Michael Joseph Venturi

The Crown appealed the respondent's acquittal on a charge of having care and control of a motor vehicle with an alcohol concentration exceeding 80 mg.

The appeal raised issues regarding the investigating officer's belief in the proper working order of an Approved Screening Device (ASD), whether breath tests were administered "as soon as practicable" a Section 8 Charter violation, and the trial judge's Section 24(2) Charter analysis.

The Superior Court found that the trial judge erred in law on all grounds, specifically in requiring the officer to perform a self-test on the ASD, misapprehending evidence regarding delays in breath test administration, and consequently, erred in finding a Charter breach and in the Section 24(2) analysis.

The appeal was allowed, the acquittal set aside, and a new trial ordered.

The accused, Raymond Roy, was found guilty on count one.

The court imposed a sentence of three years' jail, with 740 days credited for pre-trial custody, leaving an additional 355 days to serve.

A three-year probation period was ordered, including statutory conditions, complete abstention from alcohol and drugs for the first year, and a condition not to be in the company of his father if either is consuming alcohol for the remaining two years.

A lifetime weapons prohibition under section 110 of the Criminal Code, with an exception for hunting for sustenance under section 113, was imposed.

Roy was also ordered to provide a DNA sample and report to a probation officer within seven days of release, taking recommended counselling.

The Crown appealed an acquittal for impaired driving and over 80mgs.

The trial judge had found that breath samples were not taken "as soon as practicable" because the respondent had waived his right to counsel, making police efforts to facilitate counsel contact an unreasonable delay.

The appeal court found that the trial judge erred by engaging in a minute-by-minute assessment of delay and misapplied the "as soon as practicable" standard.

The court also determined that the respondent's initial responses regarding counsel were ambiguous, not a clear and unequivocal waiver, and thus the police acted reasonably in facilitating counsel.

The appeal was granted, the acquittal set aside, and a conviction for over 80mgs was substituted, remitting the matter for sentencing.

The appellant appealed his conviction for refusing to comply with a demand for a roadside breath sample, arguing that the trial judge failed to consider material evidence regarding the equivocal nature of his refusal.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge conducted a careful analysis of the evidence, including the officer's cross-examination, and was entitled to conclude that the appellant's final response constituted a clear and unequivocal refusal, despite earlier potentially conditional statements.

The court affirmed that a trial judge is not required to recite every piece of evidence or make a finding on exact words, as long as the reasons are intelligible and allow for meaningful appellate review.

The accused was charged with impaired driving contrary to section 253(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The Crown alleged the accused drove with more than 80 mg of alcohol in 100 mL of blood.

The accused challenged the admissibility of breath test results on Charter grounds and argued the instruments were unreliable and inaccurate.

The trial spanned 18 days over approximately two years.

The court found the police lawfully stopped the vehicle based on speeding, had reasonable and probable grounds to demand breath samples, and properly administered the breath tests.

Expert evidence from the Crown's toxicologist established the reliability of the Intoxilyzer 8000 C results.

The defence expert's theory of instrument drift was rejected as unscientific and based on incomplete data.

The accused was convicted.

The appellant appealed his conviction for 'Over 80'.

At trial, the judge found that police breached the appellant's s. 8 Charter rights by conducting an unlawful search of his vehicle under the Liquor License Act, but admitted the breath samples under s. 24(2).

On appeal, the court found the trial judge erred in principle by failing to properly balance the Grant factors and by treating the reliability of breath samples as determinative.

The appeal court conducted a fresh s. 24(2) analysis, finding the breach was moderately serious and had a significant impact on the appellant's privacy interests, as the evidence was not otherwise discoverable.

The breath samples were excluded, the conviction quashed, and an acquittal entered.

The accused, charged with second degree murder, brought applications under s. 8 of the Charter to exclude evidence derived from the warrantless seizure of his pants, shoes, and sweater.

The court found that the accused had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the clothing and that the warrantless seizures violated his s. 8 rights, as there were no exigent circumstances.

Applying the Grant framework under s. 24(2) of the Charter, the court excluded the evidence derived from the pants due to a lack of evidence regarding their seizure, but admitted the evidence derived from the shoes and sweater, finding that their admission would not bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The Crown brought a pre-trial application seeking an order that the defence provide a list of its witnesses to be read to prospective jurors during jury selection to identify potential conflicts.

The defence opposed the application, arguing it violated the accused's right against self-incrimination and the principle that the defence need not reveal its case until the close of the Crown's case.

The court dismissed the Crown's application, finding that compelling the defence to reveal its witness list at the outset would amount to conscripting the accused against himself.

The court adopted a procedure proposed by the defence where a combined, anonymized list of Crown and defence witnesses would be provided to the trial judge and prospective jurors silently.

The Crown brought an application to admit the hearsay statements of a deceased victim in a second-degree murder trial under the principled exception to the hearsay rule.

The victim had made statements to police, medical staff, and family members before dying from his injuries.

The court applied the test for threshold reliability, noting concerns about the victim's perception due to intoxication, medical condition, and language barriers.

Furthermore, the victim's statements identifying the attacker as a woman contradicted the Crown's theory that the male accused was the attacker.

The court found the statements lacked sufficient threshold reliability and dismissed the application.

