M. Dale Parayeski

The plaintiff creditor brought a motion for summary judgment seeking to set aside a transfer of real property from a judgment debtor and his spouse to the spouse alone as a fraudulent conveyance.

The transfer occurred after a default judgment had been obtained and after the debtor failed to attend examinations in aid of execution.

The court considered the badges of fraud under section 2 of the Fraudulent Conveyances Act, including a transfer between close relatives for nominal consideration during circumstances of insolvency.

The respondents argued the transfer was intended to protect the transferee as a legitimate creditor.

The court held that the transfer constituted either a fraudulent conveyance or an improper preference and that no genuine issue requiring a trial existed.

A law firm brought an application under s. 140 of the Courts of Justice Act seeking to have the respondent declared a vexatious litigant.

The respondent had repeatedly pursued meritless motions and appeals after her underlying action had been dismissed on summary judgment, despite multiple rulings from the Court of Appeal stating the appeal lacked merit.

She also failed to pay costs orders and continued filing extensive materials and additional motions attempting to reopen dismissed matters.

Applying the established factors for vexatious proceedings, the court found the respondent had persistently pursued proceedings without reasonable grounds and engaged in abusive litigation conduct.

The court declared the respondent a vexatious litigant and ordered that she obtain leave of the Superior Court of Justice before commencing or continuing any proceeding in Ontario.

The plaintiff lender brought a motion for summary judgment to recover monies loaned to a corporate borrower under a debenture.

The borrower acknowledged borrowing funds but disputed the precise amount owed and raised concerns about payment preference because multiple lenders were listed in the debenture.

The court found there were no genuine issues requiring a trial, concluding that default was established through non-payment since 2010 and the borrower’s insolvency.

Documentary evidence, including a series of cheques totaling nearly $3 million, established the indebtedness.

Summary judgment was granted for $2,800,000 with provision that payment be made in a manner that would avoid preferential treatment among lenders.

The respondent father brought a motion to change a prior final order that limited his parenting time to supervised access and restricted his attendance at the child’s school.

He sought unsupervised access, telephone contact, access to information about the child’s education and health, and permission to attend the school.

The mother opposed the motion and sought termination of access.

The court found a material change in circumstances due to the refusal of the designated supervision service to continue supervising visits, but concluded that the father’s repeated confrontational conduct and inability to maintain appropriate behaviour in supervised settings made unsupervised access inappropriate.

The court terminated in‑person access and permitted only telephone contact at the mother’s discretion, while requiring the mother to provide basic information about the child’s health and education.

The plaintiff brought a motion to set aside a Registrar’s administrative dismissal for delay and to restore the action to an assignment court list.

The action arose from a pedestrian‑motor vehicle accident and had experienced lengthy procedural delays, including removal from a prior trial list by consent.

Applying the contextual approach governing motions to set aside administrative dismissals, the court considered the explanation for delay, inadvertence in missing the status hearing deadline, promptness of the motion, and prejudice to the defendants.

The court found that while delay existed, some responsibility rested with the defendants due to earlier tactical decisions, the missed deadline was attributable to inadvertence, and the defendants would not suffer significant prejudice.

The court set aside the dismissal and restored the action to the assignment court list, but declined to award costs to the plaintiff.

The plaintiffs moved to amend their statement of claim following a motor vehicle accident to add a municipality as a defendant and to properly name the existing defendant as a person under disability represented by a litigation guardian.

The municipality opposed the amendment on the basis that the limitation period under the Limitations Act, 2002 had expired.

The plaintiffs relied on the discoverability principle, arguing that they did not learn the material facts supporting a claim against the municipality until they obtained police officers’ notes describing hazardous icy road conditions.

The court held that the limitation period began when the plaintiffs ought to have obtained the notes through the exercise of reasonable diligence.

Because the plaintiffs failed to follow up on a request for the notes for several years, the discoverability principle did not extend the limitation period.

