25 total
Application to declare the repeal of peremptory challenges unconstitutional dismissed; legislation upheld as constitutional.
The applicant, charged with second-degree murder, brought an application challenging the constitutionality of the recent Criminal Code amendments that abolished peremptory challenges during jury selection.
The applicant relied on a recent decision by a judge of coordinate jurisdiction that found the amendments unconstitutional.
The court held that it was not bound by the prior decision and found it to be plainly wrong.
The court concluded that the elimination of peremptory challenges does not violate the right to a fair trial, an impartial jury, or the principles of fundamental justice, as other safeguards such as challenge for cause and the enhanced stand-aside power remain in place.
The application was dismissed and the legislation was upheld as constitutional.
Accused acquitted of firearm charges due to arbitrary detention and severe police credibility issues regarding use of force.
The accused was charged with firearm offences after being arrested during a police takedown of a target he was accompanying.
The accused brought Charter applications alleging arbitrary detention and excessive use of force, supported by independent video evidence showing police kicking him while he was handcuffed on the ground.
The court found the detention was arbitrary as police lacked reasonable grounds, and excluded the firearm under s. 24(2) due to the seriousness of the police misconduct.
The court also found the Crown failed to prove possession beyond a reasonable doubt due to severe police credibility issues, resulting in an acquittal.
Evidence from an unlawful investigative detention and search was excluded, resulting in the accused's acquittal.
Jaleel Williams was charged with robbery and other offenses.
He sought to exclude evidence seized during an investigative detention and search, arguing violations of ss. 8, 9, and 10(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.
The Crown sought to admit certain utterances made by Williams.
The court found that the detention and search violated ss. 8 and 9 of the Charter, as there was no objectively reasonable basis for the initial detention and the search exceeded the scope of a permissible pat-down.
This evidence was excluded under s. 24(2) of the Charter.
The court found no violation of Williams's s. 10(b) right to counsel and admitted his booking hall utterances as voluntary.
As a result of the exclusion of key evidence, the Crown tendered no further evidence, and Williams was found not guilty of the charges.
The offender received a six-month conditional sentence for breaching no-contact orders involving a domestic violence victim.
The accused pleaded guilty to one breach of a recognizance and one breach of probation.
The breaches involved violating court orders to stay away from the victim, Monique Fortin, whom he had previously assaulted on two separate occasions.
The court imposed a six-month conditional sentence followed by two years' probation, along with a section 109 weapons prohibition order for 10 years and a DNA order.
The sentence balanced the serious aggravating factors, including multiple breaches and a pattern of domestic violence, against mitigating factors such as the guilty plea, recent rehabilitation efforts, and stable employment.
Blood evidence was excluded and the accused acquitted after police failed to facilitate his request for counsel.
The accused was charged with impaired care or control.
The Crown's case relied on blood test results obtained at a hospital without the accused's consent.
The defence sought to exclude the blood results based on alleged Charter breaches, including unlawful detention, delayed right to counsel, and failure to facilitate the accused's request to contact counsel.
The court found that while the initial order to exit the vehicle was lawful under the Waterfield test (justified to protect life), there were Charter breaches regarding the right to counsel.
The court excluded the blood evidence under section 24(2) of the Charter, finding that the impact on the accused's Charter-protected interests was significant, particularly given the accused's vulnerability and explicit request for counsel that was not facilitated.