Leonard Ricchetti

The Crown applied under s. 9(2) of the Canada Evidence Act for leave to cross-examine a reluctant witness, Mr. Moy-Lingomba, on prior inconsistent statements made to an undercover informant, Mr. Darren Watts, during a first-degree murder trial.

The witness had recanted his prior statements during examination-in-chief, claiming he was "high" and couldn't recall.

The defence opposed, arguing no material inconsistency and challenging the circumstances of the statements.

The court found material inconsistencies and granted leave, determining that the interests of justice favoured allowing cross-examination, as the statements were relevant to the identity of the shooter, the credibility of another witness, and the motive for the shooting, and their reliability was not fundamentally undermined by the witness's claims of impairment or the informant's conduct.

The court ruled on whether to provide a Vetrovec caution to the jury for three witnesses (Mr. Borden, Mr. Moy-Lingomba, and Mr. Watts) in a criminal trial.

The Defence objected to cautions for Mr. Borden and Mr. Moy-Lingomba, arguing that such cautions are for the Defence's benefit and should be omitted if the Defence requests.

The Crown conceded that a caution was not needed for Mr. Watts.

The court determined that a trial judge's duty to ensure trial fairness and assist the jury supersedes a tactical decision by the Defence when a Vetrovec caution is necessary or mandatory.

Given Mr. Borden's overwhelming credibility issues and the centrality of his evidence to the Crown's case, a Vetrovec caution was deemed mandatory.

For Mr. Moy-Lingomba, who also had overwhelming credibility issues and whose evidence was critical to both the Crown (motive) and Defence (third-party suspect), a "mixed Vetrovec" caution was deemed mandatory to assist the jury in assessing inculpatory and exculpatory statements.

The defendant, Sheldon Ranglin, charged with first-degree murder, brought a proposed application to exclude evidence related to a three-way phone call.

The defence challenged the validity of a production order for Maplehurst Correctional Facility phone records, opposed the introduction of July 3, 2015 phone records due to alleged inconsistencies with witness testimony, and sought an adjournment of cross-examination due to outstanding disclosure.

The court summarily dismissed the application, finding that the defendant had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the Maplehurst pay phone records and thus no standing to challenge their admission.

The other issues were deemed matters for cross-examination or future application.

The court ruled on the admissibility of a prior inconsistent statement under s. 11 of the Canada Evidence Act during a first-degree murder trial.

The Crown sought to introduce evidence from a witness, Mr. Watts, that another witness, Mr. Moy-Lingomba, had previously identified the defendant as the shooter.

The court initially precluded this evidence during the Crown's examination-in-chief of Mr. Watts, finding that the precondition of s. 11, requiring the alleged statement to be squarely put to Mr. Moy-Lingomba during cross-examination, had not been met.

The ruling emphasized the rationale of s. 11 concerning trial economy, fairness to the adversary, and fairness to the witness, and also noted the limited probative value and substantial prejudicial value of the evidence in question.

The Applicant sought interim and retroactive spousal support and retroactive Section 7 expenses.

The Respondent brought a cross-motion for accounting and questioning, and sought dismissal or stay of the Applicant's motion due to non-disclosure or pending a separate action.

The court dismissed the Applicant's claims for retroactive Section 7 expenses and both retroactive and ongoing interim spousal support, citing issues with entitlement, quantum, delay, and conflicting financial disclosure.

The Respondent's request to dismiss or stay the Applicant's motion was also dismissed, but the Applicant was ordered to provide comprehensive financial disclosure.

The applicant brought a motion seeking a declaration that the respondent was in contempt of a prior judgment.

The respondent was alleged to have failed to cash in a Mauritius Orangefield Insurance Policy and pay the proceeds to the applicant, and to have transferred control of Seasons Limited - Macau Commercial Offshore, both in breach of the judgment.

The court found the respondent in contempt for wilfully and deliberately breaching both orders, rejecting his arguments regarding impossibility of performance and lack of active participation in the transfer.

The penalty phase was adjourned to allow the respondent an opportunity to purge his contempt.

The appellant appealed a conviction for driving with excess alcohol, arguing that the police lacked reasonable and probable grounds for arrest, leading to a breach of Charter rights (ss. 7, 8, 9).

The trial judge found the arrest lawful despite contradictory police testimony regarding subjective grounds.

On appeal, the court found the arrest unlawful due to the absence of subjective reasonable and probable grounds by the directing officer, which invalidated the arresting officer's actions.

Consequently, the breath samples obtained were deemed to be in breach of Charter rights.

