McLachlin

The Crown appealed a decision of the British Columbia Court of Appeal that quashed a direct indictment against the accused.

The accused had already been committed for trial after a preliminary inquiry.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, holding that the Attorney General can prefer a direct indictment under s. 577 of the Criminal Code against an accused who could have been indicted through the ordinary process under s. 574(1)(a), which permitted his inclusion in a direct indictment with his co-accused.

The judgment of the Court of Appeal was set aside and the indictment reinstated.

The appellant, a permanent resident, was ordered removed from Canada for misrepresenting his marital status on his application.

He appealed to the Immigration Appeal Division (I.A.D.) under s. 70(1)(b) of the Immigration Act, arguing that the I.A.D. should consider the potential foreign hardship he would face if removed to Cambodia.

The I.A.D. and lower courts held that foreign hardship could not be considered because the Minister had not yet determined the country of removal.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, holding that the I.A.D. is entitled to consider potential foreign hardship under s. 70(1)(b) when deciding whether to quash or stay a removal order, provided that a likely country of removal has been established by the individual facing removal.

The appellant, a Convention refugee from Iran, was suspected of being an assassin for the Iranian Ministry of Intelligence and Security.

The Minister of Citizenship and Immigration issued an opinion under s. 53(1)(b) of the Immigration Act that the appellant constituted a danger to the security of Canada and faced only a minimal risk of harm if deported.

The appellant challenged the decision and the constitutionality of the deportation provisions.

Applying the framework from the companion case of Suresh, the Supreme Court of Canada held that the appellant did not make out a prima facie case of a substantial risk of torture.

The Court found the Minister's decision was not patently unreasonable and that the appellant was provided with adequate procedural protections consistent with the principles of fundamental justice.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, a Convention refugee from Sri Lanka, faced deportation on security grounds due to alleged membership in a terrorist organization.

The Minister issued an opinion declaring him a danger to the security of Canada without providing him a copy of the immigration officer's memorandum or an opportunity to respond.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that deporting a refugee to face a substantial risk of torture generally violates section 7 of the Charter.

The Court found that the appellant had established a prima facie case of a risk of torture and was denied the required procedural safeguards.

The appeal was allowed and the case remanded to the Minister for reconsideration.

The appellant, a permanent resident, was ordered removed from Canada due to criminal convictions.

He appealed to the Immigration Appeal Division on equitable grounds under s. 70(1)(b) of the Immigration Act.

The IAD dismissed the appeal, concluding it could not consider the extreme hardship the appellant would face if returned to Iraq.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, holding that the IAD can consider potential foreign hardship when a likely country of removal has been established.

The matter was returned to the IAD for a new hearing.

The appellant, a company based in British Columbia, entered into financing agreements with a Quebec-based company that subsequently went bankrupt.

The respondent trustee in bankruptcy filed a petition in the Quebec Superior Court sitting in bankruptcy to recover assets held by the appellant.

The appellant brought a motion to transfer the proceedings to British Columbia, arguing the Quebec court lacked jurisdiction over the contractual dispute and relying on choice of law clauses.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that the bankruptcy court had jurisdiction over the dispute as it related to the bankrupt estate, and that the appellant failed to show sufficient cause to transfer the proceedings under the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act.

The appellants challenged Ontario legislation repealing agricultural labour protections and excluding agricultural workers from the statutory labour relations regime.

The majority held that, in the labour relations context, freedom of association under s. 2(d) may impose a positive obligation where exclusion from protective legislation substantially interferes with the ability of a vulnerable group to organize.

The Court found that the exclusion of agricultural workers from the LRA substantially impeded their capacity to form and maintain employee associations and created a chilling effect on associational activity.

The infringement was not justified under s. 1 because the wholesale exclusion was overly broad and failed minimum impairment.

The appeal was allowed and the declarations of invalidity were suspended for 18 months.

The respondent commenced an in rem action in the Federal Court to enforce a maritime lien against a Belgian ship, which was subsequently arrested.

The shipowner was then adjudged bankrupt in Belgium, and the appellant trustees obtained an order from the Quebec Superior Court recognizing the bankruptcy.

Despite this, the Federal Court granted default judgment and ordered the ship's sale.

The trustees then obtained a Quebec Superior Court order directing the sale proceeds to be paid to them, conflicting with the Federal Court's orders.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the Quebec Superior Court had no authority to enjoin the Federal Court from exercising its maritime jurisdiction or to dispose of a ship already captured by the Federal Court's process.

The appellant was convicted of first degree murder.

During deliberations, the jury was inadvertently provided with unedited transcripts containing submissions made in their absence regarding the admissibility of certain statements.

The trial judge refused to declare a mistrial, instead retrieving the transcripts and cautioning the jury.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge did not err in law in refusing to declare a mistrial, and that the curative proviso analysis was not necessary as no error of law or miscarriage of justice occurred.

The appellant received unemployment insurance benefits while holidaying outside Canada.

Upon returning, she filled out a Customs Declaration Form, and the information was disclosed to the Canada Unemployment Insurance Commission, which ordered repayment of the benefits.

The appellant argued this disclosure violated her right against unreasonable search or seizure under section 8 of the Charter, and that the disentitlement violated her mobility rights under section 6(1).

