused was charged with aggravated assault, assault with a weapon, and mischief to private property relating to an altercation with the victim, as well as two counts of breach of probation.

The trial involved a three-day hearing with evidence from the victim, the accused, and a third party witness.

The court found the accused guilty on all charges after rejecting the accused's self-defence claim.

The court determined that the accused had armed himself with a kitchen knife in anticipation of the victim's return to the house and used it disproportionately against an unarmed opponent.

The court found the accused's post-offence conduct—breaking the knife and hiding the blade in a toilet tank—demonstrated consciousness of guilt and knowledge that his actions were unlawful.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood.

Following a trial on Charter applications and the merits, the accused was found guilty.

The court dismissed Charter applications alleging breaches of section 8 (unreasonable search and seizure) and section 9 (arbitrary detention) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The court found that both officers had reasonable suspicion to demand an approved screening device test and that the test result was reliable.

The accused was sentenced to a fine of $1,750 plus victim surcharge (total $2,275), payable over one year, and an 18-month driving prohibition with a six-month suspension followed by 12 months of interlock device requirements.

The accused pleaded guilty to conspiracy to commit the murders of two victims in a planned home invasion arranged by a third party seeking the deaths of her parents.

The accused played a pivotal role by recruiting a shooter, arranging transportation, and driving armed participants to the residence while coordinating entry.

The conspiracy culminated in execution-style shootings that killed one victim and seriously injured the other.

The court emphasized denunciation and deterrence given the calculated nature of the plot and the accused’s extensive firearms record and prior murder conviction.

The accused was sentenced to 18 years’ imprisonment concurrent to an existing life sentence, with no credit for pre-sentence custody and with delayed parole eligibility requiring service of half the sentence.

The accused was charged with multiple counts of assault against Nancy Stol, uttering threats, failing to comply with a recognizance, and obstructing justice by attempting to get witnesses to recant their statements.

The Crown relied on testimony from Michael Crosby, a witness who lived with the accused and victim, and Nancy Stol, the alleged victim.

The court found the accused's out-of-court statements to police to be reliable and credible, despite her recantation at trial.

The court rejected the accused's attempts to discredit the evidence and found him guilty of five counts of assault and related offences, but acquitted him of obstructing justice as the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that both named witnesses were asked to recant.

The accused was convicted of two counts of assault and one count of uttering threats to cause death against his common-law partner.

The Crown sought 14 months incarceration with consecutive sentences.

The defence sought 6 months, already served in pre-trial custody.

The court imposed a suspended sentence with 3 years probation, taking into account the accused's prior domestic violence convictions, mitigating factors including consistent employment and compliance with previous probation, and the principle of totality.

The court emphasized that domestic violence requires denunciation and deterrence while considering rehabilitation for a youthful offender.

The accused was charged with two counts of assault and uttering threats to cause death against his intimate partner.

The complainant initially provided a detailed sworn video-taped statement to police describing multiple incidents of assault and threats.

At trial, the complainant recanted her entire statement, claiming she had fabricated the allegations because she was angry at the accused for being late with food delivery.

The court rejected the complainant's recantation as incredible and unreliable, finding her explanations for why she would make false allegations to be nonsensical and preposterous.

The court admitted the complainant's prior police statement as hearsay evidence meeting the criteria of necessity and threshold reliability.

Based on corroborating evidence including photographs of injuries, the 911 call made shortly after the incident, and the complainant's demeanor and consistency in her police statement, the court found the Crown had proven all charges beyond a reasonable doubt.

During a murder trial involving multiple accused, the Crown brought a motion asking the court to reconsider a prior evidentiary ruling admitting a hearsay statement from a former girlfriend of an alleged alternate suspect.

The Crown argued new evidence from two witnesses and digital communications demonstrated a strong motive for the declarant to fabricate the statement.

The court held that the new evidence constituted a material change in circumstances permitting reconsideration of the earlier ruling.

However, applying the relaxed threshold reliability standard applicable to defence evidence, the judge concluded the statement retained some reliability and should remain admissible.

The Crown was permitted to call reply evidence from the new witnesses to challenge the credibility and reliability of the hearsay statement.

During a murder trial involving a home invasion, the accused advanced a third party suspect defence and sought to question the alleged third party about prior criminal charges that had not resulted in convictions.

The court considered whether such evidence was admissible as disposition evidence and whether it could be used to impeach the credibility of the defence’s own witness.

The court held that questioning a witness about prior charges without convictions was improper because it undermines the presumption of innocence and has little probative value.

