Martin S. James

The Crown appealed the acquittal of the respondent on charges under the Environmental Protection Act for operating a waste disposal site without a Certificate of Approval and disposing of waste contrary to their Waste Management System Approval.

The core issue was whether the respondent's approval for "collection, handling and transportation" implicitly included storage.

The court found that storage was not authorized and that the trial judge erred in her interpretation of the approval and the application of due diligence.

The appeal was allowed, the acquittal set aside, and a stay of proceedings was ordered, as further proceedings were deemed not in the interests of justice.

The defendant Graham McKeddie moved for summary judgment to dismiss the claim against him, which was based on social host liability.

The plaintiff, a minor injured as a passenger in a car driven by Graham's son, supported the dismissal.

The defendant Echelon General Insurance Company, a party under uninsured/underinsured provisions, cross-claimed against Graham alleging social host liability.

The court applied the framework from Childs v. Desormeaux and the summary judgment principles from Hryniak v. Mauldin.

Despite conflicting evidence regarding the host's interaction with the guests, the court found insufficient evidence to establish a paternalistic relationship or any other basis for a positive duty of care on the host's part as a social host.

The motion for summary judgment was granted, dismissing the claim against the moving defendant.

Following a 17-day trial resulting in a net judgment of approximately $472,000 for the plaintiffs, the court assessed costs.

The plaintiffs sought over $445,000 in fees and disbursements.

The court reduced the senior counsel's hourly rate, applied a 60% partial indemnity rate, and deducted amounts for unsupported time and disbursements.

The court declined the defendants' request to impose a $40,000 remedial penalty on the plaintiffs for refusing to mediate, noting such penalties should be proportionate to a party's financial strength.

Costs were fixed at $204,811.50 for fees and $42,545.30 for disbursements, plus HST.

The plaintiff employee was temporarily laid off by the defendant employer.

The plaintiff brought a motion for summary judgment claiming constructive dismissal, arguing the employment contract did not permit temporary layoffs.

The employer argued the layoff complied with the Employment Standards Act.

The court held that a temporary layoff without express or implied contractual authority constitutes constructive dismissal, rejecting the argument that the ESA displaces the common law requirement.

The plaintiff was awarded statutory notice and severance pay.

However, the court capped common law damages at five months because the plaintiff failed to mitigate by refusing a recall to work, and these damages were fully offset by statutory payments and new employment income.

The applicant sought costs following a motion for retroactive and ongoing spousal support, where the respondent brought a cross-motion for child support and extraordinary expenses.

Success was divided, and neither party's offer to settle was clearly superior.

However, the court found the applicant was sufficiently successful to warrant partial indemnity costs, having obtained a sizeable award for spousal support.

The respondent was ordered to pay costs of $5,500 plus HST.

The applicant was substantially successful on a motion to change and obtained a better result than his offer to settle.

The court resolved an outstanding issue regarding life insurance on consent, ordering the applicant to maintain an $18,000 policy until January 2018.

On the issue of costs, the court noted the applicant utilized both senior and junior counsel but failed to provide actual time dockets, raising concerns about duplication of effort.

Applying the principle of proportionality and considering the respondent's reasonable expectations, the court fixed the applicant's costs at $27,000 inclusive of disbursements and HST, which may be credited against his spousal support arrears.

The defendant Children's Aid Society brought a motion to strike the self-represented plaintiff's statement of claim for failing to disclose a reasonable cause of action.

The plaintiff, whose child had been apprehended, alleged deceit, misrepresentation, and intentional infliction of mental suffering by the Society.

The court found that while the Society generally owes no duty of care to parents in negligence, the plaintiff's allegations sounded in intentional wrongdoing and bad faith, which might pierce the Society's statutory immunity under the Child and Family Services Act.

However, because the claim lacked sufficient material facts, the court struck the pleading but granted the plaintiff leave to amend.

The accused brought an application to exclude a confession to police on the basis that his right to retain and instruct counsel without delay under s. 10(b) of the Charter was breached.

The accused had requested a specific lawyer who was unavailable, and police waited approximately forty minutes before commencing an interview without providing a Prosper warning.

The court held that the accused did not effectively waive his right to counsel and that a Charter breach occurred because police failed to provide a reasonable opportunity to contact counsel.

However, applying the s. 24(2) framework in R. v. Grant, the court admitted the statement, finding the police conduct was not deliberate and that society’s interest in adjudicating a serious home invasion offence outweighed the breach.

Following a jury verdict in a personal injury action arising from a motor vehicle collision involving a cyclist, the court addressed post-verdict issues including the statutory threshold for recovery of non-pecuniary damages, the applicable statutory deductible, and the appropriate rate of pre‑judgment interest.

The court found that the injured plaintiff established a permanent serious impairment of an important physical function under the Insurance Act threshold.

The court further held that the increased statutory deductible introduced by O. Reg. 221/15 applied to pending actions, characterizing the deductible as procedural in nature and applicable to quantification of damages.

However, the court concluded that entitlement to and quantification of pre‑judgment interest are substantive matters and therefore the amended Insurance Act provisions did not apply retrospectively.

Pre‑judgment interest was therefore calculated under Rule 53.10 until December 31, 2014 and under s. 128(1) of the Courts of Justice Act thereafter.

The parties brought cross-motions on interim family law issues.

The applicant sought to reduce the listing price of the matrimonial home, payment of child support arrears, and contribution to consolidated debt.

The respondent sought interim and retroactive spousal support.

The court ordered the listing price of the matrimonial home reduced to $295,000, postponed the issue of child support arrears to trial, maintained the status quo on the consolidated debt, and declined to order interim spousal support as entitlement was not clearly established.

