M. Dale Parayeski

A homeowner brought an action against a contractor arising from a kitchen renovation project involving multiple unclear written and unwritten agreements.

The plaintiff alleged numerous deficiencies including an uneven floor, improperly installed cabinets, lack of structural roof support after removal of ceiling joists, and ventilation deficiencies.

The court found that the contractor breached aspects of the contract and performed some work negligently, including failing to provide structural support compliant with the Building Code.

However, the plaintiff failed to prove the cost of rectifying most alleged deficiencies, which is required to establish damages absent rescission.

Judgment was granted only for the return of a $5,600 window deposit that was paid but for which no windows were supplied or installed.

The plaintiff sought continuation of an ex parte interim injunction and a permanent injunction to prevent nearby blasting associated with residential construction, alleging vibrations would disrupt the alignment of satellite earth stations used for communications services.

The court applied the standard requiring a very strong probability of grave future harm before granting injunctive relief.

Expert evidence from the defendants indicated an extremely low probability of damage under the blasting plan, while the plaintiff’s evidence was largely speculative and lacked detailed technical analysis.

The court concluded the plaintiff failed to establish a strong probability of harm on the balance of probabilities.

The motion to continue the injunction was therefore dismissed.

The defendants brought a motion seeking removal of the plaintiffs’ law firm on the basis of an alleged conflict of interest arising from a lawyer who previously acted for some defendants sharing office space with the plaintiffs’ counsel and being described as “of counsel.” The moving parties argued that the physical proximity and prior involvement in related matters created a risk of confidential information being shared.

Applying the Supreme Court of Canada test from MacDonald Estate v. Martin, the court considered whether a reasonably informed person would conclude that confidential information would be used.

The court found the evidence showed separate practices, systems, and files, and that the lawyer’s involvement in the present matter had ended well before the office‑sharing arrangement.

The motion to remove the plaintiffs’ counsel was therefore dismissed.

Following a nine-day family law trial, the court determined the appropriate costs award between the parties.

Although both parties had exchanged settlement offers, neither was sufficiently advantageous to trigger substantial indemnity costs under the applicable principles.

The court found that the respondent father was significantly more successful on the primary issues at trial and that the trial was unnecessarily prolonged due to the applicant mother's unwillingness to make reasonable concessions.

Applying Rule 24 of the Family Law Rules, the court ordered the mother to pay the father's costs in the fixed amount of $12,000.

The court directed that the costs be applied to reduce the equalization payment owed by the father rather than to his support obligations in order to avoid negative impacts on the children.

Following a trial decision, the court determined the appropriate quantum of costs payable to the successful plaintiff.

The plaintiff sought $74,612.14 all-inclusive, relying in part on an offer to settle that triggered substantial indemnity costs from the date of the offer.

One defendant conceded the entitlement to substantial indemnity costs from that date, while another provided no submissions on costs and a corporate defendant did not participate in the trial.

The court considered the conduct of the participating defendants, including late concessions that prolonged the trial and required unnecessary witnesses.

Balancing the relevant considerations, the court fixed the plaintiff’s costs at $65,000 all-inclusive against the individual defendants.

The plaintiff sought recovery of remediation costs paid to repair structural defects in a newly constructed home after the builder failed to fulfill warranty obligations.

The corporate builder and its principals had executed indemnification agreements requiring reimbursement of losses arising from warranty claims.

The defendants argued the claim was barred by the two‑year limitation period under the Limitations Act, 2002 and that the indemnity cap for the individual defendants was $20,000 rather than $200,000.

The court held that limitation periods for indemnity claims run from the date the indemnifier actually pays out losses, not from when the underlying defect arises.

The action was therefore timely because the payments occurred in 2006 within two years of the claim issued in 2007.

The court further held the contract imposed an aggregate $200,000 indemnity cap for the individual defendants, not a per‑home limit.

A teenage plaintiff became paraplegic after falling from a tree in a municipal park.

The plaintiffs alleged the municipality breached its duties under the Occupier’s Liability Act by failing to monitor the park, trim or remove the tree, or prohibit tree climbing.

