Maureen J. McGuire

In a criminal appeal as of right based on a dissent, the appellant argued ineffective assistance of trial counsel and resulting unfair trial.

The Court applied the two-part test requiring proof of counsel incompetence and a resulting miscarriage of justice.

It held that, although the dissent identified critical deficiencies, the reasons did not establish how those deficiencies caused a miscarriage of justice.

The Court was not persuaded that any form of miscarriage of justice occurred and dismissed the appeal.

The appellant challenged convictions for sexual interference and sexual exploitation on the sole ground that the verdict was unreasonable.

The court held that the complainant's evidence, together with confirmatory admissions made during a police interview, provided an adequate evidentiary foundation for guilt.

The court agreed with the majority in the intermediate appellate court that the verdict was reasonable.

The appeal was dismissed and the conviction affirmed.

The respondent pled guilty to conspiracy to traffic in cocaine and was sentenced to two years less a day, plus probation, with 12 months' credit for pre-trial custody.

The Crown appealed the sentence, arguing the respondent played a more significant role than a mere courier.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the respondent was involved in the distribution of multi-kilogram quantities of cocaine and negotiating prices.

The sentence was varied to four years, with credit for pre-trial custody and time served on parole.

The Crown appealed an 18-month conditional sentence imposed on the respondent for production of marijuana, possession for the purpose of trafficking, and theft over $5000 related to a commercial grow-op.

The Court of Appeal found that the sentencing judge erred in principle by conflating the forfeiture of offence-related property with general sentencing principles.

However, the majority held that a conditional sentence was still appropriate given the mitigating factors, including a guilty plea, employment, and family obligations.

The appeal was dismissed, with the court noting that the respondent had already served over eight months of the sentence.

The Crown appealed an acquittal entered after the trial judge found a section 8 Charter breach regarding a safety search incident to arrest.

The trial judge based this finding on conflicting police evidence about whether the arresting officers were told the respondent was known to carry a gun.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, holding that the trial judge erred in law by failing to consider relevant evidence of the officers' observations at the scene, which could have justified the search.

The appellant was convicted of possession of crack cocaine for the purpose of trafficking, possession of proceeds of crime, and possession of stolen property.

At trial, she testified that a passenger handed her the cocaine and she hid it in her wig out of panic.

The trial judge rejected her explanation, partly because she did not offer it to the police when searched.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal held that the trial judge infringed the appellant's right to silence by using her failure to explain to the police as a basis for finding her incredible.

The appeal was allowed, convictions set aside, and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed an effective 15-year sentence imposed for two separate sets of serious charges arising from a prolonged high-level drug trafficking enterprise, which included firearms, threatening, and conspiracy to export offences.

The second set of offences involved significant amounts of drugs and was committed while the appellant was in custody awaiting sentence on the first set.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the trial judges' application of sentencing principles, including totality, and held that the sentences were within the applicable range.

The sentence appeal was dismissed.

The Crown appealed the total sentence of seven years and a $250,000 restitution order imposed on the respondent for his involvement in a $2.7 million armoured car theft and subsequent cocaine trafficking offences committed while on bail.

The Court of Appeal found the sentencing judge erred in principle by imposing an inadequate sentence for the drug offences and by failing to explain the totality reduction and the low restitution amount.

The appeal was allowed, the total sentence was increased to nine years, and the restitution order was increased to $1 million.

The appellant appealed his conviction for drug trafficking, arguing the trial judge erred in admitting expert evidence that it is not uncommon for price to be omitted in street-level drug conversations.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the evidence met the Mohan criteria, was relevant to the custom of the trade, and directly addressed an issue raised by the defence.

The appellant appealed his convictions for importing narcotics, arguing that the trial judge erred in his jury instructions regarding the assessment of witness credibility, the appellant's videotaped statement, and the position of the defence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the instructions on credibility and the videotaped statement were fair and did not subject the appellant's statement to special scrutiny.

Although the trial judge's summary of the defence position was brief, the single issue of lack of knowledge was made crystal clear to the jury throughout the charge.

