COURT FILE NO.: 390/08 (Orangeville)
DATE: 2015 12 09
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE - ONTARIO
RE: ROBERT STOCKEY and GARY GRANT and DIANA KOPP GRANT
BEFORE: EMERY J.
COUNSEL: Ian K. Latimer, for the Plaintiff
Mark Wiffen, agent for the defendants, Gary Grant and Diana Kopp Grant
HEARD: October 5, 2015 (Orangeville)
ENDORSEMENT
[1] The defendants, Gary Grant and Diana Kopp Grant bring this motion for leave to appeal the order made by Justice André on September 8, 2014 that dismissed their motion to set aside or vary two orders made by Justice Daley of this court on December 23, 2009 and June 29, 2010. The motion for leave to appeal Justice André’s order is brought under Rule 62.02(4)(b) of the Rules of Civil Procedure. The motion proceeded with submissions being made for half a day despite the change to Rule 62.02(2) that motions for leave to appeal are now to be made in writing without the attendance of parties or counsel.
[2] For the reasons that follow, the motion for leave to appeal is granted.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
[3] I propose to set out the background to Justice Daley’s orders and the apparent reasons why the defendants moved to set aside those orders. I shall then set out the basis on which Justice André made his order to dismiss the defendants’ motion. I then propose to set out the law relating to a motion seeking leave to appeal an interlocutory order of a Superior Court judge, and to apply that law to the order for which leave to appeal is sought.
Orders made by Justice Daley
[4] The plaintiff, Robert Stockey, entered into an agreement of purchase and sale with the defendant Gary Grant in 2004. In that agreement, Mr. Stockey agreed to sell a piece of property to Mr. Grant. Mr. Grant had the right to rent the property for one year prior to closing under the agreement of purchase and sale. During the one year period, Mr. Grant was to renovate the property as it was run down and derelict at the time. This would also allow him to increase the value of the property so that Mr. Grant would be in a better position to arrange financing when it came time to purchase the property.
[5] Prior to closing, Mr. Grant discovered that one Maureen Quinn, also known as Maureen Harris, held title to the property, and not Mr. Stockey. Subsequently, three proceedings were commenced:
a) an action in Brampton Court File No. 390/08, in which Mr. Stockey made claims against Mr. Grant for his failure to complete the purchase of the property;
b) the action in Brampton Court File No. 615/08, in which Mr. Grant made claims against Mr. Stockey and two other individuals seeking specific performance for the sale of the property; and
c) an application under Orangeville Court File No. 85/11, in which Mr. Grant made a claim for a lien in respect of improvements he had allegedly made to the property.
[6] The parties settled the two actions by entering minutes of settlement on January 5, 2009. Under those minutes of settlement, the parties agreed to a new closing date for the sale of the property to Mr. Grant, and purported to address concerns regarding the ownership of the property. Unfortunately, the sale did not close on the new date provided by the minutes of settlement, and a fresh dispute arose around the reason why the sale did not close.
[7] Mr. Grant subsequently brought a motion to set aside the minutes of settlement and for relief from forfeiture. As Mr. Grant had been in possession of the property since the parties had entered the agreement of purchase and sale, Mr. Stockey brought a motion to recover possession of the property from him.
[8] Both motions were heard by Justice Daley. In his reasons released on December 23, 2009, Justice Daley ordered a trial of the following issues:
a) what were the terms of the settlement reached by the parties on January 5, 2009;
b) was it the parties’ intention, and did they agree that the implementation of the terms of the settlement was to be subject to the term that time was of the essence;
c) did the Grants breach the terms of the settlement reached between the parties; and
d) are the Grants entitled to relief from forfeiture and entitled as such to close the transaction for the purchase of the property.
[9] In addition to defining the issues for trial, Justice Daley also ordered that a determination as to the admissibility of any new evidence tendered by either Mr. Stockey or the Grants shall be made during the course of the trial of those issues.
[10] Mr. Grant did not appeal the order made by Justice Daley on December 23, 2009.
[11] On June 29, 2010, Mr. Grant brought a motion before Justice Daley to essentially ask for the same relief that Mr. Grant had requested on the previous motion. On this motion, Mr. Grant also requested the following orders:
a) an order allowing an “examination for discovery” of Maureen Quinn, alias Maureen Harris;
b) an order allowing Grant to examine any party whose evidence has a direct bearing on the issues of this matter;
c) an order allowing the “fresh evidence” submitted to be admissible forthwith, for trial preparation;
d) an order adding the following issues to be tried:
(i) Did the defendants Stockey, et al, breach the terms of the settlement agreement reached between the parties?