The court held that the municipality’s inspection and maintenance practices were reasonable and that the risk of injury from climbing the tree was not reasonably foreseeable given the absence of prior complaints or incidents.

The court rejected arguments that the municipality should have altered or removed the tree or enacted prohibitions on climbing.

The action was dismissed, although the court stated that if liability had been established the plaintiff’s contributory negligence would have been assessed at 67 percent.

In supplementary reasons following a family law proceeding, the court addressed the parties’ entitlement to obtain a divorce.

After the earlier determination of the substantive issues between the parties, the court confirmed that either party could proceed to obtain a divorce upon filing the usual materials with the court.

The decision clarifies that no further judicial determination was required for the divorce itself once the necessary documentation was submitted.

The supplementary reasons therefore permit both parties to move forward with the formal divorce process.

Following a family law trial after partial settlement of issues, the court determined outstanding disputes regarding parenting arrangements, extraordinary expenses, life insurance, division of chattels, and disposition of the matrimonial home.

Sole custody of the child remained with the mother by agreement, while the court structured detailed access provisions favouring expanded parenting time for the father.

The court ordered extraordinary expenses to be shared 60/40, required both parents to maintain life insurance securing child support obligations, and directed the parties to use a parenting coordinator before returning to court over access disputes.

Regarding property, the court permitted the mother to purchase the father’s interest in the matrimonial home at fair market value determined through appraisal evidence, subject to adjustments for appreciation and closing costs.

Chattels were ordered to be physically divided using a list‑selection method proposed by the father.

The plaintiff creditor brought a motion for summary judgment seeking to set aside a transfer of real property from a judgment debtor and his spouse to the spouse alone as a fraudulent conveyance.

The transfer occurred after a default judgment had been obtained and after the debtor failed to attend examinations in aid of execution.

The court considered the badges of fraud under section 2 of the Fraudulent Conveyances Act, including a transfer between close relatives for nominal consideration during circumstances of insolvency.

The respondents argued the transfer was intended to protect the transferee as a legitimate creditor.

The court held that the transfer constituted either a fraudulent conveyance or an improper preference and that no genuine issue requiring a trial existed.

A law firm brought an application under s. 140 of the Courts of Justice Act seeking to have the respondent declared a vexatious litigant.

The respondent had repeatedly pursued meritless motions and appeals after her underlying action had been dismissed on summary judgment, despite multiple rulings from the Court of Appeal stating the appeal lacked merit.

She also failed to pay costs orders and continued filing extensive materials and additional motions attempting to reopen dismissed matters.

Applying the established factors for vexatious proceedings, the court found the respondent had persistently pursued proceedings without reasonable grounds and engaged in abusive litigation conduct.

The court declared the respondent a vexatious litigant and ordered that she obtain leave of the Superior Court of Justice before commencing or continuing any proceeding in Ontario.

The plaintiff lender brought a motion for summary judgment to recover monies loaned to a corporate borrower under a debenture.

The borrower acknowledged borrowing funds but disputed the precise amount owed and raised concerns about payment preference because multiple lenders were listed in the debenture.

The court found there were no genuine issues requiring a trial, concluding that default was established through non-payment since 2010 and the borrower’s insolvency.

Documentary evidence, including a series of cheques totaling nearly $3 million, established the indebtedness.

Summary judgment was granted for $2,800,000 with provision that payment be made in a manner that would avoid preferential treatment among lenders.

The respondent father brought a motion to change a prior final order that limited his parenting time to supervised access and restricted his attendance at the child’s school.

He sought unsupervised access, telephone contact, access to information about the child’s education and health, and permission to attend the school.

The mother opposed the motion and sought termination of access.

The court found a material change in circumstances due to the refusal of the designated supervision service to continue supervising visits, but concluded that the father’s repeated confrontational conduct and inability to maintain appropriate behaviour in supervised settings made unsupervised access inappropriate.

The court terminated in‑person access and permitted only telephone contact at the mother’s discretion, while requiring the mother to provide basic information about the child’s health and education.

The plaintiff brought a motion to set aside a Registrar’s administrative dismissal for delay and to restore the action to an assignment court list.

