Major

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal from the British Columbia Court of Appeal, adopting the dissenting reasons of Cumming J.A. The Court set aside the Court of Appeal's judgment and restored the trial judge's order staying the court action in favour of arbitration.

The appellant was awarded costs in both courts.

The accused was charged with robbing a convenience store.

The only evidence identifying the accused as the robber was a security camera videotape, as the store clerk could not positively identify him.

The trial judge convicted the accused based solely on her own comparison of the videotape and the accused in court.

The Court of Appeal quashed the conviction, finding it unreasonable without corroborating testimony.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the Crown's appeal and restored the conviction, holding that a trier of fact may identify an accused based solely on clear and convincing videotape evidence without the need for corroborating witness testimony.

The appellant appealed his conviction for several sexual offences to the Supreme Court of Canada as of right, and brought a motion to adduce fresh evidence.

The Supreme Court dismissed the motion to adduce fresh evidence and dismissed the appeal.

The Court endorsed the lower court's remarks regarding the impropriety of the Crown's conduct in the proceedings.

The appellant appealed as of right from a decision of the British Columbia Court of Appeal, which allowed the Crown's appeal from a stay of proceedings and ordered a new trial.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, agreeing that this was not one of the clearest cases warranting a stay.

The Court of Appeal was justified in reversing the trial judge's exercise of discretion because the trial judge failed to consider the appellant's lack of timely objection to non-disclosure and erred in finding a stay was the only appropriate remedy.

Criminal appeals from an order setting aside directed acquittals and directing a new trial on charges including conspiracy to obstruct justice, obstruction of justice, and corruptly accepting money.

A key prosecution witness testified at the preliminary inquiry, later recanted significant portions of her evidence, and then married one appellant before trial, rendering her incompetent for the Crown under the common law spousal incompetency rule preserved by s. 4 of the Canada Evidence Act.

The Court held that the common law rule should not be modified on these facts and that s. 715 of the Criminal Code did not authorize admission of the preliminary inquiry transcript.

However, the majority held that the former testimony was admissible at common law under the principled hearsay exception because necessity and threshold reliability were established, and the resulting unfairness or prejudice did not outweigh its probative value.

The appeals were dismissed and the new trial order was affirmed.

The appellants challenged judgments that had found constitutional defects in the institutional structure of a liquor licensing tribunal after it revoked the respondent's liquor permits for disturbance of public tranquility.

The majority held that the permit cancellation process was quasi-judicial and attracted the protections of s. 23 of Quebec's Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms, but concluded the defect lay in the tribunal's operations rather than in the enabling legislation itself.

The court found a reasonable apprehension of institutional bias because the tribunal's lawyers and directors could participate at multiple stages from investigation and file preparation to advocacy and adjudication without sufficient separation of functions.

Although the tribunal's security of tenure and institutional independence were adequate, its failure to ensure impartiality required the impugned revocation decision to be quashed.

The appeal was allowed only to the extent that no statutory invalidity declaration was necessary, while the respondent retained the remedy setting aside the tribunal's decision.

The appellant was convicted of sexually assaulting a two-and-a-half-year-old child.

At trial, the Crown did not call the child to testify, but instead introduced out-of-court statements made by the child to others.

The trial judge admitted the statements without conducting a formal inquiry into whether it was necessary to rely on hearsay rather than calling the child.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that while the trial judge erred in failing to make a formal finding of necessity, the error did not result in a miscarriage of justice.

The uncontradicted expert evidence established that the child would have been traumatized by testifying and lacked testimonial competence, meaning a trial judge would inevitably have found the necessity requirement met.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant father and the mother separated, and the mother agreed that the child would live with the father.

Years later, the mother obtained an ex parte interim access order.

The father then left the jurisdiction with the child.

He was charged with child abduction under s. 283(1) of the Criminal Code.

The trial judge acquitted him, finding he had not 'taken' the child since the child was legally in his care.

The Court of Appeal overturned the acquittal and ordered a new trial.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the father's appeal, holding that s. 283(1) does not require the deprived parent to have actual physical possession of the child at the time of the offence, and that the offence can be committed by a parent with lawful care of the child.

Parents who, for religious reasons, sent their children to private Jewish and Christian schools challenged Ontario’s refusal to fund those schools and to extend school health support services to students attending them.

The appeal raised Charter claims under ss. 2(a) and 15(1), together with the constitutional significance of s. 93 of the Constitution Act, 1867 and s. 29 of the Charter.

The majority held that the non-funding of dissentient religious schools did not violate the appellants’ Charter rights, emphasizing the constitutional structure governing denominational school rights and the absence of any positive entitlement to state support for religious education.

The majority also held that the School Health Support Services Program was properly characterized as an education service linked to the public system and therefore did not infringe the Charter.