(ii) Was the documentation provided by the defendants for the intended closing sufficient to allow a closing to occur as per the terms of the settlement agreement and encompassing the terms of the court order of Justice Murray?
(iii) Are the statutory declarations from Maureen Quinn and Stockey that were provided for the closing factual and true?
[12] On June 29, 2010, Justice Daley made an order denying Mr. Grant the opportunity to admit fresh evidence, and to conduct a discovery of Maureen Quinn, otherwise known as Maureen Harris, who was one of the defendants in the action Mr. Grant had started in Brampton Court File No. 615/08. Justice Daley also dismissed Mr. Grant’s motion to add issues for trial. Justice Daley gave the following reasons for that decision:
[8] As to the motion by Grant, I am further of the view that there is no basis to add to the issues to be tried. My order of December 23, 2009 was not appealed. Mr. Grant urged that I amend the order. Having considered the Rules he relied on, I am of the view that there is no basis upon which he is entitled to have the issues for trial expanded by the addition of new issues he has proposed.
[9] The issues that I directed go to trial are narrowly focused on the alleged settlement of the dispute and the issues proposed are not necessary for the determination of the issues set for trial.
[10] Thus the Grant motion to add the issues is dismissed.
[11] Similarly, Grant’s motion to admit fresh evidence is dismissed, as that issue was dealt with in my earlier order, leaving the questions to be determined in the trial of the issues.
[12] As to Grant’s request to conduct a discovery of Quinn, so far on the trial of the issues is concerned, again, I ordered that examinations be limited to cross-examination on affidavits on specific time limits. Grant agreed that his purpose in wishing to conduct a discovery of Quinn went beyond the issues set to be tried.
[13] Mr. Grant did not appeal this order, or seek leave to appeal within the time permitted under the Rules of Civil Procedure. However, Mr. Grant brought a motion on October 5, 2010 for an order to extend the time to appeal Justice Daley’s judgment dated December 23, 2009 and his order made on June 29, 2010 (collectively, the “trial management orders.”) This motion was heard and dismissed by Justice Lemon on October 5, 2010. Mr. Grant did not appeal or seek leave to appeal Justice Lemon’s order within the time prescribed by the rules.
[14] The trial of the issues defined by the trial management orders came before Justice Daley on April 11, 2011. Before the trial began, Justice Daley advised the parties that he was (at the time) the Administrative Judge for the Small Claims Court in the Central West judicial region, and that at the same time Mr. Latimer, counsel for Mr. Stockey, was a deputy judge of the Small Claims Court in the region. Justice Daley recused himself from hearing the trial, giving the following reasons on the record for doing so:
…The parties in this action are entitled to an impartial and independent judicial determination of the issues at stake in this trial. The parties are not only entitled to an impartial and independent determination of the issues, but also to the appearance of such impartiality and independence. While I am satisfied that I can independently and impartially try this case, I am of the view that given Mr. Latimer’s status as a Deputy Judge of the Small Claims Court, the appearance of judicial independence and impartiality made be eroded to such an extent that a reasonable fair-minded and informed person would have a reasoned suspicion that there would be less than complete impartiality and independence on the part of the court.
In the result, I have concluded that I must recuse myself. The trial of the issues directed to trial by me in my endorsement of December 23rd, 2009, is adjourned to a date to be set. The trial shall be conducted by a justice from another Region of the Superior Court upon arrangements being made through the regional trial administrator’s office.
[15] Mr. Grant brought an application for judicial review of the trial management orders made in 2009 and 2010 as Justice Daley did not address the issue of whether there was a reasonable apprehension of bias with respect to those orders he had made on April 11, 2011. Mr. Grant’s application for judicial review was heard by the Divisional Court on December 3, 2012. Mr. Grant’s application for judicial review was dismissed on the basis that the Divisional Court had no jurisdiction to review the decision of a Superior Court Judge sitting in that capacity.
[16] Mr. Grant subsequently brought a motion for leave to appeal the decision of the Divisional Court to the Court of Appeal on May 24, 2013 in writing. Mr. Grant’s motion for leave to appeal from the Divisional Court was dismissed by the Court of Appeal on September 11, 2013.