Applying the s. 24(2) Grant factors, the court determined that the police conduct was serious and had a significant impact on the accused's rights, outweighing society's interest in adjudication on the merits.

The evidence was excluded, leading to an acquittal.

A secondary issue regarding s. 11(b) Charter rights was declined due to lack of timely objection at trial.

The Father moved for interim access to the child, Arman.

The Mother brought a cross-motion for support, which was adjourned due to late service.

The primary issue was the Father's request for regular access in Pittsburgh, which the Mother opposed, citing concerns about the child's age, agitation, care by the paternal grandmother, travel hardship, lactation issues, safety, and interference with the child's schedule.

The court dismissed the Mother's preliminary request to adjourn the access motion.

The court found that the Mother's concerns were largely unsubstantiated or had been previously agreed upon in Pennsylvania.

The court ordered interim access for the Father from Wednesday to Sunday once per month in Pittsburgh, with exchanges in Buffalo and the Father covering the Mother's vehicular expenses, finding this to be in the child's best interests and consistent with a prior agreement in Pennsylvania.

The Father's request for 10-day access periods was deemed excessive for a young child.

The accused, Aaron Kennedy, brought a further bail review application after previous applications were dismissed.

The application was based on alleged material changes in circumstances, including trial delay, new evidence undermining the complainant's credibility (extortion attempts, phone records inconsistent with alleged confinement), and a new proposed release plan incorporating regular police reporting and ankle monitoring.

The court found a material change in circumstances but ultimately dismissed the application, determining that detention remained necessary on the secondary ground due to Kennedy's extensive criminal record, history of breaching court orders, and committing an assault while in custody.

The proposed release plan was deemed insufficient to mitigate the substantial likelihood of re-offending.

Deep Foundations Contractors Inc. sought full indemnity costs against B. Gottardo Construction Ltd. and its principal, David Gottardo, jointly and severally, following the dismissal of Gottardo's counterclaim and cross-motion.

The court found David Gottardo personally liable for costs due to his wilful disobedience of a court order for financial disclosure, which caused significant delay and unnecessary expense.

The court awarded full indemnity costs, finding Gottardo's and David Gottardo's conduct reprehensible and outrageous.

Carl Gorman applied for relief under the Canada Business Corporations Act and the Ontario Business Corporations Act.

Wade Kosowan brought a motion to stay the application, arguing lack of jurisdiction and opposing interim terms.

The court granted an adjournment but imposed interim terms, reinstating Gorman to his position and duties with the respondent corporations, finding Kosowan's unilateral termination and exclusion of Gorman without arbitration constituted unequal and unfair treatment.

The court also ordered Kosowan's motion to stay and Gorman's application to be heard on the same return date to expedite resolution.

The moving defendant sought to vary a Mareva injunction to release funds for restitution in an unrelated criminal matter, criminal defence legal fees, and additional civil legal fees.

Applying the four-part test for variation of a Mareva order set out in Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce v. Credit Valley Institute of Business and Technology, the court held that the moving party failed to provide full and frank disclosure of his current assets and liabilities and did not establish that no other assets were available to pay the requested expenses.

The examination of the moving party revealed significant gaps, refusals to answer questions, and unexplained financial transactions, preventing the court from properly applying the governing test.

The court also noted that the proposed restitution payment and criminal defence fees were not clearly within the categories of living or legal expenses typically permitted under a Mareva order.

The motion was largely dismissed, with a limited variance permitting potential release of $25,000 for civil legal fees subject to strict proof of prior payments.

The accused applied for a bail review under s. 520 of the Criminal Code after being detained following a breach of recognizance.

The court accepted that a material change existed due to a revised release plan including strict house arrest, continuous supervision by sureties, and electronic monitoring.

While the court found the proposed plan addressed the secondary ground concerning risk of further offences, the tertiary ground remained decisive.

Given the extremely serious allegations involving kidnapping, violent assault, extortion, and impersonating a police officer, together with the strength of the Crown’s evidence and the accused’s prior breach of release conditions, detention was necessary to maintain public confidence in the administration of justice.

The accused failed to discharge the reverse onus required to justify release.

The Crown appealed a trial decision that excluded computer evidence obtained under a search warrant in a child pornography investigation and resulted in an acquittal.

The trial judge had found multiple breaches of s. 8 of the Charter, including reliance on unverified NCMEC CyberTipline reports, failure to include disclaimers in the Information to Obtain, uncertainty regarding PhotoDNA use, and staleness of evidence due to delay.