Following an assessment hearing relating to costs, the court considered written submissions from the parties regarding entitlement to costs of the assessment proceeding itself.

The moving party argued that costs should be awarded because participation in the hearing was necessary to quantify the costs previously awarded.

The responding party argued that the amounts claimed had been substantially reduced during the assessment.

The court concluded that success was divided and that it was appropriate for each party to bear its own costs.

Following the breakdown of a long-term traditional marriage, the court determined issues relating to child support, extraordinary expenses for adult dependent children attending university, spousal support, arrears, and related financial obligations.

The respondent’s income was accepted at $90,000 and child support was ordered based on the Federal Child Support Guidelines.

The court rejected allegations of deliberate underemployment and imputed income of $10,000 to the applicant due to limited efforts toward self‑sufficiency.

Spousal support was ordered at the midpoint of the Spousal Support Advisory Guidelines range on an indefinite basis subject to review.

The court also fixed child and spousal support arrears, allocated post-secondary expenses proportionally, and ordered life insurance and financial disclosure.

The responding parent sought a retroactive variation of a child support order that had been based on earlier income figures and provided for annual financial disclosure and recalculation of support.

The court held that the order’s adjustment clause should be enforced and recalculated the set‑off child support amounts based on updated income figures, including imputing income to the other parent based on concession.

Allegations that the payor’s retirement or the other parent’s business expenses justified further imputation were rejected for lack of evidence.

The court also addressed claims for extraordinary expenses, finding tutoring expenses reasonable and payable but denying reimbursement for camp expenses because prior consent required by the order had not been obtained.

The applicant brought a motion to vary a consent order respecting child support and parenting arrangements, alleging a material change in circumstances due to increased parenting time, higher childcare costs, increased debt, and unrealized income expectations.

The court reviewed the legal test for variation of support orders, including the requirement that a material change be unforeseeable and significant since the last order.

The court found the alleged financial pressures, lifestyle differences between households, and failed income expectations did not constitute a material change in circumstances.

The applicant was therefore not entitled to vary the support or access terms.

The court also enforced the parties’ obligation to equally share Montessori childcare expenses and required payment of the applicant’s outstanding share.

Following a lengthy motion and cross-motion concerning an ex parte order, the parties were unable to agree on costs.

The court reviewed written submissions regarding entitlement to costs.

The judge found the underlying motion results were mixed: the defendants failed in their cross-motion to set aside the ex parte order, while the plaintiff’s motion materials contained significant deficiencies that would normally have justified setting the order aside but for equitable considerations.

Given that both sides effectively lost aspects of the litigation, the court held that no party should receive costs.

The defendant insurer brought a motion under Rule 15.02 of the Rules of Civil Procedure seeking dismissal of the action and costs against the plaintiff’s lawyer personally on the basis that the proceeding was commenced without the plaintiff’s authority.

Evidence revealed the plaintiff had suffered a severe brain injury and her counsel later asserted that she was under a legal disability, raising doubt about her capacity to instruct counsel at the time the claim was issued.

The court held that the plaintiff failed to provide evidence addressing her capacity to authorize commencement of the action.

Drawing a negative inference from the absence of such evidence, the court concluded that counsel lacked authority to commence the proceeding.

The action was dismissed and the plaintiff’s lawyer was ordered to pay the defendants’ costs on a partial indemnity basis.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Consent and Capacity Board confirming a Community Treatment Order under the Health Care Consent Act and the Mental Health Act.

The appellant alleged unspecified factual and legal errors but primarily raised complaints regarding medication dosage, hygiene of medication delivery personnel, and dissatisfaction with a substitute decision-maker from the Office of the Public Guardian and Trustee.

The court held that these concerns did not constitute valid grounds of appeal within the court’s jurisdiction.

Finding the Board’s decision reasonable and its reasons compliant with statutory requirements, the court dismissed the appeal and confirmed the order.