[17] There is also an order granted by Justice Wein that has relevance to the motion before me by virtue of Mr. Grant’s appeal of that order. On August 7, 2012, Justice Wein made an order requiring Mr. Grant to pay rent for his occupation of the property from February 2012 to and including August 2012. Justice Wein ordered Mr. Grant to pay $1,550 a month, for a total of $10,850 to Mr. Stockey by December 1, 2012. Mr. Grant was further ordered to pay ongoing rent of $1,550 per month commencing September 1, 2012 until further court order, among other things. Justice Wein also ordered Mr. Grant to pay costs in the amount of $5,000.
[18] Mr. Grant appealed from that order to the Divisional Court. The appeal was on April 8, 2014. On appeal, Mr. Grant alleged institutional bias against Justice Wein because Mr. Latimer, counsel for Mr. Stockey, serves as a deputy judge in the same judicial region where Justice Wein sits as a Superior Court judge.
[19] The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal. Speaking for the panel, Justice Lederer stated as follows in response to Mr. Grant’s claim of institutional bias with respect to Justice Wein:
[3] The argument arises because, on an earlier motion, Daley J. determined he should recuse himself from hearing this matter because he was the supervisor of Deputy Judges in the region. As we understand it, he was the supervisor of the Deputy Judge who appeared as counsel in this matter. Wein J. is not a supervisor of Deputy Judges. Daley J. went on to order the trial be heard by a judge from another region.
[4] We find that there is no institutional bias in this case. Having a shared occupation does not create such a bias. There are safeguards in place to ensure judges remain impartial. Judges are required to swear an oath of office and are required to adhere to a code that requires them to avoid conflicts of interest.
[5] When assessing a claim of bias against a judge, the reasonable person will keep in mind the “traditions of integrity and impartiality of the judiciary” and “the fact that impartiality is one of the duties that judges swear to uphold” (R. v. R.D.S., 1997 CanLII 324 (SCC), [1997] 3 S.C.R. 484 at paras. 111 and 117).
[6] Deputy Judges have a dual role. Their judicial role is part-time. They are permitted to pursue other occupations including the practice of law. In the role of lawyers, they are not accorded any special status. The decision of Daley J. that the matter be heard by a judge from another region was an exercise of discretion. It is not a precedent and not binding on this Court.
[7] We do not accept that institutional bias is inevitably raised just because a judge is from the same region as the Deputy Judge. This is supported by s. 32 of the Courts of Justice Act, which is the section by which Deputy Judges are appointed. It places no restriction on where Deputy Judges may appear as lawyers.
Order made by Justice André
[20] Mr. Grant’s motion to set aside the trial management orders made by Justice Daley on the grounds that there was a reasonable apprehension of bias held by Justice Daley when he made those trial management orders before recusing himself from hearing the trial was heard by Justice Andre. Mr. Grant relied upon Justice Daley’s own recusal of himself on April 11, 2011 as the basis to allege the reasonable apprehension of bias he attributed to Justice Daley.
[21] Justice André framed the issues on the motion before him in the following way:
Do I have the jurisdiction to set aside Daley J’s orders?
If I do, should Daley J have recused himself of hearing the motions based on a reasonable apprehension of bias?
[22] Justice André dismissed Mr. Grant’s motion for reasons released on September 8, 2014. After setting out the factual history from the evidence before him and the positions of the parties, Justice André concluded that he did not have jurisdiction to set aside Justice Daley’s orders. He noted that Mr. Grant had raised the issue of reasonable apprehension of bias in his application for judicial review to the Divisional Court, and that the Divisional Court had dismissed Mr. Grant’s application. He found that as a result, the doctrine of issue estoppel applied to Mr. Grant’s motion in the following way:
8 In my view, the doctrine of issue estoppel precludes Mr. Grant from relitigating the issue of reasonable apprehension of bias, where that issue has been dealt with by both the Divisional Court and Court of Appeal in this matter. As noted by the Supreme Court of Canada in Penner v. Niagara Regional Police Services Board, 2013 CarswellOnt 3743 (S.C.C.), at paragraph 28: "Relitigation of an issue wastes resources, makes it risky for parties to rely on the results of their prior litigation, unfairly exposes parties to additional costs, [and] raises the spectre of inconsistent adjudicative determinations..."