The appellant appealed his sentence for breaching a recognizance under s. 810 of the Criminal Code.

The Court of Appeal found that the sentencing judge erred in principle by concluding the conduct was in the category of the most serious possible breaches.

While the offender's criminal history must be considered, not every breach mandates the maximum sentence.

The court granted leave to appeal, set aside the original sentence, and imposed a sentence of 18 months' imprisonment (12 months plus 6 months' time served) along with the original probation period.

The Criminal Lawyers' Association (Ontario) brought a motion to intervene in an appeal concerning a costs order made against an accused following a dismissed pre-trial motion for third-party records.

The Crown opposed the intervention, arguing the record was inadequate to resolve the broader policy issues.

The Court of Appeal granted the motion, finding the moving party had the expertise and interest to provide a positive contribution, leaving the scope of argument to the panel hearing the appeal.

The appellant pleaded guilty to two counts of assault causing bodily harm and one count of assault against three separate intimate partners, receiving a three-year sentence.

On appeal, the court found the trial judge erred in principle by treating the appellant's lack of remorse as an aggravating factor rather than merely a lack of a mitigating factor.

However, upon determining a fit sentence, the Court of Appeal upheld the three-year term, citing the prolonged, severe violence and use of weapons against multiple victims.

The appellant appealed his sentence.

The Court of Appeal found no error in principle and held that the sentence, while stern, was not manifestly unreasonable.

Fresh evidence regarding the appellant's ongoing rehabilitation supported the wisdom of the trial judge's sentence.

Leave to appeal was granted, but the appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence for historical sexual offences against a child.

He argued the trial judge failed to adequately consider inconsistencies and emphatic denials in the evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the trial judge's reasons were sufficient, intelligible, and responsive to the issues raised.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, with the court noting that conditional sentences are rarely appropriate for the sexual violation of a vulnerable person by an adult in a position of trust.

The appellants appealed their convictions and sentences for sexual offences.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeals, finding no error in the trial judge's approach to corroborative evidence, position of trust, or reasonable doubt.

However, the Court granted leave to appeal the sentences, finding that the trial judge failed to give sufficient credit for pre-trial custody given the unique circumstances, including delays from an abandoned dangerous offender application.

The sentences were varied to time served.

The appellant broadcaster sought injunctive relief against parties assisting Canadian residents to subscribe to and decode U.S. direct-to-home satellite programming.

The appeal turned on whether s. 9(1)(c) of the Radiocommunication Act imposed a blanket prohibition on decoding encrypted subscription programming signals unless authorized by a lawful distributor in Canada, or only prohibited decoding of signals from licensed Canadian distributors.

Applying the modern contextual approach to statutory interpretation, the Court held the provision unambiguously creates an absolute prohibition with a limited exception and aligns with the broader broadcasting and copyright regime.

The Court refused to answer the stated Charter questions because the record did not support constitutional adjudication.

The respondents openly sold direct-to-home satellite systems with access cards that could decode United States satellite programming signals.

The police obtained and executed search warrants at the respondents' business premises, seizing extensive inventory and records.

The respondents successfully applied to quash the warrants and for the return of the seized property.

The Crown appealed.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the motions judge properly heard the application rather than deferring to the trial court, correctly concluded that the affiant failed to make full, frank, and fair disclosure, and correctly determined that the alleged offence under s. 9(1)(c) of the Radiocommunication Act was not an offence known to law due to statutory ambiguity regarding foreign signals.

The appellant, a police officer convicted of criminal negligence causing death, appealed his conviction on the basis that his statement to a commanding officer was admitted into evidence without a voir dire.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that even assuming a voir dire should have been held, it was a proper case to apply the curative proviso under s. 686(1)(b)(iii) of the Criminal Code.

The Crown appealed as of right from a decision of the Ontario Court of Appeal, which had allowed the accused's appeal from a conviction for second degree murder based on the trial judge providing the jury with a transcript of the Crown's closing address.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal substantially for the dissenting reasons of Laskin J.A. in the court below, restoring the conviction.