Lynne C. Leitch

The applicant sought a one-half interest in the respondent's pension from the start of their cohabitation in 1991, arguing unjust enrichment and a joint family venture.

The respondent contended the applicant was only entitled to a share accumulated during their marriage (2012-2014).

The court found no unjust enrichment or joint family venture prior to marriage, noting separate finances, the respondent's self-funded education, and the applicant's limited contributions to household and childcare responsibilities after becoming unemployed.

The applicant's claim for a pre-marital pension share was dismissed, but he was awarded a lump sum representing half the pension value accumulated during the marriage.

The appellant appealed a motions judge's finding that the parties had reached a binding settlement agreement.

The appellant argued there was no consensus on the specific terms of a release.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the record established agreement on the essential terms, including the payment amount, confidentiality, and a without-costs dismissal.

The court found no error in the conclusion that the specific language of the release was not an essential term of the settlement.

The plaintiffs sought leave under s. 12 of the Evidence Act to call four additional expert witnesses (three occupational therapists and one life care planner) in a personal injury action, beyond the three medical experts and one accountant already intended.

The defendants opposed, arguing duplication and unnecessary expense.

The court granted leave for two of the four additional experts: Ms. Schmidt (occupational therapist) and Mr. Smit (life care planner), but limited Mr. Smit's evidence to costs.

The court denied leave for Mr. Campbell and Mr. Tyrer, finding their evidence duplicative as both were occupational therapists and vocational assessors co-authoring reports on employability.

The plaintiff in a class action regarding alleged over-recovery of fuel surcharges by the defendant railway company brought a motion for documentary production and to compel answers to questions refused on cross-examination.

The defendant had brought a motion for summary judgment based on narrow legal grounds, arguing that the Canada Transportation Act is a complete code and that the claims are statute-barred or disclose no cause of action.

The court dismissed the plaintiff's motions, finding that the requested production and answers related to the factual issue of over-recovery, which was irrelevant to the purely legal issues raised in the defendant's summary judgment motion.

The court also accepted the defendant's evidence that the specific data requested by the plaintiff did not exist and would require complex, arbitrary allocation to create.

The Licensed Insolvency Trustee brought a motion to approve a proposal made by the bankrupt, a real estate holding company whose primary assets were 62 unserviced residential lots.

An opposing creditor argued the proposal was not properly authorized by the corporation, failed to meet statutory requirements under the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, and was unreasonable as it primarily benefited the other shareholders.

The court found that the proposal was authorized in substance, did not violate statutory priority or conduct rules, and was reasonable as it forecasted a significantly higher return to creditors than a liquidation in bankruptcy.

The proposal was approved and a confidential valuation supplement was ordered sealed.

The moving party sought leave to appeal a Small Claims Court costs order to the Divisional Court.

The underlying matter involved three small claims actions tried together.

The moving party argued the Deputy Judge erred in applying the 15 percent limit on costs under section 29 of the Courts of Justice Act and in awarding costs against him on a claim that was struck.

The court validated service of the motion on the respondent's paralegal and granted leave to appeal, finding strong grounds that the Deputy Judge may have erred in principle regarding the statutory costs limit and the awarding of costs on the struck claim.

The applicant, a health science company, sought a declaration that it owned a family of patent applications filed by the respondents relating to a 'Device-Less Invention' for cellular transplantation.

The applicant argued the invention was a modification of its own technology and was developed using confidential information obtained by the respondent doctor during a consulting agreement.

The respondents brought a motion to stay the application based on a forum selection clause in a separate clinical trial agreement, which the court dismissed after finding the consulting agreement governed the dispute.

On the merits, the court dismissed the application, finding that the respondent doctor had independently conceived and demonstrated the utility of the invention years before entering into the consulting agreement with the applicant.

The applicant brought a motion to remove his brother, the respondent, as the attorney for property and personal care for their mother, and to compel the return of over $439,000 transferred to the respondent by their parents.

The applicant also sought to strike the respondent's affidavit for failing to answer undertakings.

The court declined to strike the affidavit as the respondent's counsel took responsibility for the delay.

Applying the test for removal of a power of attorney, the court found evidence of financial misconduct but could not conclude on the motion record that removing the respondent was in the mother's best interests.

The court also found that the presumption of resulting trust applied to the inter vivos transfers, but directed a trial to determine whether the transfers were gifts and whether the power of attorney should be terminated.

The applicants were charged with possession of marijuana for the purpose of trafficking and brought an application for a stay of proceedings, alleging their right to be tried within a reasonable time under s. 11(b) of the Charter was infringed.

The total delay from the swearing of the information to the anticipated end of trial was approximately 42 months.

Applying the framework from R. v. Jordan, the court deducted defence delay but found the net delay still exceeded the 30-month presumptive ceiling for superior courts.

The court rejected the Crown's arguments that defence certiorari applications constituted discrete exceptional events and found no transitional exceptional circumstances justified the delay.

The applications were allowed and a stay of proceedings was granted.

The plaintiffs brought a medical malpractice action against the defendants after their newborn son developed kernicterus and suffered severe brain damage due to untreated hyperbilirubinemia.