The appellant sought leave to appeal his conviction for driving over 80, arguing that a 13-minute delay in obtaining an alcohol screening device violated his right to counsel and that the failure to use a N.I.S.T. thermometer raised a reasonable doubt about the breath test results.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the application for leave to appeal, finding that the proposed grounds of appeal were case-specific, did not raise questions of general importance to the administration of justice, and lacked strong merit.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault, arguing the verdict was unreasonable and that the trial judge presumed guilt while glossing over inconsistencies in the complainant's evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge properly addressed the issues and assessed the evidence, and that the appellant was merely attempting to retry the case.

The appellant appealed a summary conviction for care and control of a motor vehicle with blood alcohol exceeding the legal limit under s. 253(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The appellant argued that the breath samples were not taken “as soon as practicable,” pointing to alleged unexplained delays both before the Approved Screening Device demand and between the two breathalyzer samples.

The court held that the initial 12‑minute period was not raised at trial and could not be relied upon as a new ground of appeal.

Applying the governing principles from appellate jurisprudence, the court concluded that the trial judge properly assessed the entire chain of events and reasonably found the police conduct prompt and reasonable.

The unexplained interval between the two samples did not render the testing process non‑compliant with the statutory requirement.

The appellant appealed summary conviction findings of guilt for impaired driving and operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol level exceeding 80 milligrams, arguing the trial judge erred in determining she was the driver.

The court held that the trial judge failed to properly apply the second stage of the W.(D.) analysis after rejecting the appellant’s testimony and also misapprehended material circumstantial evidence relevant to driver identity.

In a case resting entirely on circumstantial evidence, the reasons did not adequately assess the totality of the evidence or whether guilt was the only reasonable inference.

The appeal was allowed, the convictions were quashed, and a new trial was ordered.

The applicant sought review of bail conditions requiring an acceptable surety and a $10,000 non-deposited pledge after being charged with sexual offences against his stepdaughter.

He proposed release to the Elizabeth Fry Society with residence at the Salvation Army, daily reporting, and a reduced pledge of $500, arguing that stricter conditions effectively denied bail given his indigence and engaged s. 11(e) Charter concerns.

The court held that the justice of the peace reasonably concluded the proposed institutional supervision was inadequate to manage the risks, particularly given the applicant's prior failures to appear, breach history, lack of fixed address, lack of employment, and weak community ties.

Deference was owed to the original bail decision, and the application was dismissed.

The applicant brought a Charter motion under sections 10(b) and 24(2) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, alleging that she was not afforded contact with counsel of her choice and did not receive adequate legal advice.

The applicant was arrested for impaired driving and given her right to counsel.

She selected three lawyers from a provided list.

The police attempted to contact her first two choices without success and successfully connected her with her third choice, with whom she spoke for approximately eight minutes.

The applicant subsequently complained to police that the lawyer was rude and hung up on her, and that she received no advice.

The court found that the police took reasonable steps to facilitate contact with counsel of choice and that the applicant did not diligently and reasonably indicate that the advice received was inadequate.

The accused pleaded guilty to child luring after communicating with an undercover police officer posing as a 13-year-old girl on Craigslist.

The accused sought a stay of proceedings, arguing he was entrapped by the police.

The court dismissed the entrapment claim, finding the officer was engaged in a bona fide investigation and merely provided an opportunity to commit the offence without inducing it.

A finding of guilt was registered.

The accused was charged with luring contrary to section 172.1 of the Criminal Code.

The accused pleaded guilty to the offense and subsequently raised the defense of entrapment.

The court found that the police officer conducting the investigation was engaged in a bona fide, proactive investigation with reasonable suspicion that the accused was engaged in prohibited activity.

The court determined that the police did not induce the commission of the offense but merely provided an opportunity, which the accused freely pursued on multiple occasions without coercion.

The entrapment defense was rejected and a conviction was registered.

The accused applied to exclude evidence seized pursuant to a search warrant executed at his residence in a child pornography investigation.

He argued the Information to Obtain contained stale information, lacked full, frank and fair disclosure, and failed to provide sufficient technical evidence supporting reasonable grounds.

The court reviewed the authorization under the Garofoli framework and concluded the issuing justice had sufficient grounds to issue the warrant, relying on the officer’s observations of child pornography files associated with the IP address and explanatory evidence regarding file sharing networks and forensic recovery.

The court held the information was adequate and not misleading, and that reasonable grounds existed to believe evidence would be found.

In the alternative, the court found the evidence would not be excluded under s. 24(2) of the Charter because the police acted in good faith and the evidence was reliable and crucial to the prosecution.

The accused, charged with sexual assault and sexual interference, brought an application for a stay of proceedings under s. 24(1) of the Charter, alleging a breach of her s. 11(b) right to be tried within a reasonable time.

The court analyzed the 891-day period between arrest and the scheduled trial date.

After deducting delay attributable to the defence and inherent time requirements, the remaining delay was approximately 11 months, which fell well within the 14 to 18-month guideline established in Morin.

Finding no actual prejudice linked to the delay, the court dismissed the application.

The accused brought an application under s. 591(3) of the Criminal Code seeking severance of three counts of historic sexual offences involving two complainants who were sisters.

The accused argued that the counts lacked a sufficient factual nexus and that a joint trial would create moral and reasoning prejudice.

The court considered the severance factors outlined in R. v. Last, including prejudice to the accused, the legal and factual nexus between counts, complexity of evidence, multiplicity of proceedings, and the potential use of similar fact evidence.

The court found a sufficient factual and legal nexus between the allegations and determined the risk of prejudice was minimal in a judge-alone trial.

The accused failed to establish on a balance of probabilities that the interests of justice required severance.