The action arose from a pedestrian‑motor vehicle accident and had experienced lengthy procedural delays, including removal from a prior trial list by consent.

Applying the contextual approach governing motions to set aside administrative dismissals, the court considered the explanation for delay, inadvertence in missing the status hearing deadline, promptness of the motion, and prejudice to the defendants.

The court found that while delay existed, some responsibility rested with the defendants due to earlier tactical decisions, the missed deadline was attributable to inadvertence, and the defendants would not suffer significant prejudice.

The court set aside the dismissal and restored the action to the assignment court list, but declined to award costs to the plaintiff.

The plaintiffs moved to amend their statement of claim following a motor vehicle accident to add a municipality as a defendant and to properly name the existing defendant as a person under disability represented by a litigation guardian.

The municipality opposed the amendment on the basis that the limitation period under the Limitations Act, 2002 had expired.

The plaintiffs relied on the discoverability principle, arguing that they did not learn the material facts supporting a claim against the municipality until they obtained police officers’ notes describing hazardous icy road conditions.

The court held that the limitation period began when the plaintiffs ought to have obtained the notes through the exercise of reasonable diligence.

Because the plaintiffs failed to follow up on a request for the notes for several years, the discoverability principle did not extend the limitation period.

Following an assessment hearing relating to costs, the court considered written submissions from the parties regarding entitlement to costs of the assessment proceeding itself.

The moving party argued that costs should be awarded because participation in the hearing was necessary to quantify the costs previously awarded.

The responding party argued that the amounts claimed had been substantially reduced during the assessment.

The court concluded that success was divided and that it was appropriate for each party to bear its own costs.

Following the breakdown of a long-term traditional marriage, the court determined issues relating to child support, extraordinary expenses for adult dependent children attending university, spousal support, arrears, and related financial obligations.

The respondent’s income was accepted at $90,000 and child support was ordered based on the Federal Child Support Guidelines.

The court rejected allegations of deliberate underemployment and imputed income of $10,000 to the applicant due to limited efforts toward self‑sufficiency.

Spousal support was ordered at the midpoint of the Spousal Support Advisory Guidelines range on an indefinite basis subject to review.

The court also fixed child and spousal support arrears, allocated post-secondary expenses proportionally, and ordered life insurance and financial disclosure.

The applicant brought a motion to vary a consent order respecting child support and parenting arrangements, alleging a material change in circumstances due to increased parenting time, higher childcare costs, increased debt, and unrealized income expectations.

The court reviewed the legal test for variation of support orders, including the requirement that a material change be unforeseeable and significant since the last order.

The court found the alleged financial pressures, lifestyle differences between households, and failed income expectations did not constitute a material change in circumstances.

The applicant was therefore not entitled to vary the support or access terms.

The court also enforced the parties’ obligation to equally share Montessori childcare expenses and required payment of the applicant’s outstanding share.

Following a lengthy motion and cross-motion concerning an ex parte order, the parties were unable to agree on costs.

The court reviewed written submissions regarding entitlement to costs.

The judge found the underlying motion results were mixed: the defendants failed in their cross-motion to set aside the ex parte order, while the plaintiff’s motion materials contained significant deficiencies that would normally have justified setting the order aside but for equitable considerations.

Given that both sides effectively lost aspects of the litigation, the court held that no party should receive costs.

The defendant insurer brought a motion under Rule 15.02 of the Rules of Civil Procedure seeking dismissal of the action and costs against the plaintiff’s lawyer personally on the basis that the proceeding was commenced without the plaintiff’s authority.

Evidence revealed the plaintiff had suffered a severe brain injury and her counsel later asserted that she was under a legal disability, raising doubt about her capacity to instruct counsel at the time the claim was issued.

The court held that the plaintiff failed to provide evidence addressing her capacity to authorize commencement of the action.

Drawing a negative inference from the absence of such evidence, the court concluded that counsel lacked authority to commence the proceeding.

The action was dismissed and the plaintiff’s lawyer was ordered to pay the defendants’ costs on a partial indemnity basis.