Mark A. Wiffen

The appellant appealed a Small Claims Court judgment ordering him to repay a $20,000 loan, arguing the claim was statute-barred.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding that part payments made by the appellant's company extended the limitation period for both the company and the appellant.

Furthermore, the court held that an email sent by the appellant acknowledging the debt and containing his name constituted a signed acknowledgement in writing under section 13 of the Limitations Act, 2002, which also extended the limitation period.

The defendants brought a motion for leave to appeal an order that dismissed their motion to set aside two trial management orders.

The defendants argued that the original judge who made the trial management orders later recused himself due to a reasonable apprehension of bias, as he was the supervising judge of deputy small claims judges and the plaintiff's counsel was a deputy small claims judge.

The motions judge dismissed the motion to set aside on the basis of issue estoppel, finding the Divisional Court had already dealt with the bias issue.

The court granted leave to appeal, finding good reason to doubt the correctness of the motions judge's order because he failed to consider Rule 59.06, and finding the issue of institutional bias to be a matter of general importance.

The defendants brought a motion for leave to appeal an order that dismissed their motion to set aside earlier trial management orders.

The defendants argued the earlier orders should be set aside due to a reasonable apprehension of institutional bias, as the judge who made them was the supervising judge for deputy small claims judges in the region, and the plaintiff's counsel was a deputy judge.

The motions judge had dismissed the motion on the basis of issue estoppel.

The court granted leave to appeal, finding good reason to doubt the correctness of the motions judge's order because he failed to consider Rule 59.06, and concluding that the issue of institutional bias in these circumstances is a matter of general importance to the administration of justice.

The appellant, a taxi driver, was convicted in absentia of careless driving following a rear-end collision.

His appeal to the Ontario Court of Justice was dismissed on the basis that he had no defence to the charge.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the appellant's explanation—that the car in front of him pulled over and then suddenly pulled back into the lane—could provide a defence to the strict liability offence if believed at trial.

The conviction was set aside and a new trial was ordered.

The appellants sued the respondent for damages after allegedly finding a mouldy piece of chicken in a box of cereal.

The parties reached a settlement to dismiss the action without costs, but the appellants later attempted to resile from the agreement, claiming it was accepted in haste and under stress.

The motion judge enforced the settlement against the adult appellants.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the motion judge's conclusion that the appellants failed to establish grounds, such as mistake or significant compromise, to justify setting aside the settlement.

The plaintiff religious corporation sought repayment of funds raised by its congregation that were used by the defendants to purchase and renovate a new, larger place of worship under a newly incorporated entity.

The plaintiff also sought repayment for a mortgage placed on its original property to fund its conversion into a funeral home.

The court dismissed both the plaintiff's claims for breach of trust, breach of fiduciary duty, and conversion, as well as the defendants' counterclaim for the value of improvements.

The court found that the fundraising and property transition were done with the knowledge and support of the original directors, and both parties ultimately benefited from the respective properties.

The appellants appealed a decision dismissing their application regarding alleged voting irregularities in a Hindu temple's By-Law vote.

The Court of Appeal upheld the application judge's finding that the appellants failed to establish an irregularity, meaning the burden of proof never shifted to the respondents.

However, the Court allowed the appeal on costs, finding the application judge misapprehended evidence when awarding substantial indemnity costs.

The costs award was reduced to partial indemnity.

The appellant building mortgagee appealed an order confirming a Master's report in a construction lien priority dispute.

The Master found that the appellant's $25,000 mortgage advance was made on November 19, 2009, giving the respondent lien claimant priority, based on a formal admission of fact that the appellant was refused leave to withdraw.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the motion judge correctly applied the standard of review and that the formal admission of fact was conclusive.

Following the dismissal of an application seeking to set aside a by-law passed at a general meeting of a temple organization, the court addressed costs.

The unsuccessful applicants argued that no costs should be awarded because they were public interest litigants and alleged governance concerns within the organization.

The court rejected the characterization of the applicants as public interest litigants, finding the litigation was primarily driven by efforts to regain control of the organization rather than a broader public interest.

Applying the factors under Rule 57.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the court determined the respondents were entitled to substantial indemnity costs.

Costs were fixed at $30,000 payable jointly and severally by the applicants.

The defendant brought a motion to enforce a settlement under Rule 49.09 of the Rules of Civil Procedure and to obtain court approval of an infant settlement under Rule 7.08.

The underlying action alleged psychological and related harm after the plaintiffs claimed to have discovered a moldy piece of chicken in a box of cereal.

The court found that a binding settlement agreement had been reached through email communications between counsel.

However, the required sworn affidavit evidence and motion materials necessary for approval of a minor’s settlement under Rule 7.08 had not been properly filed.

