Mary E. Vallee

The offender was convicted of sexual interference against his niece, who was 11 or 12 years old at the time of the offences.

The offender, who lived in the victim's family home, committed four instances of sexual interference over a two-year period, involving direct sexual contact.

The Crown sought a sentence of 10 years imprisonment, while the defence argued for approximately 4 years.

The court imposed a sentence of 5 years imprisonment, applying the sentencing framework established in R. v. Friesen and considering aggravating factors including the abuse of trust, the victim's young age, the duration and frequency of the offences, and the degree of physical interference.

The court declined to impose a section 161 order but imposed ancillary orders including DNA sampling, firearms prohibition, SOIRA registration, and communication restrictions.

The court sentenced Milton Urgiles to five years' imprisonment for criminal negligence causing death, following the fatal crash of a commercial truck with unroadworthy tires.

The decision reviews the facts, victim impact, aggravating and mitigating factors, and relevant sentencing principles and authorities, emphasizing the high degree of moral blameworthiness and the need for denunciation and deterrence in workplace safety offences.

The Township of McMurrich Monteith brought a motion for summary judgment seeking to dismiss a negligence claim by the plaintiffs, William and Emily Huether, on the grounds that the limitation period had expired.

The plaintiffs alleged the Township was negligent for failing to continuously monitor an open building permit file and conduct necessary inspections for a house built in 1986, whose foundation was failing.

The Township argued its duty ended with construction or permit closure in 1988, making the claim statute-barred under the Limitations Act, 2002.

The court found that the Township had a continuous duty to monitor its open permit file until the building was substantially complete and met occupancy conditions, which never occurred.

Therefore, the ultimate limitation period under s. 15(2) of the Limitations Act did not apply, and s. 15(6) for continuous omissions applied.

The Township's motion for summary judgment was dismissed, and costs were awarded to the plaintiffs.

This is a costs endorsement following an unsuccessful motion by the applicant purchaser for a certificate of pending litigation related to a failed real estate transaction.

The respondent seller successfully defended the motion.

The court rejected the applicant's claim of partial success regarding deposits and arguments based on force majeure events.

The respondent's Rule 49 offer to settle was deemed reasonable.

The court awarded the respondent partial indemnity costs up to the offer date and substantial indemnity costs thereafter, finding the requested fees and disbursements reasonable and proportionate.

The applicant sought to vary a 2018 consent order regarding an equalization payment, arguing that the amount transferred from the respondent's pension should have been grossed up for tax purposes, resulting in an underpayment of $66,723.93.

The applicant, self-represented at the time of the original order, discovered the alleged error in 2021 but did not bring the motion until May 2023.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the applicant failed to act promptly as required by the test for varying orders under Rule 25(19)(b) of the Family Law Rules.

The court emphasized that the respondent had relied on the finality of the 2018 order and that requiring an additional payment almost five years later would cause injustice.

The applicant purchaser brought a motion for an order granting leave to register a Certificate of Pending Litigation (CPL) against a property after failing to close an agreement of purchase and sale due to lack of financing.

The respondent seller opposed, arguing the purchaser had no interest in the land.

The court applied the test for a CPL, considering whether there was a triable claim to an interest in land and equitable factors such as property uniqueness, calculability of damages, and potential harm.

The court found the purchaser's claim for specific performance was not supported, the property was not proven unique, and damages (deposits plus interest) were ascertainable.

The motion for a CPL was dismissed.

However, the court ordered that the total deposits paid by the purchaser, along with pre-judgment interest, be held back from any future sale proceeds of the property by the seller's solicitor and invested, pending resolution of the underlying dispute regarding the deposits.

The accused, S.B.S., faced a 13-count indictment including human trafficking, procuring, assault, administering a noxious thing, and receiving material benefit.

The accused admitted to two assault charges (counts 6 and 11) and a related assault charge (count 10).

The Crown invited an acquittal on one charge (count 7).