[23] Justice André went on to find that it was not necessary for him to decide whether there was a reasonable apprehension of bias arising from Justice Daley’s decision to “deal with the motions in this case.”
ANALYSIS
[24] Mr. Grant seeks leave to appeal Justice André’s order as an interlocutory order of a judge of the Superior Court of Justice. The grounds on which leave may be granted are set out in Rule 62.02(4) of the Rules. Counsel retained by Mr. Grant for the leave motion was clear that leave is sought specifically under Rule 62.02(4)(b). Under this rule, leave to appeal shall not be granted unless:
(b) there appears to the judge hearing the motion good reason to doubt the correctness of the order in question and the proposed appeal involves matters of such importance that, in his or her opinion, leave to appeal should be granted.
[25] The test for leave under Rule 62.02(4)(b) is an onerous one: see Apotex Inc. v. Eli Lilly and Co., 2013 CarswellOnt 1853 (Div. Ct.), at paragraph 5. The test was recently restated by Justice Molloy in Cilic v. Vivace Tavern Inc. c.o.b. as the House of Lancaster, 2015 ONSC 6169 in the following terms:
5 Under Rule 62.02(4)(b), the moving party must establish that there is reason to doubt the correctness of the order in question and that the proposed appeal involves matters of such importance that leave to appeal should be granted. It is not necessary that the judge granting leave be satisfied that the decision in question was actually wrong; that aspect of the test is satisfied if the judge granting leave is satisfied that the correctness of the order is open to "very serious debate": Nazari v. OTIP/RAEO Insurance Co., 2003 CanLII 40868 (ON SC), [2003] O.J. No. 3442 (S.C.J. per Then J.); Ash v. Lloyd's Corp. (1992), 1992 CanLII 7652 (ON SC), 8 O.R. (3d) 282 (Gen Div., per Farley J.). In addition, the moving party must demonstrate matters of importance that go beyond the interest of the immediate parties and involve questions of general or public importance relevant to the development of the law and the administration of justice: Rankin v. McLeod Young Weir Ltd. (1986), 1986 CanLII 2749 (ON SC), 57 O.R. (2d) 569 (H.C.J. per Catzman J.); Greslik v. Ontario Legal Aid Plan (1988), 1988 CanLII 4842 (ON SCDC), 65 O.R. (2d) 110 (Div. Ct.).
[26] On the first part of the test, Mr. Grant as the moving party must establish there is good reason to doubt the correctness of Justice André’s order. Justice André dismissed Mr. Grant’s motion on the basis that he had no jurisdiction to hear it because the Divisional Court had dismissed Mr. Grant’s application for judicial review in which he had raised the issue of reasonable apprehension of bias.
[27] In order for Justice André to have found that he had no jurisdiction to hear the motion on the basis of issue estoppel, it would be necessary for the Divisional Court to have determined the issues that were subsequently before Justice André. This would have required the Divisional Court to consider and to adjudicate the claim that there was a reasonable apprehension of bias on Justice Daley’s part when he made the trial management orders.
[28] Issue estoppel has three criteria. The Supreme Court of Canada in Danyluk v. Ainsworth, 2001 SCC 44, [2001] 2 S.C.R. 460 definitively set out those criteria as follows:
(a) The same question must have been decided in the earlier proceedings;
(b) The decision that is said to create the estoppel must be final; and
(c) The parties to the earlier decision must be the same as the parties to the proceedings in which the estoppel is raised.
[29] It has been held that the first criteria requiring that the same question to have been decided in the earlier proceeding must be narrowly construed. It is not sufficient that the issue was raised in an earlier proceeding, but rather that the issue must have been “fundamental to the decision arrived at” in the earlier proceedings to raise an estoppel: see Danyluk v. Ainsworth, at paragraph 24, and Nordion Inc. v. Life Technologies Inc., 2015 ONSC 99 at paragraph 33.
Good Reason to Doubt the Correctness
[30] A close reading of the endorsement made by the Divisional Court reveals three things. First, the Divisional Court observed that Mr. Grant was seeking judicial review of two interlocutory orders made by Justice Daley. Second, the Divisional Court observed that Mr. Grant had previously been refused an extension of time to seek leave to appeal those orders. Third, the Divisional Court found that it had no jurisdiction to grant judicial review of an order of a Superior Court judge sitting in that capacity.