As a result, the court could not approve the settlement and restored the action to the trial list.

Applicants sought to set aside a temple by-law passed at a September 2007 general meeting, arguing that forged membership applications and improper proxies invalidated the meeting and the resulting constitution of the organization.

They further alleged that the current board improperly restricted membership.

The court held that the applicants failed to prove on a balance of probabilities that forged memberships affected the June 2007 election or that proxies from that meeting were improperly used to pass the September 2007 by-law.

The evidence also did not establish that the board had improperly restricted membership.

The court upheld the validity of the by-law and dismissed the application.

Following a reference determining entitlement to contract funds under the Construction Lien Act, the court addressed costs between the parties.

An added party supplier who succeeded at the trial of an issue sought substantial indemnity costs against the plaintiff lien claimant.

The court found the claimant engaged in misleading and reprehensible conduct, including misrepresenting contractual arrangements, misappropriating deposit funds, and pursuing a lien claim despite alternative dispute mechanisms.

Substantial indemnity costs were awarded to the successful supplier and partial indemnity costs were awarded to the contractor defendant against the claimant.

The court also confirmed distribution of funds paid into court and declared the plaintiff’s construction lien invalid.

The plaintiff, operating as Neptun Light, registered a construction lien claiming entitlement to $147,776.60 owed by the defendant contractor for the supply of lighting fixtures.

An added party, Neptun Distributors, also claimed entitlement to the funds, asserting it was the true contracting party.

The court held a trial of an issue to determine who contracted with the defendant.

Applying an objective standard for contract formation, the court found that the contract was formed between the defendant and Neptun Distributors, and that the plaintiff acted as an agent for Neptun Distributors.

The court directed that the funds be paid to Neptun Distributors.

The appellant appealed his provincial offences convictions, including operating a motor vehicle without insurance, failing to wear a seatbelt, and operating without a validated permit.

The Court of Appeal admitted fresh evidence establishing that the appellant had automobile insurance at the time of the offence.

The conviction for operating without insurance was set aside and an acquittal substituted.

The appeal regarding the remaining charges was dismissed as the appellant provided no substantive defence or explanation for missing his first court appearance.

The appellant appealed a Master's procedural order concerning late delivery of an affidavit of documents and related case management directions, including a substantial indemnity costs award and dispensing with approval of the draft order.

The court emphasized the high level of appellate deference owed to discretionary procedural decisions made by Masters.

It held that brief endorsements can suffice as reasons in procedural case management contexts and that no palpable and overriding error had been demonstrated.

The appellant had not sought leave to appeal the level of costs under the Courts of Justice Act.

The appeal was therefore dismissed.

The applicant, a former teacher whose certificate was cancelled in 1997 following a criminal conviction, applied for a new Certificate of Qualification and Registration.

The Registrar referred the application to the Discipline Committee pursuant to s. 33(15) of the Ontario College of Teachers Act.

The applicant sought judicial review, arguing he should be treated as a new applicant under s. 18 and that s. 33(15) could not apply retrospectively.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, holding that the legislative amendment applied retrospectively as its purpose was to protect the public, not to punish, and the Registrar did not breach any duty of fairness.

The appellants (majority directors) appealed a costs order of $213,380.64 made against them personally following an application by the respondents (minority directors).

The Court of Appeal upheld the quantum of costs but found the application judge erred in ordering costs against the directors personally without a finding of mala fides.

The court noted the corporation's constitution provided for indemnification of directors acting in the execution of their duties.

The appeal was allowed in part, varying the order to make the corporation responsible for the costs.

The plaintiff brought motions for leave to appeal two interlocutory orders that dismissed a motion to continue an ex parte Anton Piller order and dismissed subsequent motions for relief under Rules 30 and 45.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motions for leave to appeal, finding that the motion judge properly considered the matter de novo and correctly concluded that the plaintiff failed to establish a strong prima facie case to justify continuing the intrusive order.

The court found no reason to doubt the correctness of the orders and no denial of natural justice.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment that found no wrongdoing or improper conduct by the respondents.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the trial judge properly applied the relevant legal test and that the factual findings did not support the application of s. 178(1)(d) of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act.

Costs were awarded to the respondents.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment declaring that a lease agreement for a municipal solid waste demonstration plant expired on January 28, 2003, and ordering the third party to indemnify the respondent municipality.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's interpretation that the automatic three-year extension was triggered when the facility first accepted waste, not when it was fully completed.

The Court also upheld the finding that the third party was bound by an indemnity undertaking contained in its proposal, which was incorporated into the agreement between its wholly-owned subsidiary and the municipality.