The court found the Crown failed to prove human trafficking (counts 1, 8, 12) and procuring (counts 3, 4, 9, 13) beyond a reasonable doubt for all three complainants, largely due to inconsistencies in complainant testimony and lack of sufficient control exercised by the accused over the complainants' movements or sex trade work.

The court also dismissed charges of receiving material benefit related to exploitation and procuring.

This endorsement addresses the costs of a motion where the applicant successfully sought an order for the child to reside with him during the school week due to the respondent's failure to ensure school attendance.

The applicant sought full recovery costs, having made multiple offers to settle that were met or beaten.

The respondent opposed costs, citing financial hardship and medical reasons for unemployment.

The court found the respondent's conduct unreasonable, particularly her prioritization of parenting time over the child's education and her inappropriate use of dated mental health allegations.

Applying Rule 24(12) of the Family Law Rules and relevant case law, the court awarded the applicant $17,299.51 in all-inclusive costs, emphasizing fairness and reasonableness.

The applicants were successful in their underlying matter and sought elevated costs due to the respondents' disregard for previous court orders concerning a right-of-way.

The court found the applicants' counsel's hourly rate and time spent reasonable, noting the necessity of the proceedings.

Applying principles of fairness and reasonableness, the court awarded the applicants $16,971.24 in all-inclusive costs, payable by Brian Douglas Coldin and 1387881 Ontario Inc.

The defendant vendor brought a motion to stay an action commenced by the plaintiff purchasers, arguing that the dispute, concerning the termination of an agreement of purchase and sale due to the alleged incomplete state of a new home, fell under a mandatory arbitration clause.

The plaintiffs opposed, contending that the defendant had waived its right to arbitration by pleading to the action, unduly delayed bringing the motion, and that the matter was suitable for summary judgment.

The court found that the dispute fell within the arbitration clause, the defendant had not unduly delayed, and the matter was not appropriate for summary judgment due to significant factual disputes.

Consequently, the defendant's motion to stay the action was granted, and the plaintiffs' cross-motion for an adjournment to bring a summary judgment motion was implicitly dismissed.

The applicants sought a declaration of a prescriptive easement for year-round vehicular and pedestrian traffic over the respondents' land, along with injunctions to prevent interference.

The respondents conceded a seasonal easement but proposed relocating it to a new road and limiting its use to seasonal.

The court ruled that the relocation request was not properly before it, affirmed the easement as year-round, and granted injunctions against the respondents for interfering with the easement, while allowing for one southerly gate for security.

The applicant, Dr. Paul Bastedo, brought a motion to change an existing order to terminate spousal support and a related life insurance obligation, citing his retirement as a material change in circumstances.

The respondent, Ms. Maxine Bastedo, opposed the motion, seeking indefinite spousal support.

The court found that Dr. Bastedo's retirement and the corresponding loss of income constituted a material change not contemplated in the original 1996 order.

Considering the parties' current financial positions, including Ms. Bastedo's substantial pension and assets, and the fact that Dr. Bastedo had paid support for 25 years (8 years beyond the Spousal Support Advisory Guidelines' maximum duration for a 17-year marriage), the court determined that Ms. Bastedo no longer required ongoing spousal support to meet her financial needs.

The motion to terminate spousal support was granted, with an additional three months of payments ordered due to insufficient notice of retirement.

The applicant sought a declaration of priority over a promissory note assigned to him by 1007937 Ontario Inc., which was also secured by TD Bank and later assigned to the respondent, Mary Eileen Casey.

The court found that the validity of the assignment to the applicant was not sufficiently proven, particularly given that the assignor (1007937 Ontario Inc.) assigned a corporate asset as security for a personal debt of its principal (Mr. Ornsby) while a major creditor (TD Bank, later Ms. Casey) had a prior secured interest.

The application was dismissed without prejudice to the applicant to bring further proceedings to prove the assignment's validity.

