Malcolm N. Ruby

The appellants appealed a decision refusing to set aside a noting in default and enforcing a U.S. District Court judgment.

They argued there was a failure of natural justice because the self-represented appellant was not permitted to read her prepared submissions.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the motion judge merely assisted in focusing submissions and committed no error in principle in refusing to set aside the default.

The court ordered a stay of execution pending the final resolution of the appellants' appeals in the United States.

The appellant, the Federal Trade Commission, appealed a judgment finding it was properly served with a notice of application under the State Immunity Act.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding no evidence capable of supporting the conclusion that the appellant was an 'agency of a foreign state' under section 2 of the Act.

Furthermore, even if service had been proper, the respondents obtained judgment before the mandatory sixty-day period under section 10 of the Act had expired.

The judgment was set aside.

The United States of America and the Federal Trade Commission appealed a decision setting aside an ex parte Mareva injunction and Anton Piller order against the respondents, who operated a telemarketing scheme selling Canadian lottery tickets to U.S. residents.

The appellants alleged the respondents engaged in fraudulent misrepresentation by demanding up-front fees.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the motions judge's conclusions that the appellants failed to establish a strong prima facie case of common law fraud or a real risk of asset dissipation.

The appellant leased truck trailers to a company that subsequently went bankrupt.

A priority dispute arose between the appellant and the bankrupt's secured creditor over the trailers.

The trailers were used in multiple jurisdictions but the debtor was located in Alberta.

The Court of Appeal held that although the lease was a 'true lease' not requiring registration under the Ontario PPSA, the choice of law provisions in s. 7(1) of the Ontario PPSA still applied.

Consequently, Alberta law governed the dispute.

Under the Alberta PPSA, the lease was deemed a security interest requiring registration, and because the appellant registered against the wrong entity, its interest was subordinate to the secured creditor's perfected security interest.

The appeal was dismissed.

The moving parties brought motions to quash an appeal from an order that dissolved two earlier orders.

The responding parties argued that the order was a final determination on the issue of standing, making it appealable as of right to the Court of Appeal.

The majority of the Court of Appeal held that the order was interlocutory, as it did not finally dispose of the issue of standing, and granted the motions to quash the appeal.

Borins J.A. dissented, finding the order final as it disposed of the plaintiffs' claim for interlocutory injunctive relief.

The appellant appealed a decision refusing to certify an action against an investment advisor for negligence, misrepresentation, fraud, and conspiracy as a class proceeding.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding that the motions judge made no error in principle and correctly concluded that a class action was not the preferable procedure due to the individual issues of detrimental reliance.

The appellants appealed an order of the motion judge.

The respondent brought a motion to quash the appeal.

The Court of Appeal granted the motion to quash, finding that the same constitutional issue had already been decided in respect of a closely connected defendant in the same proceeding.

The court also noted that the trial was imminent, several plaintiffs were critically ill, and the defendants had engaged in a proliferation of proceedings resulting in unacceptable delay.

The plaintiff, an Ontario resident, was injured in a motor vehicle accident in Alberta involving Alberta residents.

He returned to Ontario, where he received medical treatment and suffered ongoing damages.

He sued the defendants in Ontario, serving them outside the jurisdiction under Rule 17.02(h).

The defendants moved to stay the action, arguing the rule was ultra vires and that Ontario lacked jurisdiction or was forum non conveniens.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that Rule 17.02(h) is procedural and constitutional.

The court established an eight-factor test for determining whether a real and substantial connection exists to assume jurisdiction over out-of-province defendants, concluding that jurisdiction was properly assumed and Ontario was the appropriate forum.

The respondent was convicted of second degree murder after an accomplice shot and killed a victim they had kidnapped for ransom.

The trial judge instructed the jury on constructive murder under s. 213(a) of the Criminal Code.

The Court of Appeal struck down s. 213(a) based on R. v. Vaillancourt and ordered a new trial.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the Crown's appeal, holding that s. 213(a) violates ss. 7 and 11(d) of the Charter and is not saved by s. 1, for the reasons given in R. v. Martineau.

The Court also declined to apply the curative proviso, as a properly instructed jury would not necessarily have convicted the respondent.