Mahmud Jamal

The appellant, Dell, sold computers online and mistakenly posted incorrect low prices.

The respondent consumer ordered a computer at the incorrect price using a deep link.

When Dell refused to honour the order, the consumer sought to institute a class action.

Dell applied to refer the claim to arbitration based on a clause in its terms and conditions.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the arbitration clause was valid and not an external clause, as it was reasonably accessible via hyperlink.

The Court also held that under the competence-competence principle, the arbitrator should rule first on their own jurisdiction, and that the arbitration clause did not contain a foreign element that would trigger the application of the rules on the international jurisdiction of Quebec authorities.

The appeal was allowed and the matter referred to arbitration.

The Minister of Finance appealed a decision of the Court of Appeal for Ontario which held that the definition of 'hedging' in the Mining Tax Act was restricted to contracts settled by physical delivery of gold from an Ontario mine.

The respondent, a mining company, had realized significant gains from financial hedging transactions that did not result in physical delivery, and excluded these gains from its profit computation based on the Minister's former administrative practice.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, holding that the statutory definition of 'hedging' extends to transactions that do not result in physical delivery.

The Court applied the modern approach to statutory interpretation, finding that the narrower interpretation would render parts of the statutory definition redundant.

Following the plaintiff's successful appeal to certify an environmental claim as a class proceeding, the court determined the appropriate costs awards for the certification motion, the Divisional Court appeal, and the Court of Appeal.

The court held that the plaintiff was entitled to costs for all stages, imputing success at the certification motion stage despite the plaintiff having substantially narrowed the claim on appeal.

Recognizing the public interest nature of the environmental class action under s. 31(1) of the Class Proceedings Act, the court awarded the plaintiff $90,000 for the motion, $65,000 for the Divisional Court appeal, and $50,000 for the Court of Appeal.

The appellant sought to certify a class proceeding against the respondent for environmental contamination caused by a nickel refinery in Port Colborne.

The motion judge and Divisional Court dismissed the certification motion.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and certified the action.

The Court found that the appellant's narrowed claim for property devaluation met all certification requirements under the Class Proceedings Act, 1992, including identifiable class, common issues, preferable procedure, and representative plaintiff.

The appellant sought to certify a class proceeding against Inco Limited for environmental contamination in Port Colborne, alleging that nickel oxide emissions caused a decline in property values following a 2000 Ministry of the Environment announcement.

The motion judge and Divisional Court refused certification, finding the class arbitrary and individual issues overwhelming.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and certified the action, holding that the narrowed claim focusing solely on property devaluation met all certification requirements under the Class Proceedings Act, including identifiable class, common issues, preferable procedure, and suitable representative plaintiff.

The appellant gold mining company engaged in financial hedging transactions to protect against fluctuations in the spot price of gold.

The Minister of Finance assessed the net gains from these transactions as taxable 'proceeds' under the Mining Tax Act.

The trial judge upheld the assessment, finding a sufficient nexus between the transactions and the mine's output.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the statutory definition of 'hedging' is clear and unambiguous, requiring the fixing of a price for the actual output of a mine before delivery.

Since the appellant sold all its gold at spot prices and did not deliver any gold pursuant to the hedging contracts, the gains were not taxable under the Act.

The Municipal Property Assessment Corporation (MPAC) sought judicial review of an order by the Assistant Information and Privacy Commissioner requiring it to disclose an electronic database containing the personal information of over 10 million Ontario residents to a collection agency.

The Commissioner had found that disclosure was expressly authorized by the Assessment Act, relying on previous case law regarding municipal election records.

The Divisional Court quashed the Commissioner's decision, finding that the Assessment Act did not expressly authorize disclosure of the electronic records and that the Commissioner failed to properly consider the differing statutory contexts and privacy interests.

The Court also held that MPAC was entitled to refuse disclosure under the Municipal Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act because the information was already available to the public in paper form.

A recreation instructor was convicted of sexually assaulting a boy under his supervision and was subsequently dismissed by the City of Toronto.

The union grieved the dismissal, and the arbitrator allowed the relitigation of the sexual assault allegations, ultimately finding the employee was dismissed without just cause.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the arbitrator's decision to allow relitigation of the criminal conviction was an abuse of process.

The Court ruled that the criminal conviction must stand with all its legal effects, and the arbitrator's failure to give it full effect rendered the decision patently unreasonable.

The appellant gas company appealed a declaration that the respondent municipality's right to purchase the gas distribution system arose upon the expiry of the 20-year term of their franchise agreement.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the franchise agreement explicitly made the municipality's right to purchase subject to section 10 of the Municipal Franchises Act.

Under section 10, the Ontario Energy Board has the power to renew or extend the franchise.

Therefore, the franchise does not terminate, and the municipality's right to purchase does not arise, if the Board orders an extension.

The City of Kingston moved for leave to intervene in an appeal between the City of Sudbury and Union Gas Limited regarding the interpretation of a franchise agreement and the jurisdiction of the Ontario Energy Board under s. 10 of the Municipal Franchises Act.

Kingston argued there was a common question of law with its own pending appeal involving Union Gas.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the factual and legal contexts of the two proceedings were significantly different and that the disadvantages of permitting the intervention outweighed the advantages.

The appellant municipality sought to enforce Ontario's building code and development charge regime against a massive redevelopment project at a federally owned international airport operated under long-term leases.

The court held that the entire redevelopment, including terminals, runways, utilities, and air navigation facilities, fell within Parliament's exclusive jurisdiction over aeronautics and also formed part of a federal undertaking, such that provincial laws directly regulating building design, permits, and development charges were constitutionally inapplicable under interjurisdictional immunity.

The court further held that provincial land and property development legislation could not apply to the federal Crown's continuing property interest in leased airport lands.

Ancillary claims based on the ground lease, common law compensation, and refusal of fire services were rejected, with the municipality directed to pursue the statutory grant-in-lieu regime instead.

The appellant appealed an order striking part of its statement of claim that sought a declaration that the respondent airport authority lacked jurisdiction to impose fees and charges on airport users.

The court held it was unnecessary to resolve the pleaded delegation and Crown-operation issues because the respondent's authority arose from its leasehold interest and corporate capacity, as recognized by the applicable federal legislation and regulations.

The court further held Parliament did not intend to create a complete code restricting airport user charges to those set by ministerial regulation.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The appellants appealed a decision of the Federal Court of Appeal which had found that section 231.4 of the Income Tax Act infringed sections 7 and 8 of the Charter.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, adopting the dissenting reasons of Strayer J.A. in the court below.

The Court held that section 231.4 does not restrict the rights guaranteed by section 7 or section 8 of the Charter, and restored the trial judgment dismissing the constitutional challenge.