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, finding no reasonable expectation of privacy in the disclosed customs information and no breach of mobility rights.

The appellant appealed a decision regarding the disclosure of customs information on travellers by Revenue Canada to the Canada Employment Insurance Commission.

The program aimed to identify individuals receiving employment insurance benefits while outside Canada.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, adopting the reasons of the Federal Court of Appeal that the disclosure was authorized under the Privacy Act and the Customs Act.

The appellant was arrested for drug trafficking after police observed him engaging in suspected drug transactions.

Following a pat-down search, police conducted a strip search of the appellant in a public restaurant, which included pulling down his pants and forcibly removing a package of crack cocaine from his buttocks.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that while the common law power to search incident to arrest includes the power to strip search, such searches require reasonable and probable grounds and must generally be conducted at a police station absent exigent circumstances.

The Court found the strip search in this case violated s. 8 of the Charter because it was conducted in a public place without exigent circumstances and in an unreasonable manner.

The appeal was allowed and an acquittal entered.

The respondents were charged under the Occupational Health and Safety Act.

The Crown refused to disclose a Prosecution Approval Form, claiming solicitor-client privilege.

A justice of the peace found a Charter breach, ordered disclosure, and awarded costs against the Crown.

The Crown successfully applied to quash the costs order, arguing the provincial offences court was not a 'court of competent jurisdiction' under s. 24(1) of the Charter.

The Court of Appeal reversed this decision.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the Crown's appeal, holding that a provincial offences court has the power to order costs against the Crown for a Charter breach based on a functional and structural approach to its jurisdiction.

The appellants represented a class of individuals victimized by a gold delivery fraud, having deposited funds into a solicitor's trust account.

They alleged the Law Society of Upper Canada breached a duty of care by failing to properly investigate and monitor the solicitor's trust account after being notified of irregularities.

The Supreme Court of Canada applied the Anns/Kamloops test and held that the Law Society did not owe a prima facie duty of care to the appellants, who were not clients but participants in a third-party business promotion.

The Court further noted that even if a duty existed, it would be negated by residual policy considerations and the statutory immunity provided under the Law Society Act.

During a murder investigation, police used a 'crime boss' undercover scenario to elicit a confession from the accused.

At the voir dire, the trial judge granted a publication ban on the identity of the undercover officers and the investigative techniques used.

The appellant newspaper appealed the ban directly to the Supreme Court of Canada.

The Court allowed the appeal, applying the Dagenais/Mentuck test.

It held that a ban on the investigative techniques was not necessary and its deleterious effects on freedom of expression outweighed its salutary effects.

However, a ban on the officers' identities was necessary to protect ongoing operations, but was limited to a period of one year.

The appellant was convicted of second degree murder after an elderly woman was robbed, hog-tied, and left to die of asphyxiation.

The appellant appealed, arguing the trial judge misdirected the jury by applying the 'beyond de minimis' standard of causation from Smithers rather than the 'substantial cause' standard from Harbottle.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that the Smithers standard applies to all homicide offences, including second degree murder, while the Harbottle standard applies only to first degree murder under s. 231(5) to determine if the accused's participation warrants the increased stigma and penalty.

The Court suggested that trial judges may express the Smithers standard positively as a 'significant contributing cause'.

The appellant appealed from a judgment of the British Columbia Court of Appeal that set aside his acquittal on two counts of using an imitation firearm in the commission of a robbery.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal substantially for the reasons of Chief Justice McEachern of the Court of Appeal.

The appellants, contractors and construction workers, were charged with hiring employees without required competency certificates or working without them, contrary to the Quebec Construction Act.

They challenged the constitutionality of the Act, arguing that the requirement to join one of five designated union groups to obtain a competency certificate violated their freedom of association under s. 2(d) of the Charter, specifically the negative right not to associate.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal.

A majority held that while s. 2(d) includes a negative right not to associate, the legislation did not infringe this right as it did not impose ideological conformity, or alternatively, any infringement was justified under s. 1 of the Charter given the complex history of labour relations in the Quebec construction industry.

The appellant brought a civil claim for damages arising from an acquitted first degree murder prosecution, alleging malicious prosecution by the provincial Attorney General.

The majority held that the exceptional threshold for lifting prosecutorial immunity was met because the prosecution lacked reasonable and probable cause and was motivated by an improper purpose arising from the mixing of public prosecutorial functions with private interests tied to related defamation litigation.

The Court found the identification evidence flagrantly inadequate, the surreptitiously recorded conversation likely inadmissible and devoid of probative value, and the prosecutorial conduct inconsistent with the Crown’s role as minister of justice.

The appeal was allowed, the Court of Appeal judgment was set aside, and the trial judgments on liability and damages were restored.

The respondents sought to certify a class action on behalf of current and former students who were abused at a provincial residential school for the deaf and blind.

The province appealed the Court of Appeal's decision to certify the class.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, finding that the respondents satisfied the certification requirements under the Class Proceedings Act.

The Court held that the issues of systemic negligence and breach of duty were common to the class, and that a class proceeding was the preferable procedure for resolving these claims fairly and efficiently.