Martin S. James

The applicant sought a stay of proceedings under section 11(b) of the Charter, relying on R. v. Jordan.

The total delay from charge to decision was 34.5 months, exceeding the 30-month presumptive limit for Superior Court cases.

The court found the case to be complex due to numerous underage complainants and counts, and some complainants residing outside Ontario, which justified the lengthy preliminary hearing.

Crown counsel demonstrated reasonable reliance on the pre-Jordan legal framework, and defence counsel raised delay concerns only at a very late stage, after closing arguments.

The court concluded there was no unreasonable delay or disregard for the accused's rights under the former regime, and the complexity and transitional nature of the case constituted exceptional circumstances.

The application for a stay was dismissed.

The father brought a motion to change child support and the apportionment of post-secondary education expenses for the parties' children.

The court held that the mother's RRSP withdrawals and rental income must be included in her income for child support purposes.

The court suspended table child support for the child attending college away from home, except for the summer months.

The court enforced a prior consent order requiring the parents to pay two-thirds of post-secondary expenses in proportion to their incomes, but relieved the father of liability for prior expenses because he was not consulted.

Finally, the court ordered the parties to share uninsured dental expenses equally rather than proportionately.

Following a judge-alone criminal trial on historical intrafamilial sexual offence allegations involving three complainants, the court applied the W.(D.) framework to determine whether the Crown had proved individual counts beyond a reasonable doubt.

The court found some allegations involving ambiguous lap contact and an alleged kiss lacked sufficient surrounding circumstances to establish the requisite sexual purpose or violation of sexual integrity.

By contrast, the court accepted the evidence of two complainants concerning breast touching, breast licking, and oral-sex-related conduct as credible and reliable, and found that evidence sufficient to overwhelm the accused's denials.

The accused was acquitted on several counts and convicted on selected counts of sexual assault and sexual exploitation, with the potential application of the Keinapple principle left for a later date.

The accused was tried on multiple counts arising from allegations by eight underage complainants who regularly attended his residence.

The court found beyond a reasonable doubt that repeated massages and the so-called Teddy bear procedure involved touching for a sexual purpose and entered convictions for eight counts of sexual interference.

The court was not satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt on the separate sexual assault, invitation to sexual touching, internet luring, and child pornography possession counts, emphasizing the nuanced distinction between sexual interference and sexual assault, the insufficiency of the text-message record for luring, and reasonable doubt about control over deleted files in unallocated space.

A publication ban under s. 486.4 applied.

Following a motion regarding the application of the Limitations Act, the successful respondent sought partial indemnity costs of $12,437.54.

The moving party had tendered a bill of costs for $13,390.00.

Noting that the respondent's position evolved during the motion and questioning the 48 hours docketed by junior counsel, the court fixed the respondent's costs at $6,500 plus disbursements and HST, payable by the moving party estate.

In a supplementary endorsement following an application regarding an estate, the court addressed three issues.

On consent, the court ordered that the distribution of the residue of the estate be delayed until the termination of the life estate in the applicant's favour.

The court declined the applicant's request to treat a vehicle as part of the household contents.

The court also declined the applicant's request to replace the named estate trustees, noting that no formal application for removal had been brought and a testator's choice of trustees is not lightly interfered with.

Following a trial where the applicant was unsuccessful in setting aside her late husband's will for undue influence but successful in obtaining an $85,000 lump sum support order under the Succession Law Reform Act, the court determined costs.

The applicant sought over $114,000, while the respondents argued the applicant should pay them a net amount of $42,518.87.

Applying Rule 57 and noting the mixed success, excessive time claimed by the applicant, and the respondents' improper pressure on the testator, the court awarded the applicant costs fixed at $51,940.27 inclusive of disbursements and HST.

Following a successful motion and trial of issues to enforce a settlement agreement, the applicant sought costs on a full indemnity basis totaling over $95,000.

The respondent argued for a set-off or a lower award due to her modest financial resources.

The court awarded costs to the applicant on a partial indemnity basis, noting that full indemnity was not warranted and considering proportionality and the respondent's ability to pay.

The respondent was ordered to pay a global amount of $40,221.22 in monthly installments over three years.

The plaintiff sued the estate of a deceased priest and the Archdiocese for historical sexual assault.

The plaintiff's claim against the estate was dismissed due to the two-year limitation period in the Trustee Act.

The estate then brought a motion to dismiss the Archdiocese's crossclaim for contribution and indemnity, arguing it was also barred by the Trustee Act.

The court dismissed the motion, holding that section 18 of the Limitations Act, 2002 governs claims for contribution and indemnity and prevails over the Trustee Act limitation period, allowing the crossclaim to proceed.

The applicant insurer (LawPRO) sought a declaration that the respondent insurer (Lloyd's) was obliged to contribute to the costs of defending their common insured.

The respondent argued the application was untimely under the Limitations Act and that its policy was excess, not primary.

The court found Lloyd's policy to be in an excess position and that the case was not analogous to situations where equitable contribution applies between primary and excess insurers (e.g., Broadhurst).

The application was dismissed as premature, though the court also ruled that the claim was not statute-barred under the Limitations Act, as the claim had not yet been "discovered" given the ongoing litigation against the insured.