[31] It would appear that the Divisional Court dismissed Mr. Grant’s application for judicial review on the basis that it had no jurisdiction to grant judicial review of an order made by a Superior Court judge sitting in that capacity. The first two lines are observations made by the court and do not form part of the rationale for its decision. It would further appear that the Divisional Court did not dismiss the application for judicial review after considering whether there could be found a reasonable apprehension of bias on the part of Justice Daley when he made the trial management orders. The finding of the Divisional Court was much more fundamental; it found that it had no jurisdiction to make such a ruling of a Superior Court judge “sitting in that capacity” at all. This is likely because it is the function of an appellate court to sit on appeal of an order made by a judge, and not on a judicial review.
[32] Mr. Grant’s notice of motion before by Justice Andre did not expressly set out Rule 59.06 as one of the grounds on which he relied. However, that notice of motion requested an order that the orders of Justice Daley made on December 23, 2009 and on June 29, 2010 to set aside. The motion referred to Justice Daley’s recusal as the trial judge on April 11, 2011. I reviewed the court copy of the motion record that was before Justice Andre as material I was permitted to consider under Rule 61.03 (2)(v), having regard to Rules 62.02(5) and 61.03.1(4) when read together. I note that the court copy of the notice of motion has Rule 59.06(1) (2) handwritten in as one of the grounds to be relied upon for the motion.
[33] Although Mr. Grant was self-represented and his motion materials were unfocused, it is clear to me that he brought the motion to set aside the trial management orders under Rule 59.06 of the Rules of Civil Procedure on the basis of facts discovered after a motion has been heard.
[34] However imperfectly Mr. Grant’s motion was framed, it is clear that Justice Andre did not consider or apply Rule 59.06. As a consequence, he did not consider or decide the motion under Rule 59.06. That part of the motion under Rule 59.06 seeking an order to set aside Justice Daley’s trial management orders on the basis of a reasonable apprehension of bias was based on information that became known to Mr. Grant after those orders had been made. He was not seeking to re-litigate the question of jurisdiction on which the Divisional Court had dismissed his application for judicial review.
[35] On a motion under Rule 59.06(2)(a), the party who seeks to set an order aside must provide evidence of a fact arising or discovered after the order was made. The test under Rule 59.06(2) involves two considerations for the court:
a) First, whether the evidence could not have been discovered prior to the original hearing by the exercise of reasonable diligence; and
b) Second, the evidence might probably have altered the judgment, would probably have changed the result, or would have affected or altered the ultimate decision: Wong v. Adler, [2004] O.J. 3385 (Ontario Master).
[36] It is clear from the evidence that Justice Daley on his own initiative disclosed his administrative duties as the supervising judge of deputy small claims judges in Central West Region and the prospect of a reasonable apprehension of bias out of an abundance of fairness, candor and caution when he recused himself from hearing the trial on April 11, 2011. He may have recused himself because a trial of the issues will require hearing viva voce evidence from witnesses about the reasons the sale did not close under the minutes of settlement, which could include the lawyers involved. This is a very different exercise than counsel arguing a motions or an application on affidavit material. However, it is a fact that Justice Daley made that disclosure and recused himself on April 11, 2010 after making the orders in December 2009 and June 2010.
[37] Whether that information could have been discovered by Mr. Grant or his counsel prior to the making of those orders and whether Justice Daley’s role as the supervising judge of deputy small claims judges and knowledge that Mr. Latimer is a deputy small claims judge would have constituted facts within the meaning of Rule 59.06(2)(a) is one question. Whether knowledge of those offices held by each of Justice Daley and Mr. Latimer might probably have altered the judgment, or probably have changed the result or would have affected or altered the ultimate decision to satisfy the second part of the test under Wong v. Adler is another.
[38] It is unfortunate that Justice Andre dismissed Mr. Grant’s motion without deciding that part of the motion brought under Rule 59.06. It is settled law that an appeal lies from an order, and not for the reasons for making the order: White v. 123627 Canada Inc. 2014 CarswellOnt 6976 and Canadian Express Ltd. v. Blair (1991), 1991 CanLII 7172 (ON SC), 6 O.R.(3d) 212 (Div. Ct.). Mr. Grant has a reasonable basis to challenge Justice Andre’s order because the ground on which the motion was dismissed was not applicable, and Rule 59.06 as the alternate ground for the motion was not considered. Accordingly, there is good reason to doubt the correctness of Justice Andre’s order.
