Mark Abradjian

The defendant moved to set aside an ex parte Mareva injunction that had frozen his assets pending trial.

The court held that the plaintiff failed to make full and frank disclosure of material facts when obtaining the injunction, including the existence of a prior written settlement agreement that could be dispositive of the claim and other misleading statements regarding the defendant’s financial circumstances.

Applying the principles governing Mareva injunctions and Rule 39.01(6) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the court found the nondisclosure sufficient to rescind the order.

The court also declined to grant a fresh injunction, finding the plaintiff had not established a prima facie case or a genuine risk of dissipation of assets.

The defendant’s motion was granted and the plaintiff’s motion to continue the injunction was dismissed.

The appellant appealed a decision interpreting a varied trust deed.

The trust had been converted into a percentage trust (unitrust) to allow the trustee to invest for maximum returns.

Due to market downturns, the trustee had to sell capital assets to meet the mandatory minimum percentage distributions to the income beneficiaries, depleting the trust's capital.

The application judge found that the trust deed's terms made the percentage payments mandatory and ousted the trustee's duty to maintain an even hand between income and capital beneficiaries regarding distributions.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the application judge correctly interpreted the trust deed based on its clear language and the surrounding factual matrix, including the prior court approval and tax rulings.

The testator left a life interest in the residue of his estate to his wife, directing that upon her death, the residue be divided equally between his son and daughter, 'per stirpes'.

The son predeceased the life tenant, leaving his estate to his second wife.

The application judge held that the phrase 'per stirpes' indicated an intention to benefit the son's children, rather than his estate or the surviving daughter.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that while a gift to named children 'per stirpes' can be contradictory, in this context it conveyed the testator's intention to benefit his children's children if either child predeceased the life tenant.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of her application for declaratory and injunctive relief regarding alleged zoning and sign by-law infractions by the respondents' moving business.

The respondents operated their business from a property zoned for agricultural use, claiming it was a permitted 'home occupation'.

The Court of Appeal upheld the application judge's finding that the business activities, which were largely conducted off-site, did not contravene the zoning by-law.

The court also found no sign by-law infraction, as the municipality had granted exceptions.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment regarding a dispute over a share of winnings.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge's factual conclusions, particularly regarding a conversation at a restaurant, were supported by the evidence and based on unassailable credibility findings.

Costs of $10,000 were awarded to the respondent.

The appellants appealed a decision regarding the validity of a Township fence bylaw, arguing it conflicted with the Region's zoning bylaw and therefore could not restrain the height of their fence.

The Court of Appeal found no conflict, noting the lands were zoned 'lakeshore' rather than 'residential', and the zoning bylaw's provisions on accessory uses explicitly excluded boundary fences.

The appeal was dismissed with costs awarded to the respondents.

The appellants appealed a summary judgment order granting possession of their property to the respondent.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no merit in the appellants' arguments regarding corroborating evidence and equitable estoppel, and upheld the motion judge's reasons.

The appellant husband appealed a decision dismissing his application to reduce spousal support following his early retirement.

The husband argued the applications judge failed to apply the rule against double-dipping from Boston v. Boston and misapprehended the evidence regarding his income.

The Court of Appeal found that while the rule against double-dipping did not apply because the support was largely based on need, the applications judge did misapprehend the evidence regarding the husband's post-retirement income and expenses.

The appeal was allowed, and spousal support was reduced from $1,800 to $1,200 per month, indexed to the cost of living.