Michael Anne MacDonald

The appellant appealed his conviction, advancing an implied consent defence for the first time on appeal.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no air of reality to the defence, as the appellant's conduct went well beyond routine physical contact.

The court also found no error in the trial judge's assessment of the complainant's evidence.

The appellant was convicted of aggravated assault and assault with a weapon after stabbing the complainant in a shower.

On appeal, he argued the trial judge erred by refusing to instruct the jury on self-defence and by not admitting preliminary inquiry evidence under the principled approach to hearsay.

The Court of Appeal dismissed these grounds, finding no evidentiary basis for self-defence and noting the hearsay issue was not raised at trial.

However, the court found that convictions for both offences offended the rule against multiple convictions, staying the assault with a weapon conviction and affirming the aggravated assault conviction.

The appellant sought leave to appeal from a summary conviction appeal judgment that set aside a stay of proceedings based on alleged unreasonable delay.

The court held that the delay between December 15 and May 5 was attributable to the defence, and that the trial judge improperly placed significant weight on systemic scheduling concerns unrelated to the actual causes of delay in the case.

Agreeing with the summary conviction appeal judge, the court concluded that a fair balancing of the relevant s. 11(b) factors did not justify a stay.

The application for leave to appeal was dismissed.

The appellants challenged a municipal tax sale of an island they had mistakenly occupied and improved, arguing the municipality had confused two islands and that no meaningful tax arrears existed on the occupied property.

The majority held that tax arrears on the registered parcel triggered the Municipal Tax Sales Act, 1984, that any assessment invalidity was insulated by s. 13(1)(a), and that the appellants' adverse possession claim failed because they were not abutting landowners within s. 9(5)(c).

The dissent would have applied a purposive interpretation to avoid an absurd and unjust result, concluding that the substantive trigger of tax arrears never truly arose.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The respondent, a young offender, was charged with possession of stolen goods in Ontario.

He argued that Ontario's failure to implement alternative measures programs under section 4 of the Young Offenders Act violated his equality rights under section 15(1) of the Charter, as such programs were available in other provinces.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the Crown's appeal, holding that section 4 is valid federal criminal law that grants provinces the discretion, but not the obligation, to establish alternative measures programs.

The Court further held that the differential application of the law based on province of residence did not violate section 15(1) of the Charter, as province of residence in this context is not a personal characteristic and differential application is a legitimate feature of the federal system.