The Superior Court held that the trial judge applied an incorrect legal standard by requiring verification for accuracy rather than assessing whether the information provided a credibly based probability sufficient for the issuing justice to grant the warrant.

The court found that NCMEC reports and Microsoft-generated data could constitute reliable hearsay supporting reasonable and probable grounds and that the time delay and investigative uncertainties did not negate the probability that computer artifacts or account evidence would remain.

The acquittal was set aside and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed a summary conviction for impaired care or control of a motor vehicle under s. 253(1)(a) of the Criminal Code.

The trial judge convicted after finding the accused impaired while seated in the driver’s seat of a vehicle with the engine running, relying on the statutory presumption of care or control.

On appeal, the court held the trial judge failed to analyze whether the presumption of care or control under s. 258(1)(a) had been rebutted by the accused’s evidence that he did not intend to drive.

The trial judge also failed to conduct a proper risk-of-danger analysis required where the Crown seeks to establish actual care or control.

Because the reasons did not reveal the necessary analytical steps, appellate review was impossible and the conviction could not stand.

The appellant appealed a summary conviction for impaired driving (care and control) arising from being found asleep in a parked vehicle with the engine running.

The appellant argued the trial judge failed to find that the evidence raised a reasonable doubt regarding impairment and failed to adequately explain the rejection of the defence evidence that the behaviour observed by police was caused by fatigue rather than alcohol consumption.

The court held that the trial judge’s credibility findings and factual determinations were supported by the evidence and entitled to significant appellate deference.

The reasons, read as a whole, sufficiently explained the rejection of the defence theory and the application of the W.D. framework.

No error of law, misapprehension of evidence, or miscarriage of justice was established.

The Crown brought a bail review application under the Criminal Code after a justice of the peace ordered the accused released pending trial on serious charges including kidnapping, extortion, unlawful confinement, assault causing bodily harm, and uttering threats.

The reviewing judge held that the justice of the peace erred by giving insufficient weight to the accused’s extensive violent criminal record and excessive weight to the proposed surety.

The accused had a lengthy history of violent offences, breaches of court orders, and further violent conduct while in custody.

Applying the secondary and tertiary grounds under s. 515(10) of the Criminal Code and the guidance from R. v. St. Cloud, the court concluded there was a substantial likelihood the accused would commit further offences if released and that detention was necessary to maintain confidence in the administration of justice.

The prior release order was therefore clearly inappropriate.

The appellant appealed a summary conviction for impaired driving after being acquitted at trial of the related “over 80” offence.

He argued the trial judge erred in finding impairment beyond a reasonable doubt and improperly reversed the burden of proof in dismissing a Charter s. 8 challenge to the breath demand.

The Superior Court held that, when read as a whole, the trial judge correctly found that the arresting officer had reasonable and probable grounds to arrest and demand a breath sample.

Any misstatement regarding the burden of proof caused no miscarriage of justice, particularly since the appellant was acquitted on the over‑80 charge.

The appellate court further found no error in the trial judge’s factual or credibility findings and confirmed that impairment and over‑80 are distinct offences that may yield different verdicts.

The Crown applied for mandamus with certiorari in aid to quash a preliminary inquiry decision discharging the accused on robbery-related charges arising from a tractor‑trailer robbery.

The Crown argued the preliminary inquiry judge failed to consider admissible similar fact evidence from other robberies when determining whether there was sufficient evidence to commit the accused to trial.

The court held that the failure to consider the whole of the evidence, including potentially admissible similar fact evidence, constituted a jurisdictional error.

After analyzing the similarities between several robberies and the linkage evidence, the court concluded the similar fact evidence was admissible and that a properly instructed jury could reasonably infer the accused were parties to the July 2 robbery.

The discharges were quashed and the matter was returned to the preliminary inquiry justice with directions to commit the accused to trial.

In a family law motion arising from competing motions to change a prior consent final order, the moving party sought to terminate spousal support, set aside arrears, add the respondent’s new spouse as a party for disclosure and questioning, and amend his motion to change to raise additional issues including custody and access.

The court held that termination of spousal support could not be granted on the interlocutory motion.

The request to add the respondent’s new spouse as a party was dismissed because no claim was advanced against the proposed party and he had not been served.

The court emphasized the moving party’s ongoing breach of existing support orders and concluded the attempt to add the new spouse would delay trial.

Leave was granted only to amend pleadings to properly set out issues already identified in a prior consent order, and the matter was directed to proceed promptly to trial.