The moving party sought consolidation of three simplified procedure defamation actions brought by separate plaintiffs against the same defendants, as well as an order striking certain paragraphs of the statements of claim and requiring particulars of allegations of malice.

The court held that the actions arose from the same alleged defamatory statements and involved common issues of fact and law, making consolidation appropriate under Rule 6.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure and consistent with the principle against multiplicity of proceedings.

The court declined to strike impugned paragraphs of the pleadings, finding they provided contextual allegations relevant to the defendant’s alleged mindset in a defamation claim.

However, the court ordered the plaintiffs to provide full particulars of alleged malice pursuant to Rule 25.06(8).

Given the mixed outcome, no order as to costs was made.

Following earlier reasons on family law motions, the court addressed the issue of costs after inviting written submissions when the parties were unable to agree.

The responding party had been largely successful on the substantive motion and sought costs on a partial indemnity basis.

The moving party argued costs should be deferred because the spousal support relief granted was only interim in nature.

The court rejected that argument and held that the successful party was entitled to costs immediately.

Due to insufficient differentiation in counsel’s bill of costs between settled issues and argued issues, the court fixed costs at a reduced all‑inclusive amount.

Following a successful trial in an accident benefits dispute, the parties were unable to agree on the quantum of trial costs after the Court of Appeal permitted submissions on the issue.

The plaintiff sought nearly $297,000 in legal fees plus significant disbursements, including expert accounts with high compound interest.

The court held that the interest component of the damages under the Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule did not justify treating the litigation as a $500,000 case for costs purposes.

The hourly rates claimed by plaintiff’s counsel were reduced and significant reductions were made to the claimed fees and certain disbursements.

The court fixed partial indemnity fees at $170,000 plus GST and disallowed interest claimed on expert disbursements.

The moving defendants sought to set aside a previously granted ex parte Mareva injunction and related orders, alleging the plaintiff failed to make full and fair disclosure when obtaining the original order.

The court considered allegations of multiple instances of non‑disclosure and misstatements, including failure to disclose certain agreements, undisclosed referral commissions, and a one‑sided interpretation of financial statements.

While the court found that the plaintiff had not fully met the stringent duty of full and frank disclosure required for ex parte relief, it held that setting aside the injunction would create an injustice given evidence suggesting insolvency, questionable financial practices, and potential dissipation of assets.

Exercising discretion, the court declined to dissolve the injunction and maintained the existing orders.

The defendants’ motion was therefore dismissed.

The payor brought a motion to terminate or reduce spousal support ordered following the breakdown of a long-term common-law relationship.

The payor argued the recipient’s increased income and ability to subsist on reduced payments constituted a material change in circumstances.

The court held that although the recipient’s income had increased, it remained at subsistence level and did not amount to a material change sufficient to vary support.

The motion was dismissed and the original support order reinstated.

The court also ordered partial arrears after finding the payor failed to disclose his return to employment while continuing to pay reduced support through enforcement proceedings.

Following the dismissal of a motion seeking leave to appeal an earlier order to the Divisional Court, the successful defendant sought costs.

The defendant claimed $4,470.10 on a partial indemnity basis, including fees and disbursements, while the plaintiff proposed an award of $2,000.

Applying the relevant factors under the Rules governing costs, the court found that the docketed hours appeared somewhat excessive and noted that certain claimed disbursements, including a car rental, were inappropriate.

The court exercised its discretion to fix costs in a reduced lump sum amount.

On cross-motions in a family proceeding, the applicant sought interim access while the respondent sought child and spousal support.

The principal issue was whether the applicant stood in the place of a parent to a stepchild who had lived with the parties for approximately ten years.

Applying the Supreme Court of Canada framework for determining whether a person stands in the place of a parent, the court found that the applicant had assumed a parental role and therefore owed support under the Divorce Act.

Interim child support for two children was ordered after accounting for the biological father’s obligation, and interim spousal support was awarded due to the respondent’s illness and substantial loss of income.