Matters of Importance for Justify Leave
[39] The test for leave to appeal must satisfy not only the first part of the test, but also the second part of the test that the matter for which leave to appeal is requested is of such importance that leave to appeal should be granted. In Kassian Estate v. Canada (Attorney General), 2013 ONSC 892, the second part of the test was met where it was found the issue under appeal transcended the interests of the immediate parties, and dealt with issues of broader significance. It has further been held that matters that deal with the administration of justice or the development of the law are more likely to be matters of such importance to justify the granting of leave to appeal.
[40] On this particular motion, those matters include a consideration of whether the failure of Justice André to determine whether there were grounds to set aside the trial management orders made by Justice Daley under Rule 59.06 for any alleged reasonable apprehension of bias is a matter of importance that goes beyond the interests of Mr. Stockey or the Grants. This would include a consideration of whether those matters involve questions of general or public importance relevant to the development of the law and the administration of justice.
[41] Mr. Grant concedes that there is no evidence of actual bias shown by Justice Daley when he made his orders in 2009 and 2010. The motion materials certainly contain no evidence of bias, real or apprehended. Mr. Grant further concedes that he has made no reference to any authority that stands for the proposition that where a judge recuses himself to avoid a reasonable apprehension of bias, there is automatically a presumption or appearance of a reasonable apprehension of bias with respect to earlier decisions made by that judge.
[42] The question on this motion does not involve an actual or imputed reasonable apprehension of bias on the part of Justice Daley. The appeal here raises the question of whether an institutional bias arises on the circumstances in this case.
[43] I recognize that the Divisional Court dismissed Mr. Grant’s appeal of the order made by Justice Wein, finding that there is no institutional bias where a justice of this court in Central West Region sits on a motion where counsel for one of the parties serves as a deputy small claims judge. However, that conclusion is not a complete answer to the current question. Justice Daley was the administrative judge for deputy judges in the Region at the time, and Justice Wein was not. Therefore, no legal authority I know of addresses the question of whether an institutional bias in a proceeding arises simply by virtue of the other duties performed on separate occasions by each the judge who made trial management orders in an action and the lawyer who happens to represent one of the parties.
[44] Justice must not only be done, but must be seen to be done. This is clearly an access to justice case, where Mr. Grant seeks a review of Justice Daley’s orders made in 2009 and 2010 by a court with no basis for Mr. Grant to have a reasonable apprehension of bias against him, institutional or otherwise. In my view, this raises an issue that goes beyond the interests of the immediate parties and involves a question of general importance relevant to the administration of justice.
[45] I find that the second part of the test under Rule 62.02(4)(b) has been met.
CONCLUSION
[46] Regrettably, I consider myself to have no jurisdiction to decide the outstanding issues raised on the motion before Justice Andre under Rule 59.06. Mr. Wiffen made it clear in his submissions that the motion before me did not include a request for relief under Rule 59.06. I have only jurisdiction to decide whether leave to appeal should be granted. However, if I grant leave to appeal, the Divisional Court who hears the appeal has the power to make the order that could have been made by Justice Andre as the motions judge under Section 134(1)(a) or (c) of the Courts of Justice Act.
[47] Leave to appeal the order of Justice André dated September 8, 2014 is therefore granted. Mr. Latimer argued on behalf of Mr. Stockey that Mr. Grant has not complied with the order made by Justice Wein with respect to making certain payments required by the order. As there was no motion before me seeking relief for the non-compliance alleged, I have no jurisdiction to deny Mr. Grant the relief he seeks for that reason. There was also an argument made by Mr. Stockey that the court should dismiss Mr. Grant’s motion to set aside the trial management orders for his delay in bringing the motion under Rule 59.06. A request for relief in either respect may be something that the Divisional Court can deal with under section 134 (1) when the appeal is heard.
[48] Under all of the circumstances, I consider it reasonable and just to reserve the costs of this motion to the panel of the Divisional Court hearing the appeal.
Emery J
DATE: December 9, 2015
COURT FILE NO.: 390/08 (Orangeville)
DATE: 2015 12 09
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE - ONTARIO
RE: ROBERT STOCKEY
and
GARY GRANT and
DIANA KOPP GRANT
BEFORE: EMERY J.
COUNSEL: Ian K. Latimer, for the Plaintiff
Mark Wiffen, agent for the defendants, Gary Grant and Diana Kopp Grant
ENDORSEMENT
EMERY J
DATE: December 9, 2015