The appeal was dismissed, with partial dissents on the equality and school health support issues.

The appellant was acquitted of manslaughter at trial, but the Alberta Court of Appeal allowed the Crown's appeal and ordered a new trial.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appellant's appeal and restored the acquittal, holding that the appellant's s. 10(b) Charter rights were violated.

The Court found that the appellant should have been rewarned of his right to counsel when there was a substantial change in his jeopardy, which occurred when the police officer concluded he had committed the offence and advised him accordingly.

The appellant municipality appealed a decision finding it liable for negligence in failing to enforce a building by-law.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, agreeing with the trial judge that the municipality owed no duty of care to the respondent in the circumstances of the case.

The Court of Appeal's judgment was reversed and the trial judgment dismissing the action was restored.

The Crown appealed a decision of the Ontario Court of Appeal which had allowed the accused's appeal from convictions for dangerous driving, impaired driving, and driving while disqualified, and ordered a new trial.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the Crown's appeal, agreeing with the dissenting reasons of Doherty J.A. at the Court of Appeal.

The Court found that the trial judge did not prejudge the credibility of a witness, the accused was not prevented from making full answer and defence, and the Crown's cross-examination did not exceed permissible limits.

The trial judgment was restored.

The appellant appealed his conviction for conspiracy to traffic in narcotics, arguing that the trial judge erred in refusing to allow a Charter application and denied him the right to make full answer and defence.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal for the reasons given by the court below.

The respondents were issued speeding tickets under the New Brunswick Motor Vehicle Act.

They failed to pay the fines and did not appear in court, resulting in convictions without a trial pursuant to s. 16 of the Provincial Offences Procedure Act.

The respondents challenged the constitutionality of s. 16, arguing it infringed their right to be presumed innocent and to a fair hearing under s. 11(d) of the Charter.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that s. 16 does not infringe s. 11(d), as the regulatory scheme provides sufficient safeguards and notice such that an accused's failure to act constitutes a valid waiver of their s. 11(d) rights.

The appellant broadcaster challenged an order made by a trial judge under s. 486(1) of the Criminal Code excluding the public and media from part of the sentencing proceedings of an accused who pleaded guilty to sexual offences.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that while s. 486(1) infringes the freedom of the press guaranteed by s. 2(b) of the Charter, it is saved under s. 1 as a reasonable limit to protect the proper administration of justice.

However, the Court found that the trial judge erred in exercising his discretion to exclude the public in this specific case, as there was insufficient evidence to support a concern for undue hardship to the victims or the accused.

The appeal was allowed and the exclusion order was quashed.

The appellant suffered back injuries in two successive motor vehicle accidents.

While recovering, he experienced a disc herniation during a mild stretching exercise.

The trial judge found the accidents contributed 25% to the herniation and awarded 25% of the global damages, which the Court of Appeal upheld.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, holding that apportionment between tortious and non-tortious causes is contrary to tort principles.

Because the accidents materially contributed to the indivisible injury, the defendants were fully liable for the entire loss under the thin skull rule.

The appellant bank loaned money to the respondent's wife, secured by a mortgage and guaranteed by the respondent.

When the mortgage matured, the bank and the mortgagor renewed it at a higher interest rate without notice to the respondent.

The mortgagor defaulted, and the bank obtained summary judgment against both.

The Court of Appeal set aside the judgment against the respondent, finding he was released from the guarantee.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the bank's appeal, holding that the renewal agreement constituted a material alteration of the principal contract without the surety's consent, thereby discharging the guarantor.

The appellant employer provided an income replacement insurance policy that terminated benefits for mentally disabled employees after two years unless they were institutionalized, while physically disabled employees received benefits until age 65 regardless of institutionalization.

The respondent, who became mentally disabled, filed a human rights complaint alleging discrimination.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the insurance plan discriminated on the basis of mental disability contrary to s. 16(1) of the Saskatchewan Human Rights Code, as the true purpose of the plan was to insure against the income-related consequences of disability generally, making the distinction between mental and physical disabilities discriminatory.

The appellant, a beneficial owner of common voting shares of the respondent bank, submitted proposals for inclusion in a management proxy circular.

The bank declined to include the proposals because the appellant was not a registered shareholder.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that under s. 143(1) of the Bank Act, only a 'shareholder entitled to vote' may submit a proposal, and under s. 93(1), the bank may treat the registered owner as the person exclusively entitled to vote.

Therefore, a beneficial shareholder cannot submit a shareholder's proposal.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing that late Crown disclosure prejudiced his right to make full answer and defence, and that the trial judge erred in admitting a prior inconsistent statement for its substantive use under a K.G.B. application.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, finding no prejudice from the late disclosure.

The Court also held that a witness's failure of memory, which prevents complete cross-examination, is a factor going to the weight of the prior inconsistent statement rather than its admissibility.