Martin S. James

The applicant, a residual beneficiary of an estate, brought an application against the estate trustees (respondents) alleging mismanagement.

The claims included undue delay in selling the estate house, improper handling of a joint bank account, misdirection of life insurance proceeds, and premature taking of executor compensation.

The court dismissed the applicant's claims regarding occupation rent, the joint bank account, and the life insurance proceeds, finding insufficient evidence for the rent claim, no specific impropriety with the bank account, and that the presumption of resulting trust for the life insurance was rebutted.

While noting the irregular prepayment of executor compensation, the court directed the respondents to formally pass accounts to determine the proper amount.

The defendant, Kevin Rix, brought a motion to compel the plaintiff, Louise Charron-Rix, to attend a defence orthopaedic assessment and to extend the time for serving the resulting report.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the defendant's request was made too late, three years after the plaintiff's initial expert report and just two months before trial.

The court emphasized the prejudice to the plaintiff and the risk of delaying the trial, noting that the updated medical records did not disclose new diagnoses justifying a late assessment and that the defendant had not previously asserted the necessity of such an examination.

The respondent, Rene Faucher, brought a motion to change seeking shared decision-making, equal shared parenting time, and child support based on s. 9 of the Federal Child Support Guidelines, including a retroactive adjustment.

The applicant, Dianne Douglas, opposed the increase in parenting time and sought sole decision-making.

The court found that the respondent's parenting time had exceeded 40% since 2017 and granted a retroactive child support adjustment in his favour, effective January 1, 2018.

However, the court dismissed the respondent's request to transition to equal parenting time, citing the children's settled routine, their age, and the protracted duration of the status quo.

The applicant's request for sole decision-making was also dismissed due to insufficient evidence.

Mark Cameron was found guilty of break and enter with intent, robbery with a firearm, possession of a weapon for a dangerous purpose, and possession of cocaine.

This decision outlines the reasons for his sentence.

The court considered the circumstances of the home invasion-style robbery, the significant impact on the victims, Mr. Cameron's dated but extensive criminal record including prior robberies, and his personal circumstances.

The court applied sentencing principles, emphasizing denunciation and deterrence, while also considering rehabilitation and the parity principle with co-accused.

The court granted a two-year credit for pre-sentence custody and onerous bail conditions.

A global sentence of 8 years imprisonment was imposed, reduced to 6 years after credits.

The appellant was convicted of accessing child pornography under section 163.1(4.1) of the Criminal Code.

The appeal challenged the trial judge's finding that the Information to Obtain (ITO) for the initial Production Order provided sufficient information to support a reasonable belief that a child pornography offence had been committed.

Specifically, the appellant argued that the described image, depicting a nude pre-pubescent female, did not meet the statutory definition of child pornography, contending that a pre-pubescent breast did not constitute a sexual organ under section 163.1(1)(a)(ii).

The court dismissed the appeal, finding no extricable error of law or palpable and overriding error of mixed fact and law in the trial judge's thorough review and determination that the ITOs were not facially deficient and that the image qualified as child pornography within the statutory definition.

The defendants brought a motion for summary judgment seeking to dismiss the plaintiff's action, arguing that no contract was formed as alleged by the plaintiff, or alternatively, that the claim was barred by the Limitations Act, 2002.

The plaintiff sought summary judgment in his favour, asserting a binding agreement for shares or a portion of sale proceeds.

The court granted the defendants' motion, finding that the parties were never bound to a legally enforceable agreement beyond the initial employment contract, which contained an "entire agreement" clause.

The court concluded there was no "meeting of the minds" on subsequent compensation arrangements and that the limitations period issue was moot given the lack of a discoverable claim.

This is a costs endorsement following a successful motion by the Respondent to increase parenting time.

The Respondent sought substantial indemnity costs of $9,000, alleging unreasonable behaviour by the Applicant in refusing to negotiate and ignoring communications.

