Mercedes Perez

The appellant appealed a Consent and Capacity Board finding that she was incapable with respect to treatment by antipsychotic medication under the Health Care Consent Act, 1996.

The court applied reasonableness review to factual and mixed findings, correctness to pure law, and held the practitioner bore the burden of rebutting the presumption of capacity on a balance of probabilities.

The court found there was corroborative evidence and sufficient evidence supporting the Board's two-part incapacity analysis, including evidence from both the treating physician and the appellant's own testimony.

The court also held the Board's reasons were adequate in context and entitled to deference given the statutory timelines for Board proceedings.

The appeal was dismissed and the Board decision was upheld.

The appellant, who suffers from a delusional disorder and believes he is the rightful King of Canada, appealed a decision upholding the Consent and Capacity Board's finding that he was incapable of consenting to treatment with anti-psychotic medication.

The appellant argued that the test for capacity under section 4 of the Health Care Consent Act was unconstitutionally vague and that the Board's decision was unreasonable.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the statutory test was not vague and had been defined with reasonable precision by the Supreme Court of Canada.

The Court held that the Board's decision was reasonable, as the appellant's mental condition prevented him from recognizing his illness and appreciating the consequences of refusing treatment.

The appellant appealed an order of the Superior Court of Justice.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal in part and varied the order below in accordance with the agreement of the parties.

No costs were ordered.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Ontario Review Board refusing his request to be transferred to medium security and ordering an independent assessment prior to the next annual review.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding ample evidence to support the Board's conclusion that remaining at Oak Ridge was the least restrictive means of controlling the significant risk posed by the appellant.

The Court also found that ordering an independent assessment was a prudent precautionary step, not an indication of uncertainty.

The appellant, an involuntary psychiatric patient, appealed a Superior Court decision upholding the Consent and Capacity Board's findings that she was incapable of consenting to treatment and managing her property.

The Board found that while the appellant could understand relevant information, her delusional disorder prevented her from appreciating the reasonably foreseeable consequences of her decisions.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the Board applied the correct legal tests from Starson v. Swaze and that its conclusions were reasonable and supported by the medical evidence.

The appellant, who had been found not guilty by reason of insanity, applied for a declaration restricting the interpretation of the victim notification requirements under s. 672.5(13.2) of the Criminal Code and challenging their constitutional validity.

The Ontario Review Board had previously adjourned his hearings to notify potential victims, but eventually granted him an absolute discharge when no victims were found.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal for mootness, declining to exercise its discretion to hear the case because the appellant had already been discharged and there was no factual record involving actual victims to properly determine the statutory and constitutional issues.