However, the court found that the underlying facts of certain prior incidents involving firearms and violent activity could be admissible where relevant to the issue of identity and the third party suspect defence.

The court therefore permitted questioning about the underlying facts of most incidents, except a 1996 event involving a knife and pepper spray which lacked sufficient probative value.

In a multi‑accused murder trial, the Crown sought to introduce a PowerPoint presentation prepared by an Ontario Provincial Police analyst summarizing extensive cell phone records already entered in evidence.

Defence counsel objected, arguing the presentation was redundant, prejudicial, and effectively allowed the Crown to present its theory of the case twice.

The court held that the PowerPoint itself was not evidence but an illustrative aid reorganizing evidence already admitted.

Although useful and reliable, its probative value was outweighed by prejudice arising from duplication, significant trial time, and the unfair advantage of allowing the Crown to present its theory through a witness before closing submissions.

The court excluded the presentation from evidence but permitted the Crown to use it in closing argument and ordered the Crown to disclose the presentation to defence counsel in editable PowerPoint format.

During a joint trial for first-degree murder and attempted murder, the jury reported that a juror's spouse had been attending the proceedings and texting the juror information about the case, which was then shared with other jurors.

Two of the accused brought an application for a mistrial.

The court conducted an inquiry, questioning each juror individually, and determined that the information imparted was innocuous, primarily concerning scheduling delays and a witness's appearance.

The court dismissed the mistrial application, finding that the improper contact did not cause actual prejudice or irreparably taint the appearance of justice and fairness.

During a joint murder trial involving five accused, one accused (Mylvaganam) sought to introduce an alternate suspect defence, which included propensity evidence against a co-accused (Carty).

The trial judge prematurely ruled on the admissibility of this propensity evidence without a full evidentiary record or complete submissions.

Carty brought an application for severance, arguing the premature ruling gave rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias.

The court dismissed the application, finding that while the ruling was premature, a fully informed reasonable person would not apprehend bias, as the error could be remedied by conducting a proper and fulsome voir dire on the propensity evidence.

During a multi‑accused murder trial, one accused sought leave to introduce alternate suspect evidence implicating an uncharged third party.

The proposed evidence consisted primarily of hearsay statements allegedly made by that third party to former partners confessing involvement in the offence.

The court considered the admissibility of the statements under the principled exception to the hearsay rule, focusing on necessity and threshold reliability.

The judge concluded that the utterances possessed sufficient reliability and could be admitted, provided the declarant was first called and denied making them in accordance with the K.G.B. procedure.

The court further held that related propensity evidence affecting a co‑accused could be admitted with appropriate limiting instructions.

In a multi‑accused murder trial arising from a home invasion in which one victim was killed and another survived, a co‑accused sought to exclude a text message sent on the day of the offence stating “To after work ok will be game time.” The moving party argued the text was an ambiguous fragment whose meaning could only be determined through speculation and should therefore be excluded under the probative value versus prejudicial effect analysis.

The court distinguished authorities dealing with incomplete overheard utterances, finding the text was a stand‑alone statement capable of interpretation when viewed alongside earlier communications among the accused.

When considered in context with prior text exchanges suggesting planning activity, the message was capable of supporting an inference relevant to the identity and involvement of the accused.

The court held the text possessed probative value that outweighed any prejudicial effect and declined to exclude it.

The Crown sought to admit a videotaped police statement made by the accused following a high-risk arrest for murder and attempted murder.

The defence argued the statement was involuntary due to oppressive circumstances, including the manner of arrest, relentless questioning, and the accused's physical illness.

The court applied the common law confessions rule and found the statement voluntary for the first three hours and twenty-three minutes, as the accused was able to make a meaningful choice to speak or remain silent.

However, the court found a reasonable doubt as to voluntariness for the remainder of the interview, as the accused became visibly ill and unable to continue.

The statement was ruled partially admissible.

The Crown sought to admit a videotaped police statement made by the accused during a homicide investigation.

The defence challenged the admissibility of the statement on the grounds that it was involuntary and obtained in breach of s. 10(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

Applying the confessions rule from R. v. Oickle, the court assessed whether threats, inducements, oppression, lack of an operating mind, or police trickery undermined voluntariness.

The court found the police interview tactics—including accusatorial questioning, references to investigative techniques, and moral appeals—did not overbear the accused’s will and did not amount to improper inducements or oppressive conduct.

The court further held that the accused was not psychologically detained prior to arrest under the framework in R. v. Grant and R. v. Suberu, and therefore her right to counsel under s. 10(b) was not breached.

The November 22 statement was ruled voluntary and admissible.