The Applicant argued the docketed time was excessive and that a punitive costs order was unwarranted, proposing $3,312 plus HST.

The court found that punitive costs were not appropriate as the conduct was not egregious and Rule 18 did not apply.

The court awarded the Respondent $4,000 plus HST in partial indemnity costs, finding the total time spent by the Respondent was higher than reasonably anticipated by the Applicant.

This costs endorsement follows the respondent's successful jurisdictional motion to dismiss the applicant's originating application and addresses the costs of the applicant's unsuccessful contempt motion.

The jurisdictional motion centered on the Ontario Superior Court's power to set aside a final New Brunswick family court order, which the court found it lacked.

Applying Rule 24 of the Family Court Rules, the court awarded partial indemnity costs to the successful respondent, noting the moderate complexity of the issues and the inappropriateness of the applicant's contempt motion, which lacked proper service and was an ill-suited remedy.

This is a costs endorsement following a trial management conference and a motion by the applicant to adjourn the trial.

The adjournment was necessitated by the respondent's failure to comply with financial disclosure obligations, which the court emphasized as essential for fair and efficient family law proceedings.

The applicant sought full indemnity costs, and the respondent failed to provide any responding submissions.

The court awarded the applicant fixed costs of $1500 plus HST, payable forthwith, finding the amount reasonable given the time spent and counsel's hourly rate.

The respondent husband brought a motion seeking a declaration that the Ontario Superior Court of Justice, Family Division, lacked jurisdiction to set aside a Consent Final Order issued by the New Brunswick Court of Queen’s Bench.

The applicant wife had commenced an application in Ontario to set aside the New Brunswick order, alleging fraud and misrepresentation by the respondent regarding his retirement status, which impacted spousal support waiver and pension division.

The court determined that an Ontario court does not possess the inherent or statutory jurisdiction to set aside a final order from another province, particularly when the original order was based solely on provincial legislation and not the Divorce Act.

The court noted that while interjurisdictional support orders have specific statutory mechanisms (e.g., ISOA), these do not extend to setting aside the original order itself.

The respondent's motion was granted, and the applicant's underlying application was dismissed.

This was an application by Virginia Dolinska to be discharged as counsel of record for the accused, S.S., who is facing multiple serious criminal charges and is in custody.

Ms. Dolinska sought to withdraw due to anonymous threats received related to her representation of S.S., which caused her to fear for her safety, and a perceived loss of trust in the solicitor-client relationship.

The accused stated he had not lost confidence in his counsel.

The court considered the potential prejudice to the accused, including possible delays to scheduled trial and severance application dates, but ultimately granted the application, noting that the perception of counsel not being fully committed due to safety fears was contrary to the interests of justice.

This is a costs endorsement following a successful application under the Municipal Conflict of Interest Act.

The applicant, the Integrity Commissioner, was found substantially successful in the underlying application, despite not succeeding on all allegations.

The court considered the applicant's claim for partial or substantial indemnity costs and the respondent's arguments regarding excessive time and junior counsel fees.

The court awarded the applicant $25,000.00 for fees plus $2,125.42 for disbursements, including HST, finding the respondent's conduct intentional and persistent, which warranted more than a nominal costs order.

The offender, G.T., was found guilty of sexual assault.

This decision outlines the reasons for sentencing.

The Crown sought 18-24 months incarceration, while the defence proposed a conditional discharge or a 3-6 month conditional sentence.

The court rejected a conditional discharge due to the offender's lack of genuine remorse and insight.

Ultimately, the court imposed a 12-month conditional sentence followed by an 18-month probation order, citing mitigating factors such as the offender's youth, lack of criminal record, and significant procedural delays, and the constitutional ruling that allowed for conditional sentences for sexual assault.

The offender, R. V., was found guilty of sexual interference involving a 7-8 year old female child.

The sentencing proceeded in abstentia due to the offender's unconfirmed whereabouts.

