Michael M. Miller

The appellant municipality appealed a decision of the Ontario Energy Board declining to review its previous decision that allowed a wind energy company to build distribution facilities on municipal road allowances.

The municipality argued the Board erred in interpreting its review power too narrowly and that the presence of an original panel member on the review panel created a reasonable apprehension of bias.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding the Board's interpretation of its review rules was reasonable and that the participation of an original member in a reconsideration process does not raise a reasonable apprehension of bias.

The appellant developer appealed a decision dismissing its application to declare a municipality's conveyance of access lands to a respondent developer void.

The municipality had transferred a one-foot reserve and four lots dedicated as a public highway to the respondent to provide road access to landlocked development lands.

The Court of Appeal found that the conveyance constituted a 'sale' of 'surplus' land under s. 193 of the Municipal Act.

The municipality failed to comply with the mandatory procedural requirements of s. 193, including passing a procedure by-law and providing public notice.

Furthermore, the by-law passed under s. 297 to stop up the highway lots did not exempt the municipality from public notice requirements.

The appeal was allowed and the conveyance was declared void.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment declaring a road passing through the respondents' property to be an access road under the Road Access Act, but restricting its use and denying costs.

The respondents cross-appealed the declaration and the denial of their request to close the road.

The Court of Appeal upheld the finding that the road was an access road but found no statutory basis for restricting its use to specific parties or purposes.

The Court also found the trial judge erred by failing to determine whether parties entitled to notice had a legal right to use the road before denying the closure request under s. 3(1)(b).

The appeal and cross-appeal were allowed in part, and a new trial was ordered regarding the road closure and stayed damage claims.

The appellant appealed a decision confirming an order of the Chief Building Inspector under s. 17(1) of the Building Code Act, arguing that the order must be in writing.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the current statutory provision does not require the order to be in writing and contemplates that it can be given orally and subsequently reduced to writing.

The protection for the owner is found in s. 17(7), which requires the chief building official to apply to a judge for confirmation of the order.

The appellant Township appealed an Ontario Municipal Board decision that approved a zoning by-law amendment for a specialty stone quarry without requiring the respondent to rebuild an access road to current municipal standards.

The Township argued that its Official Plan mandated a road maintenance agreement prior to rezoning.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding the Board's decision reasonable.

The Court held that the Official Plan provision was discretionary and specifically applied to gravel trucks, which was inapplicable as the site would not extract gravel.

The Board properly considered the Planning Act requirements regarding transportation needs and municipal finances.

The respondent constructed a dock without a building permit and was charged under s. 8(1) of the Building Code Act thirteen months after completion.

The trial judge and summary conviction appeal judge dismissed the charge, finding it was barred by the one-year limitation period in s. 36(8).

The Crown appealed, arguing the limitation period should run from the date of discovery and that the offence was a continuing one.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the discoverability principle did not apply to this specific statutory limitation period and that the offence was complete upon the conclusion of construction, not a continuing offence.

The appellant appealed an order of the Superior Court of Justice directing the sale of a property.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the application judge's exercise of discretion in ordering the sale.

The appeal was dismissed with costs fixed at $7,500.

The appellant Township appealed a decision regarding the application of a zoning bylaw to a specific property.

Prior to the appeal, the property was sold, the use ceased, and the bylaw was amended.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal as moot.

The appellant also sought leave to appeal the costs order of $30,000 on a partial indemnity basis.

The Court granted leave but dismissed the costs appeal, finding the amount reasonable.

Costs of the appeal were fixed at $12,000 to the respondents.

The appellant appealed an order granting an equalization payment.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the motion judge overlooked an agreed statement of facts which established that at the date of separation, the debts of both parties exceeded their assets, resulting in a zero equalization.

The relevant paragraphs of the lower court order were struck out, though the respondent was permitted to proceed with her support application.

The appellant municipality challenged a trial judgment arising from a bicycle accident on a paved roadway that also formed part of a fitness path.

The court held that s. 4(1) of the Occupiers’ Liability Act did not apply because the location was regularly used for vehicular traffic and was more than a recreational trail.

The court upheld the findings of no contributory negligence and the general damages award, but set aside a $50,000 award for loss of competitive advantage because the evidence of future earning capacity loss was meagre and unquantified.

The appeal was allowed in part, the cross-appeal was dismissed, trial costs were reduced to party-and-party, and there were no costs on the appeal or cross-appeal.