The accused was charged with dangerous driving causing death after striking and fatally injuring a pedestrian following a hockey game.

The court heard evidence from civilian and police witnesses, including accident reconstruction experts.

The judge found that the accused was driving at a high rate of speed (estimated 60 km/h) in an area with significant pedestrian traffic, which constituted a marked departure from the standard of care expected of a reasonable person.

The accused was found guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.

This case involved a trial of specified issues to determine the enforceability of a settlement agreement between separated spouses.

The applicant sought to enforce the agreement, while the respondent sought to set it aside under section 56(4)(b) of the Family Law Act, alleging she did not understand its nature or consequences and was subjected to undue influence by her counsel.

The court found the respondent to be an intelligent and engaged litigant who understood the finality and consequences of the agreement.

Despite some pressure during negotiations, her will was not overborne, and the agreement was not fundamentally unfair.

The court dismissed the respondent's request to set aside the settlement, finding it valid and enforceable.

The appellant appealed a Small Claims Court decision ordering her to pay the respondent for the installation of two heating systems in her duplex.

The appellant argued the respondent's quote was for two furnaces, not one, and alleged the trial judge made palpable and overriding errors, failed to apply the Consumer Protection Act, and denied her a fair trial as a self-represented litigant.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's conclusion that the quote was for a single furnace was supported by evidence.

The court also found no reasonable apprehension of bias or denial of trial fairness, noting that while the trial judge could have managed the process better, the appellant was able to present her case.

The appellant appealed a Small Claims Court decision ordering her to pay the respondent for the installation of two heating systems in a duplex.

The appellant argued the respondent's quote was for two furnaces, while the respondent maintained it was for one and that the parties agreed to double the price for two units.

The appeal court found no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's factual finding that the quote was for a single furnace.

The court also dismissed the appellant's claims regarding trial unfairness and bias, concluding the appeal should be dismissed.

The landlord, White Spruce Apartments, brought a motion to quash an appeal filed by the tenant, Anne Deschenes, against an eviction order from the Landlord and Tenant Board.

The landlord argued that the appeal was clearly without merit and did not raise a question of law.

The tenant's grounds of appeal included procedural fairness issues, erroneous factual findings, and the landlord's failure to accommodate to the point of undue hardship.

The court denied the tenant's adjournment request, finding that a responding affidavit was not critically important.

The court ultimately agreed with the landlord, determining that the appeal grounds raised questions of mixed fact and law, not law alone, and were devoid of merit.

The motion to quash the appeal was granted.

The applicant, Pamella Poitras, brought an application against her stepchildren challenging the 2013 will of her deceased husband, Gilles Poitras, on grounds of undue influence and lack of testamentary capacity.

She also sought dependant's relief under the Succession Law Reform Act.

The court found that while suspicious circumstances existed regarding undue influence, the evidence did not establish coercion sufficient to set aside the will.

The court also found Gilles had testamentary capacity.

However, the court determined that Gilles had not made adequate provision for Pamella's proper support and awarded her a lump sum of $85,000 under the SLRA, in addition to her life estate in the matrimonial home and its contents.

The plaintiffs were awarded $12,650.25 plus prejudgment interest following a three-day construction lien trial.

The defendants argued costs should be limited to 25% of the award under the former Mechanics Lien Act, but the court noted the revised Construction Lien Act leaves costs to the court's discretion.

Applying Rule 57, the court held that the proportionality doctrine should be tempered so successful plaintiffs suing for small amounts are not punished by unrealistically low costs awards.

The court awarded the plaintiffs $13,325.97 in costs on a partial indemnity basis.

This is a costs endorsement following a six-day trial where the defendants were entirely successful.

The court applied the usual rules for costs awards, including partial indemnity basis (60% of actual costs), proportionality, and recovery of disbursements.

The defendants claimed $131,126.00 plus HST and disbursements.

The plaintiffs argued for a maximum of $50,000.

The court awarded the defendants $65,000.00 plus HST and most disbursements, disallowing certain unexplained travel expenses.

Costs were made payable by the plaintiff Ben Kutner to the defendants within 30 days.

This motion for judgment involved a landlord's claim for damages following a tenant's early vacation of premises.

The landlord sought rental arrears and prospective losses.

The tenant argued a material breach by the landlord due to inadequate parking.

The court found the tenant wrongfully repudiated the lease, entitling the landlord to agreed-upon rental arrears.

However, the landlord's claim for lost future rent was deemed to require a summary trial due to insufficient evidence on present value, actual rental value, and mitigation efforts.

No costs were awarded due to divided success.

The accused, Melissa Lee, was charged with aggravated assault, choking with intent, and unlawful confinement against the complainant, Yale Pan.

The court heard conflicting accounts from the complainant, the accused, and her brother.

After assessing witness credibility and physical evidence, the judge rejected the accused's version of events, finding the complainant's testimony credible and corroborated by injuries.

Lee was found guilty of aggravated assault but acquitted of choking with intent and unlawful confinement due to the Crown failing to prove intent for the former and insufficient evidence for the latter.