Following a family law trial in which the respondent secured retroactive and ongoing spousal support, the court addressed the respondent’s claim for costs.

The respondent sought costs calculated at substantial indemnity rates based on counsel’s hourly billing and the applicant’s disclosure failures.

The court reaffirmed that legal aid representation does not reduce the recoverable costs from the opposing party, but held that substantial indemnity was not justified in the circumstances.

Considering the applicant’s disclosure non-compliance and the respondent’s overall success at trial, balanced against the need to avoid impairing the applicant’s ability to pay ordered support, the court fixed costs on a partial indemnity basis.

The accused applied to exclude evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter, alleging multiple Charter breaches arising from a roadside investigative detention following an armed robbery.

The court found the initial stop lawful but concluded police breached s. 10(a) and s. 10(b) by failing to promptly inform the detainee of the reason for detention and the right to counsel.

The accused argued that evidence discovered later, including items found at his residence and incriminating text messages, was derived from the unlawful detention.

Applying the framework from R. v. Grant, the court held that although the police conduct was deliberate, the link between the breach and the later-discovered evidence was weakened by intervening events including consent given by a third party and search warrants.

Considering the seriousness of the offence and the reliability of the evidence, the court admitted the evidence.

The plaintiff sought enhanced costs following a successful summary judgment motion, after the Court of Appeal remitted the costs issue back to the motion judge to consider the effect of offers to settle.

The plaintiff had made a Rule 49 offer to settle for less than the amount ultimately awarded.

The court found the plaintiff was entitled to enhanced costs and awarded $64,280.09, representing a reasonable increase over the original partial indemnity award.

The defendants brought a motion for summary judgment dismissing the action arising from a fatal helicopter incident involving a foreign soldier during a NATO mission in Afghanistan.

They argued the claim was barred by the six‑month limitation period in s. 269 of the National Defence Act and that the Ontario Superior Court lacked jurisdiction over the claim against the Crown under the Crown Liability and Proceedings Act.

The court held that the discoverability principle applied to the statutory limitation period, meaning the action was not statute‑barred.

However, the court found it lacked jurisdiction over the claim against the Crown because the claim arose outside Canada.

The action was therefore dismissed only as against the Attorney General of Canada.

The applicant sought release on bail pending trial on a charge of second degree murder.

The proposed release plan included strict house arrest with parental sureties, significant financial bonds, and real-time GPS monitoring.

The court considered the statutory grounds for pre-trial detention under the Criminal Code and evaluated the apparent strength of the Crown’s case, the seriousness and circumstances of the alleged offence, and the risk of interference with witnesses and the administration of justice.

The court concluded that the Crown’s case appeared reasonably strong and that the alleged conduct involved planning, serious violence, and attempts to influence a witness.

Detention was ordered on the secondary and tertiary grounds to protect the public and maintain confidence in the administration of justice.

The moving defendant sought summary judgment dismissing claims for breach of contract, misrepresentation, and unjust enrichment arising from negotiations for the purchase of a steam turbine generator for a co‑generation project.

The plaintiffs alleged that a binding contract arose from a purchase order and letter of intent and that the moving defendant participated in the negotiations and misrepresented issues affecting the project.

The moving party argued no contract was ever concluded and that any dealings were solely with a related corporate entity.

Applying the principles from Hryniak v. Mauldin, the court held that genuine issues requiring a trial existed, including the role of the moving defendant in negotiations, whether contractual relations were formed, and whether misrepresentations or unjust enrichment occurred.

Given the complex factual matrix and credibility issues, summary judgment was inappropriate.

Following dismissal of the plaintiff’s claim asserting a compensable interest in property owned by the defendant, the court determined the defendant’s entitlement to costs.

The defendant relied on two offers to settle, including one that remained open until trial and was more favourable than the final result, entitling her to enhanced cost recovery.

The court considered the Rules of Civil Procedure factors, the reasonableness of counsel’s hourly rate, and the lack of clear separation between partial and substantial indemnity claims.

Balancing these considerations, the court fixed costs at a reduced amount from what was sought.

On competing family law motions concerning child access, relocation, grandparent contact, and proposed reunification therapy, the court found that the child's serious illness and the family's relocation to southwestern Ontario constituted a material change in circumstances.

The court declined to terminate the father's supervised access or the grandparents' access, granted the mother's request to relocate, and granted the father's request to amend his pleadings to seek custody.

Limited supervised in-person access in the London area was ordered together with telephone and written contact, while the therapy request was dismissed without prejudice because the evidentiary record lacked necessary particulars.

Costs were awarded primarily to the moving party for the earlier successful attendance, with no costs order as between the main parties for the later hearing.

The plaintiff sought a declaration of ownership interest in a house legally owned by his former mother-in-law, arguing either an express agreement that title would transfer after the mortgage was paid or, alternatively, proprietary estoppel.

The court rejected the plaintiff's account of any promise to gift the down payment or transfer the property, preferring the evidence that the arrangement was a rental investment intended to provide favourable housing to family members.

Applying the elements of proprietary estoppel, the court found no inducement or encouragement by the owner, insufficient proof of detriment in light of below-market rent and other countervailing benefits, and no unconscionable conduct.

The action was dismissed, the parties were declared to stand in a landlord-tenant relationship, and judgment for unpaid rent was granted to the defendant.

This costs endorsement followed a contested motion in an estate administration dispute concerning access to trust fund accounting records and other relief.

The moving party succeeded on only one disclosure-related issue and failed on several others, while the responding estate trustee opposed broader relief.

Applying the Rule 57.01 costs factors and exercising broad discretion, the court declined to order personal costs against the respondent.

Instead, it ordered that each side recover $5,000 from the trust fund and otherwise bear its own costs.