The action against the physicians was settled, and the trial proceeded against the hospital and the nurse who cared for the infant overnight.

The court found that the nurse breached the standard of care by failing to report her observation of the infant's jaundice to a physician.

Applying a robust and pragmatic approach to causation, the court concluded that but for the nurse's negligence, a physician would have ordered a bilirubin test and initiated phototherapy in time to prevent the infant's injuries.

The hospital was held vicariously liable.

The defendants brought motions for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiff's negligent misrepresentation claim arising from a real estate appraisal.

The plaintiff had relied on the appraisal to advance a second mortgage, but later discovered the property was worth significantly less.

The court granted the summary judgment motions, finding that the plaintiff's claim was statute-barred under the Limitations Act, 2002, as he knew or ought to have known he had suffered a loss more than two years before commencing the action.

The plaintiffs brought a medical malpractice and wrongful birth claim against a radiologist and an obstetrician.

The radiologist performed a second-trimester ultrasound that revealed fetal anomalies but failed to communicate the findings urgently.

The obstetrician failed to review the ultrasound report in a timely manner and did not expedite follow-up or refer the patient to a fetal medicine clinic before 24 weeks' gestation.

The court found both doctors breached the standard of care.

Applying the modified objective test, the court concluded that but for the negligence, the plaintiffs would have elected to terminate the pregnancy in Ontario before 24 weeks.

The defendants were found liable.

The plaintiff sought costs for three contested motions in a class action regarding a listeria outbreak: a motion for leave, a certification motion, and a summary judgment motion.

The defendants argued for no costs or a reduced award, citing divided success and the novelty of the legal issues.

The court found the plaintiff was the successful party overall and that the issues were not novel.

The court awarded the plaintiff costs of $10,000 for the leave motion, $120,000 for the certification motion, and $20,000 for the summary judgment motion, plus disbursements and HST.

The defendant Amy L. Patterson moved for summary judgment to dismiss the action and cross-claim against her following a motor vehicle accident.

The plaintiff took no position.

The court granted leave for the motion, finding no genuine issue requiring a trial regarding Ms. Patterson's liability.

The evidence indicated that Ms. Patterson, who had the right of way, could not have avoided the collision, which occurred too quickly.

The motion was granted, dismissing the action and cross-claim against Ms. Patterson, and costs were awarded to her.

The defendants sought leave to appeal a class action certification decision concerning alleged price-fixing of colour display tubes.

The motion for leave to appeal raised three main issues: whether an unlawful means conspiracy claim could be based on the Competition Act, whether "umbrella purchasers" had a viable cause of action, and whether the methodology for establishing class-wide harm met the "credible and plausible" standard.

The court granted leave to appeal on the issue of umbrella purchasers due to conflicting jurisprudence and concerns about indeterminate liability, but denied leave on the other two issues, finding the certification judge applied the correct test for common issues and that the Competition Act is not a complete code precluding common law claims.

The plaintiff sought leave to appeal a motion judge's order denying an amendment to the class definition to include all downstream purchasers of LCD panels and products.

The court found no good reason to doubt the correctness of the motion judge's decision, noting that the motion judge properly exercised discretion under the Class Proceedings Act and correctly characterized the plaintiff's attempt to re-litigate a previously settled issue as an abuse of process.

Leave to appeal was denied.

The appellant appealed an order confirming a worldwide Mareva injunction against him, arguing that an Ontario court cannot grant such an injunction when the defendant has no assets in the jurisdiction.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the court's in personam jurisdiction allows it to grant a Mareva injunction even if the defendant has no assets in Ontario, provided it is just and convenient.

The court also upheld the motion judge's discretionary decision to accept an undertaking as to damages from a foreign corporate non-party.

During a medical malpractice trial involving a newborn who developed kernicterus from untreated jaundice, the plaintiffs sought to qualify a registered nurse as an expert in perinatal nursing.

The defendants objected, arguing she lacked specific recent experience in tertiary hospital nurseries and was a 'roaming expert.' The court applied the Mohan and White Burgess frameworks, finding the proposed expert possessed the requisite specialized knowledge and experience in newborn care and jaundice assessment.

The court admitted the expert evidence, concluding its probative value outweighed any potential prejudice.

The defendant insurer brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiff's action for damages arising from a motorcycle accident allegedly caused by an unidentified vehicle.

The insurer argued the claim was statute-barred due to the plaintiff's failure to report the accident to the police or the insurer within the prescribed time limits, and that the accident could not have occurred as described.

The court dismissed the motion, finding genuine issues requiring a trial regarding whether the plaintiff is entitled to relief from forfeiture, whether the identity of the vehicle was ascertainable with due diligence, and whether the plaintiff is entitled to OPCF 44R coverage.

The respondent was successful on a motion to change, reducing his spousal support obligation from $900 to $725 per month.

He sought costs of $18,000 on an all-inclusive basis.

The applicant, who was self-represented and impecunious, argued that each party should bear their own costs.

The court considered the factors under Rule 24(11), including the applicant's financial circumstances, the extent of the variation, and the respondent's reasonable offer to settle.

The court awarded the respondent costs fixed at $5,000, to be set off against his outstanding spousal support arrears.