The court considered aggravating factors including repeated incidents with penetration, a dated but significant criminal record, and a breach of trust, alongside mitigating factors such as a strong work history, family support, health issues, and a low risk of re-offending.

Applying the principles from Friesen (2020 SCC 9), which emphasizes denunciation and deterrence for child sexual abuse, the court imposed an 8-year prison sentence.

The plaintiffs in three related lawsuits arising from a fatal head-on automobile accident brought summary judgment motions to determine liability.

All parties agreed that liability could be determined by summary judgment but held diametrically opposed positions on who was liable.

The court found that the existence of competing expert accident reconstruction reports, particularly those based on computer simulations with unknown reliability, created genuine issues of material fact regarding causation.

The court also noted an "air of reality" to the contention that the deceased plaintiff's distracted driving might have contributed to the collision, despite a prior Highway Traffic Act conviction against one of the defendants.

Consequently, the motions for summary judgment were dismissed, as a full trial with oral testimony and cross-examination was deemed necessary to resolve the complex factual disputes and competing expert opinions.

The applicants sought an order for restitution and vacating of victim fine surcharges imposed between 2013 and 2018, following the Supreme Court of Canada's decision in R. v. Boudreault which found the surcharge unconstitutional.

The court granted the order vacating the unpaid surcharges for the applicant, Serge Parent, finding it just and appropriate under s. 24(1) of the Charter, and that the limitation period had not expired.

However, the court dismissed the request for restitution of already paid surcharges and the broader class remedy, noting that s. 24(1) is for personal remedies and that government measures had ameliorated some harms.

The Applicant, successful in an oppression application under the Canada Business Corporations Act, sought substantial indemnity costs after recovering a modest $14,555.34.

The court assessed the Applicant's costs outline, which included two offers to settle.

The first offer was deemed invalid for costs consequences under Rule 49.11 as it was not made to all jointly and severally liable defendants and was not unilaterally controllable.

The second offer, while made to both respondents, was structured in a way that required an ad hoc assessment of costs, making it difficult to determine if the result was better than the offer.

Emphasizing proportionality given the modest recovery and the significant costs incurred by the Applicant (including multiple lawyers), the court awarded a proportionate sum of $20,000, all inclusive, payable jointly and severally by the Respondents, significantly less than the Applicant's claim.

The accused, a 74-year-old retiree, was charged with kidnapping, uttering threats, aggravated assault, and attempted murder against his former partner.

After their separation, the accused drove the complainant to a secluded wooded area against her will, threatened to run her over if she escaped, and stabbed her in the abdomen and neck.

The court applied the W.D. framework to resolve conflicting testimony, rejecting the accused's claim of self-defence.

The accused was found guilty of kidnapping, uttering threats, and aggravated assault, but acquitted of attempted murder as the Crown failed to prove a specific intent to kill beyond a reasonable doubt.

This is a costs endorsement following the Applicant's successful motion to enforce a 2011 final order.

The Applicant sought costs on various bases, but the court found that her offer to settle lacked a meaningful element of compromise, thus not triggering enhanced costs recovery.

The court also noted that motions brought without notice generally do not expose the opposing party to costs liability.

While the Applicant's hourly rates were reasonable, the time spent was considered high for a short motion.

The court reiterated that partial recovery is the norm and impecuniosity is not a reason to deny costs.

Ultimately, the Applicant was awarded $3,000.00 in costs, inclusive of fees, disbursements, and taxes.

The Applicant brought an urgent motion for the return of T.G.M.C., an adult child with significant developmental challenges, to her primary care.

The Respondent had retained T.G.M.C. in his care, defying an existing sole custody order, arguing that the order was unenforceable as T.G.M.C. had turned 18 and that her return to in-class learning was not in her best interests due to health concerns.

The court found it had inherent jurisdiction over vulnerable adults and ordered the immediate return of T.G.M.C. to the Applicant's care, affirming the existing custody order's continued force.