The defendant, Mary Fatima DeMelo, brought a motion seeking disbursement of $488,348.75 from the proceeds of her former matrimonial home's sale and a seven-day suspension of a writ of possession held by CIBC Mortgages Inc. She argued that CIBC acted in bad faith by holding proceeds from one property (Binns) while also having security on another (Greenvalley), and by not paying funds into court as per a freezing order.

CIBC contended it was entitled to execute its writ against any of the defendant's assets and was not obligated to withdraw its writ or take a chance on future repayment from the Greenvalley property sale, which had deficiencies.

The court dismissed the defendant's motion, finding that CIBC was entitled to file and execute its writ and that holding the sale proceeds did not constitute bad faith, as CIBC was a secured creditor not required to take a chance on future repayment.

The father brought a motion for a temporary order to return their child, Owen, to his habitual residence in Barrie, alleging the mother's unilateral move to Guelph constituted unlawful self-help.

The mother brought a cross-motion for a temporary order that Owen reside primarily with her in Guelph.

The court found the mother's self-help justified due to unique circumstances, including financial constraints and an untenable living situation with the father's parents.

Considering the child's best interests under the Children's Law Reform Act, the court favored the mother's parenting plan due to its sustainability and her primary caregiver role.

The father's motion was dismissed, and the mother's motion was granted, establishing primary residence in Guelph, a specific access schedule for the father, child support, and a referral to the Office of the Children's Lawyer.

Costs were not awarded, as the father's motion was deemed reasonable.

The defendants brought a motion to discharge a certificate of pending litigation (CPL) obtained by the plaintiff against a property and for an order that the plaintiff post security for costs.

The plaintiff opposed, alleging fraud in the property's sale and seeking an injunction.

The court found that the plaintiff failed to make full disclosure of material facts when obtaining the CPL and did not have a reasonable claim to an interest in the land, leading to the discharge of the CPL.

The court also ordered the plaintiff to post security for costs, as the plaintiff corporation had insufficient assets and its principal failed to provide adequate financial disclosure to prove impecuniosity.

The applicant father brought a motion to change a parenting order, seeking to expand his parenting time from alternating weekends to a week-about schedule for his four-year-old son.

The respondent mother opposed the motion, arguing there was no material change in circumstances.

The court applied the test from *Gordon v. Goertz*, finding that the child's increased age and starting junior kindergarten, while changes, did not fundamentally alter the child's needs or the parents' ability to meet those needs in a way that was unforeseen or could not have been reasonably contemplated.

Consequently, the court determined that no material change in circumstances had been established, and the motion to change was dismissed.

This decision addresses the costs arising from two applications concerning the care and property management of Irene Deshevy, an incapable 90-year-old.

Brenda Deshevy initiated an application seeking to remove Linda Deshevy as attorney and be appointed guardian.

Linda Deshevy, Irene's appointed attorney, filed a responding application.

Brenda subsequently withdrew her application after receiving a medical report clarifying Irene's extensive care needs and her contentment with Linda's care.

The court found Brenda's application was brought in good faith due to a lack of communication and a misunderstanding of Irene's wishes, rather than misconduct.

Considering Brenda's limited income and the mixed responsibility for the litigation, the court awarded Linda Deshevy $4,000 in all-inclusive costs from Brenda.

Irene Deshevy's legal fees were ordered to be paid from her estate.

Irene Bellefeuille, 91 and incapable, was the subject of two applications: one by her son Jerry for guardianship of her property and person, and another by her daughter Jacqueline (named attorney under a power of attorney) seeking to exercise custodial powers and relocate Irene.

The court found Irene incapable.

It terminated Jacqueline's power of attorney due to strong and compelling evidence of misconduct, including co-mingling funds, using Irene's money for personal purchases, and failing to provide an adequate accounting.

The court also found Jacqueline created healthcare concerns to justify moving Irene, which was not in Irene's best interest.

Jerry Bellefeuille was appointed guardian of Irene's property and person, contingent on an updated management plan, as this was deemed to be in Irene's best interest.